Posts filed under 'Unemployment Catastrophe'
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| Flagging: a US sailor stands on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington |
If a week is a long time in politics, a decade is starting to look like an age in geopolitics. Comparing the America that began the 21st century with the America of today is to witness a country that has in some ways quite radically altered its view of itself and its relationship to the world.
In short, the metallic rust of decline has crept into the American soul. “You could argue that the first decade of the 21st century was the last decade of the American century,” says David Rothkopf, a former Clinton administration official and student of US foreign policy. “We are now entering the multipolar century.”
January 16th, 2010
Barack Obama ran for president as a man of the people, standing up to Wall Street as the global economy melted down in that fateful fall of 2008. He pushed a tax plan to soak the rich, ripped NAFTA for hurting the middle class and tore into John McCain for supporting a bankruptcy bill that sided with wealthy bankers “at the expense of hardworking Americans.” Obama may not have run to the left of Samuel Gompers or Cesar Chavez, but it’s not like you saw him on the campaign trail flanked by bankers from Citigroup and Goldman Sachs. What inspired supporters who pushed him to his historic win was the sense that a genuine outsider was finally breaking into an exclusive club, that walls were being torn down, that things were, for lack of a better or more specific term, changing.
Then he got elected.
What’s taken place in the year since Obama won the presidency has turned out to be one of the most dramatic political about-faces in our history. Elected in the midst of a crushing economic crisis brought on by a decade of orgiastic deregulation and unchecked greed, Obama had a clear mandate to rein in Wall Street and remake the entire structure of the American economy. What he did instead was ship even his most marginally progressive campaign advisers off to various bureaucratic Siberias, while packing the key economic positions in his White House with the very people who caused the crisis in the first place. This new team of bubble-fattened ex-bankers and laissez-faire intellectuals then proceeded to sell us all out, instituting a massive, trickle-up bailout and systematically gutting regulatory reform from the inside.
How could Obama let this happen? Is he just a rookie in the political big leagues, hoodwinked by Beltway old-timers? Or is the vacillating, ineffectual servant of banking interests we’ve been seeing on TV this fall who Obama really is?
Whatever the president’s real motives are, the extensive series of loophole-rich financial “reforms” that the Democrats are currently pushing may ultimately do more harm than good. In fact, some parts of the new reforms border on insanity, threatening to vastly amplify Wall Street’s political power by institutionalizing the taxpayer’s role as a welfare provider for the financial-services industry. At one point in the debate, Obama’s top economic advisers demanded the power to award future bailouts without even going to Congress for approval — and without providing taxpayers a single dime in equity on the deals.
How did we get here? It started just moments after the election — and almost nobody noticed.
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December 13th, 2009
By Edward Harrison of Credit Writedowns.
A reader at Naked Capitalism asked us to respond to a recent article from the Christian Science Monitor asking Does US need a second stimulus to create jobs?
Marshall Auerback has already done some heavy lifting – and taken all of the heat in the comments. He says emphatically yes.
Now I want to take a crack at this. My short answer is no. But before I go into this, as an aside, I wanted to mention Marshall’s new smiling, happy picture up at the great blog New Deal 2.0 where he now writes. Earlier, when Credit Writedowns was hosted at Blogger, he used a picture best described as a mug shot in his profile, but he has changed that one too (although he smiles there a little less). He thinks we haven’t noticed this sleight of hand. Well I have! Once upon a time, Marshall wrote with a man I called all bearish, all the time this summer. Take a look at that post; you don’t see him smiling now do you? We have Lynn Parramore, New Deal 2.0’s editor to thank for making Marshall Auerback into an optimist.
November 21st, 2009
November 21st, 2009
“Hindsight is a wonderful thing,” said Timothy W. Long, the chief bank
examiner for the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. “At the height of
the economic boom, to take an aggressive supervisory approach and tell people to
stop lending is hard to do.” Post Mortems Reveal Obvious Risks at Banks, NY Times
November 21st, 2009
It’s time to stop glorifying our economic doldrums with this “jobless recovery” nonsense.
Yes, the economy did grow in the third quarter, for the first time in a year. Fewer Americans are filing new claims for unemployment insurance, and giant financial institutions appear less apt to collapse and send us into another stupor. The stock market has recovered much of its winter decline.
But so far there is no sign of an employment turnaround — and without one, and soon, all the other gains could prove fleeting.
The U.S. has lost jobs in 22 straight months, and Friday’s news that 10.2% of the labor force is out of work — the highest reading since 1983 — shows just how far we have to go.
Without better job prospects, the consumers whose spending makes up the lion’s share of economic activity will remain tightfisted. That will slow the healing of deep wounds in the housing and financial markets.
“To have a real recovery you need to put people to work,” said John Harrington, who runs Harrington Investments, a socially responsible asset management firm in Napa, Calif. “Right now we aren’t doing that.”
A ‘Jobless Recovery’ Is Nothing to Get Excited About – Colin Barr, Fortune
Also, Seeking to Grow Jobs, Not the Deficit – Moira Herbst, BusinessWeek
November 8th, 2009
As political pressure has reduced the price tag of expanding coverage to below $1 trillion over ten years, many observers assumed Democrats would react by trimming financial assistance for the middle class–that is, people making between twice and four times the poverty line, or between $44,000 to $88,000 for a family of four.
The assumption was that if Democrats had to make tough choices about what to cut, they’d protect the the poor and most vulnerable. After all, they’re Democrats.
But now it appears that assumption may be wrong–or, at least, not entirely right.
October 31st, 2009
An Inside Look at How Goldman Sachs Lobbies the Senate, by Matt Taibbi: …Later on this week I have a story coming out in Rolling Stone that looks at the history of the Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers collapses. The story ends up being more about naked short-selling and the role it played in those incidents than I had originally planned…, but it turns out that there’s no way to talk about Bear and Lehman without going into the weeds of naked short-selling…
It’s the conspicuousness … that is the issue here, and the degree to which the SEC and the other financial regulators have proven themselves completely incapable of addressing the issue seriously, constantly giving in to the demands of the major banks to pare back (or shelf altogether) planned regulatory actions. There probably isn’t a better example of “regulatory capture” … than this issue.
In that vein, starting tomorrow, the SEC is holding a public “round table” on the naked short-selling issue. What’s interesting about this round table is that virtually none of the invited speakers represent shareholders or companies that might be targets of naked short-selling, or indeed any activists of any kind in favor of tougher rules against the practice. Instead, all of the invitees are either banks, financial firms, or companies that sell stuff to the first two groups.
In particular, there are very few panelists — in fact only one, from what I understand — who are in favor of a simple reform called “pre-borrowing.” Pre-borrowing is what it sounds like; it forces short-sellers to actually possess shares before they sell them.
It’s been proven to work, as last summer the SEC, concerned about predatory naked short-selling of big companies in the wake of the Bear Stearns wipeout, instituted a temporary pre-borrow requirement…
The lack of pre-borrow voices invited to this panel is analogous to the Max Baucus health care round table last spring, when no single-payer advocates were invited. So who will get to speak? Two guys from Goldman Sachs, plus reps from Citigroup, Citadel (a hedge fund that has done the occasional short sale, to put it gently), Credit Suisse, NYSE Euronext, and so on.
In advance of this panel and in advance of proposed changes to the financial regulatory system, these players have been stepping up their lobbying efforts… Goldman Sachs in particular has been making its presence felt.
Last Friday I got a call from a Senate staffer who said that Goldman had just been in his boss’s office, lobbying against restrictions on naked short-selling. The aide said Goldman had passed out a fact sheet about the issue that was so ridiculous that one of the other staffers immediately thought to send it to me. When I went to actually get the document, though, the aide had had a change of heart.
Which was weird, and I thought the matter had ended there. But the exact same situation then repeated itself with another congressional staffer, who then actually passed me Goldman’s fact sheet.
Now, the mere fact that two different congressional aides were so disgusted by Goldman’s performance that they both called me on the same day — and I don’t have a relationship with either of these people — tells you how nauseated they were.
I would later hear that Senate aides between themselves had discussed Goldman’s lobbying efforts and concluded that it was one of the most shameless performances they’d ever seen from any group of lobbyists, and that the “fact sheet” … was, to quote one person familiar with the situation, “disgraceful” and “hilarious.” …
October 3rd, 2009
Unemployment will almost certainly in double-digits next year — and may remain there for some time. And for every person who shows up as unemployed in the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ household survey, you can bet there’s another either too discouraged to look for work or working part time who’d rather have a full-time job or else taking home less pay than before (I’m in the last category, now that the University of California has instituted pay cuts). And there’s yet another person who’s more fearful that he or she will be next to lose a job.
In other words, ten percent unemployment really means twenty percent underemployment or anxious employment. All of which translates directly into late payments on mortgages, credit cards, auto and student loans, and loss of health insurance. It also means sleeplessness for tens of millions of Americans. And, of course, fewer purchases (more on this in a moment).
Unemployment of this magnitude and duration also translates into ugly politics, because fear and anxiety are fertile grounds for demagogues weilding the politics of resentment against immigrants, blacks, the poor, government leaders, business leaders, Jews, and other easy targets. It’s already started. Next year is a mid-term election. Be prepared for worse.
So why is unemployment and underemployment so high, and why is it likely to remain high for some time? Because, as noted, people who are worried about their jobs or have no jobs, and who are also trying to get out from under a pile of debt, are not going do a lot of shopping. And businesses that don’t have customers aren’t going do a lot of new investing. And foreign nations also suffering high unemployment aren’t going to buy a lot of our goods and services.
And without customers, companies won’t hire. They’ll cut payrolls instead.
Which brings us to the obvious question: Who’s going to buy the stuff we make or the services we provide, and therefore bring jobs back? There’s only one buyer left: The government.
Let me say this as clearly and forcefully as I can: The federal government should be spending even more than it already is on roads and bridges and schools and parks and everything else we need. It should make up for cutbacks at the state level, and then some. This is the only way to put Americans back to work. We did it during the Depression. It was called the WPA.
Yes, I know. Our government is already deep in debt. But let me tell you something: When one out of six Americans is unemployed or underemployed, this is no time to worry about the debt.
When I was a small boy my father told me that I and my kids and my grand-kids would be paying down the debt created by Franklin D. Roosevelt during the Depression and World War II. I didn’t even know what a debt was, but it kept me up at night.
My father was right about a lot of things, but he was wrong about this. America paid down FDR’s debt in the 1950s, when Americans went back to work, when the economy was growing again, and when our incomes grew, too. We paid taxes, and in a few years that FDR debt had shrunk to almost nothing.
You see? The most important thing right now is getting the jobs back, and getting the economy growing again.
People who now obsess about government debt have it backwards. The problem isn’t the debt. The problem is just the opposite. It’s that at a time like this, when consumers and businesses and exports can’t do it, government has to spend more to get Americans back to work and recharge the economy. Then – after people are working and the economy is growing – we can pay down that debt.
But if government doesn’t spend more right now and get Americans back to work, we could be out of work for years. And the debt will be with us even longer. And politics could get much uglier.
The Truth About Jobs That No One Wants To Tell You by Robert Reich
October 3rd, 2009
Conclusion: the labor market is till weak, weaker than it should be at this point in a cyclical recovery. Unless this changes in the fall and winter, a double dip recession is going to be more likely. While the preceding points stress the negative, I should point out that my baseline view is for job losses to continue to diminish, albeit at a slow pace. I would anticipate job gains to appear by the end of the year or early in 2010.
That gets me back to Hunt and Hoisington and partial recovery. Even if we see job gains by Q1 2010, this will be a full 6 months after the manufacturing sector turned up. This must limit consumption because spending can only increase through higher employment and income or increased debt and leverage. As most of the cost-cutting and productivity gains inherent in those cuts is now behind us, the heavy lifting begins. Earnings growth is likely to be weak in this environment.
How a fully priced equity and corporate bond market continues to rally in the face of these factors is beyond me. I see government bonds as a better bet than either corporates or equities for the medium-term.
Update: I failed to mention the rather large (over 800,000 jobs) benchmark revision of prior unemployment data. It’s this sort of thing which makes people not trust the numbers. But, revisions are always necessary if you are going to do month-to-month measurements in an economy as large as the United States.
At Credit Writedowns
October 3rd, 2009
Pittsburgh protesters demand G20 do more for jobs
Forbes
“We’re not going to accept a jobless recovery,” said Larry Adams, a postal worker who came from Jersey City, New Jersey, for the protest. …
September 21st, 2009
The expansion of international “supply chains” from Asian factories to American consumers has certainly created global trade imbalances and international currency flows that are not necessarily sustainable over the long run. A readjustment of the world economy, not a slackening demand for inexpensive consumer products, strikes me as the greatest threat to the Wal-Mart business model. And, for its part, the chain is already adapting to new circumstances. In recent years, Wal-Mart has expanded well beyond the borders of North America into Europe, Mexico and Asia. It imports factory goods from China and also operates its own retail stores there. But the stores look very different from their American counterparts. In Kunming, near the border with Myanmar, Wal-Mart rents space inside its store to independent vendors, who pay $1.20 per day to hawk Yunnan coffee, tobacco bongs filled with local rice wine and condiments made from eggplant, soybeans and ginger. The atmosphere is “festival-like, even chaotic,” as vendors shout out their wares, sometimes through loudspeakers or while pounding on drums, and customers crowd a stall to fish pears out of a solution of sugar, salt and licorice root–”a Wal-Mart store sans Wal-Martism,” according to sociologist Eileen Otis. Another Chinese employee explains his loyalty to the company by suggesting that Sam Walton was, in fact, a student of Chairman Mao who “adopted the revolutionary strategy of ‘the countryside encircling the city.’&nthinsp;” And so the revolution continues.
How Wal-Mart’s Ruthlessness Led to Its Undoing – Jefferson Decker, Nation
September 18th, 2009
Stiglitz Says U.S. Economic Recovery May Not Be ‘Sustainable’
By Michael McKee
Sept. 4 (Bloomberg) — The U.S. economy faces a “significant chance” of contracting again after emerging from its worst recession since the 1930s, Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz said.
“It’s not clear that the U.S. is recovering in a sustainable way,” Stiglitz, a Columbia University professor, told reporters yesterday in New York.
Economists and policy makers are expressing concern about the strength of a projected economic recovery, with Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner saying two days ago that it’s too soon to remove government measures aimed at boosting growth.
Stiglitz said he sees two scenarios for the world’s largest economy in coming months. One is a period of “malaise,” in which consumption lags and private investment is slow to accelerate. The other is a rebound fueled by government stimulus that’s followed by an abrupt downturn — an occurrence that economists call a “W-shaped’ recovery.
“There’s a significant chance of a W, but I don’t think it’s inevitable,” he said. The economy “could just bounce along the bottom.”
Stiglitz said it’s difficult to predict the economy’s trajectory because “we really are in a different world.” He said the crisis of the past year was made worse by lax regulation that allowed some financial firms to grow so large that the system couldn’t handle a failure of any of them.
Big Banks
“These institutions are not only too big to fail, they are too big to be managed,” he said.
Finance ministers and central bankers from the Group of 20 nations meet in London Sept. 4-5 to lay the groundwork for a summit in Pittsburgh later this month, where leaders will consider measures to overhaul supervision of the financial system…
With so much excess capacity, the American economy faces a short-term threat of disinflation and possibly deflation, Stiglitz said. Wages may even decline, given recent high productivity and the likelihood of an extended period of high unemployment, he said.
Longer term, he said the Fed’s aggressive monetary policy will mean inflation becomes the greater threat. “With the magnitude of the deficits and the balance sheet of the Fed having been blown up, it’s understandable why there are anxieties about inflation,” he said.
While the Fed says it has the tools to deal with it, there are still concerns, Stiglitz said. Because monetary policy takes six to 18 months to have its full effect, the central bank will have to begin withdrawing monetary stimulus on the basis of forecasts.
The Fed’s record on its economic forecasts isn’t enough to reassure investors and, as a result, the U.S. currency may suffer, he said.
Dollar ‘Weakness’
“Whether or not they’re able to do it, the uncertainty today about whether they can do it can contribute to the weakness of the dollar,” Stiglitz said. “That’s one of the reasons there is increasing interest around the world in discussing alternatives to the dollar system.”
Stiglitz, who is a member of a United Nations commission that will study the global financial system and currency regimes, said “the logic is compelling” for a new global currency.
The current system creates instability, weakens global confidence, and is fundamentally unfair to developing countries that are in essence lending the U.S. trillions of dollars and bearing the risk, he said.
“In most quarters, there is a feeling we should move away from the dollar system. The question is do we do it in an orderly way, or a chaotic way,” Stiglitz said. “The size of the deficit and the size of the balance sheet of the Fed have just increased the anxiety and the desire that something be done.”
While some think it would hurt the U.S. to no longer be able to borrow cheaply in dollars, “that era is over,” he said. “We’re moving to a more multi-polar world.”
Between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of Lehman Brothers was “the short period of American triumphalism, where we dominated the global scene. That period is over,” Stiglitz said.
September 4th, 2009
Arpitha Bykere and Christian Menegatti look at U.S. job market data and provide some perspective. After severe job losses in early 2009, the pace of job losses slowed starting in April and the July numbers have brought more respite. Non-farm payroll job losses were 247,000 in July. However, the private sector lost 254,000 jobs. This is considerably better than analysts expected (around 325,000) but not good enough to claim that we are in the middle of a strong and sustainable recovery. Looking at the recessions of the post-war period, average monthly job losses ranged between 150 thousand and 260 thousand. Average monthly losses in this recession are still at 350 thousand. For the first four months of the year, the average was at 648 thousand. The improvement with respect to the first part of the year is clear. The improvement with respect to what we are used to seeing in recessionary periods is much less clear cut. Today’s numbers are not exactly what you call good news, at least not in absolute terms. In relative terms, after skirting a near depression, markets seem to consider 247 thousand payroll losses a breath of fresh air. See Easing Job Losses Don’t Change Weak Prospects for U.S. Recovery.
August 14th, 2009
In Spain: Bleak forecast puts unemployment at 22% in 2010, Edward Harrison relates that the recovery in Spain will be later than elsewhere in Europe because of the extent of deleveraging, and unemployment will continue to rise.
August 5th, 2009
Homeowners are turning to the “strategic default” — walking away from a mortgage even when there are funds available to keep paying. “Increasingly, the determination of when to default is not guided by the moral question: Is this the right thing to do? It is guided by the pragmatic concern: Am I too far underwater on my mortgage?” writes Kelsey VanOverloop. Read more »
July 25th, 2009
Despite the administration’s aggressive and costly economic policy initiatives, there is trouble all around.
Barely six months in office, President Obama already finds himself in an economic box. For despite his aggressive and costly economic policy initiatives, the jobs market shows no sign of healing. At the same time, the housing market foreclosure crisis continues apace, while renewed questions are again surfacing about the soundness of the U.S. banking system. To complicate matters, financial markets are now starting to fret about the longer-run inflationary consequences of the unusually large budget deficits in prospect for as far as the eye can see.
In January 2009, on presenting its $780 billion fiscal stimulus package, the Obama administration assured the public that because of that stimulus package U.S. unemployment would not exceed 8 percent. Yet already by June 2009, unemployment had risen to 9.5 percent; including part-time workers, who would prefer to be working full time, unemployment rose to a staggering post-war high of over 16 percent. Worse still, the jobs market shows every sign of being far from bottoming out.
The degree to which unemployment has exceeded the administration’s forecasts has to raise basic questions about the appropriateness and coherence of President Obama’s economic policy approach.
The degree to which unemployment has exceeded the administration’s forecasts has to raise basic questions about the appropriateness and coherence of President Obama’s economic policy approach. These questions pertain not simply to the very poor design of the fiscal stimulus package. Rather they pertain to the adequacy of the measures aimed at stabilizing the housing market and at resolving the country’s most wrenching credit crisis in the post-war period.
At the most basic level, one has to question how much sense it made for President Obama to allow the fiscal package to become excessively back-loaded at time when the economy needed immediate large scale support. If a large fiscal stimulus was indeed needed, why has only $60 billion of that package been dribbled out by June? And why is less than a third of the package scheduled to come into effect in 2009, the year when the package is most sorely needed?
Similarly one has to wonder about the heavy price that the Obama administration paid for effectively outsourcing the package’s design to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and the rest of the Democratic congressional leadership. Should it really have come as a surprise to us that the resulting stimulus package would be laden with pork and with expenditures that are going to be very difficult to roll back? Or should we now be shocked that the package fell sadly short of including fast acting and effective fiscal stimulus measures that might have gotten the most bang for the buck?
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Obama fiscal stimulus package is the serious way in which it compromises the country’s long-run public finances and fans long-run inflationary expectations. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office estimates that the Obama budget not only implies unusually large budget deficits over the next two years but it implies that, even when the economy eventually fully recovers, the deficit will remain in the region of between 4 and 6 percentage points of GDP. As a result, over the next decade, the public debt will rise in a manner that has never occurred before in peacetime, from around 41 percent of GDP in 2008 to 82 percent of GDP by 2019.
Over the next decade, the public debt will rise in a manner that has never occurred before in peacetime from around 41 percent of GDP in 2008 to 82 percent of GDP by 2019.
The rising tide of unemployment must also raise questions about the Obama administration’s efforts to stabilize the housing market, which the administration correctly views as a necessary condition for producing a meaningful economic recovery. One has to expect that a weaker job market will only exacerbate the country’s present foreclosure crisis, which is adding supply to an already glutted housing market. The Center for Responsible Lending estimates that 2.4 million homes could be in foreclosure in 2009 and as many as 8.1 million homes over the next four years. Yet, the Obama administration’s loan modification program announced earlier this year has to date only resulted in 190,000 offers at mortgage loan modification.
Rising unemployment also has to raise questions about whether the Obama administration is not being overly sanguine about the health of the U.S. banking system. For it would seem that unemployment will now well exceed the worst-case scenario in the bank stress test presented by the administration earlier this year. Yet, despite a weakening unemployment outlook that is sure to boost bank losses, the Obama administration is now cavalierly backing away from its earlier initiatives to reduce the toxic assets that remain on the banks’ balance sheets.
Less than six months into his term, President Obama already faces difficult economic policy choices. He can choose, as he now seems to be doing, to counsel patience and assure us that all is well at considerable cost to his credibility on economic policy management. Or he can own up to the facts that he misread the economy in January and that his economic team now needs to go back to the drawing board. For the sake of the U.S. economy, one has to hope that he has the courage to review the overall coherence of his policy approach before it is too late.
Desmond Lachman is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. He was managing director and chief emerging market economic strategist at Salomon Smith Barney and a deputy director in the International Monetary Fund’s policy and review department.
Obama Is Stuck In an Economic Box – Desmond Lachman, The American
July 15th, 2009
July 15 (Bloomberg) — Congress can’t make up its mind. First, legislators pushed to let banks take a rosy view of the value of some hard-hit holdings. Now, two key committee chairmen claim banks aren’t being realistic enough about the values of some loans.
The allegation by House Financial Services Chairman Barney Frank and Senate Banking Chairman Christopher Dodd that banks are holding some loans at “potentially inflated values” should trouble investors, since it came just days before institutions like JPMorgan Chase & Co., Bank of America Corp. and Citigroup Inc. are due to report second-quarter results. If some loan values are “inflated,” that again calls into question the quality of banks’ results.
Why, after arguing for banks to have more leeway, is Congress now pushing back? Because many government responses to the financial crisis are more about manipulating prices — and behavior — than truly getting markets back on their feet.
Dressing up bank balance sheets was a first-quarter political priority. Now there is a push to get banks to modify more troubled mortgages. That effort is being stymied by a rosy view taken by many banks of the value of home-equity loans and second-lien mortgages.
Many banks have marked down these loans only by 3 percent to 4 percent, said Paul Miller, bank analyst at Friedman Billings Ramsey & Co. These loans in many cases would likely fetch about 40 cents on the dollar if sold in today’s market.
The losses are “a big part of the toxic asset issues facing banks,” Miller added.
Balk at Losses
A first mortgage on a house often can’t be restructured without the agreement of the holder of the second loan, which would entail writing it down in value. Banks have balked at doing that, due to the losses that would result. And why shouldn’t they? Congress, the Obama administration and regulators all told them earlier this year to hope for the best when it came to valuing their assets.
Let’s review. Congress this spring browbeat accounting rulemakers to make it easier for banks to ignore dour market prices for some holdings battered by the credit crisis. That was designed to help banks’ finances look better.
Without subsequent rule changes by the Financial Accounting Standards Board, earnings at 45 banks and financial companies would have been 42 percent lower than reported, according to a report last month by Jack Ciesielski, editor of The Analyst’s Accounting Observer.
The rule changes allowed companies to sidestep some impact of mark-to-market accounting on securities, many of them backed by mortgages, that have fallen in value for an extended period.
Saved From Losses
The “maneuver saved eight of the firms — Prudential Financial Inc., SI Financial Group Inc., First Commonwealth Financial Corp., National Penn Bancshares Inc., Bank of New York Mellon Corp., Zenith National Insurance Corp., Sun Bancorp Inc. and American Equity Investment Life Holding Co. — from reporting first-quarter losses instead of net income,” Ciesielski wrote.
Another rule change allowed companies in some cases to ignore market values and use their own estimates for troubled assets. That helped Wells Fargo & Co. avoid what may otherwise have been a $4.5 billion hit to its capital.
This was all part of ongoing and often unsuccessful efforts to push prices in a particular direction.
Last fall, the Securities and Exchange Commission instituted a temporary ban on selling financial stocks short — or betting they would decline in value — to try and prop up the value of bank shares. Talk about reining in speculation in commodity markets, meanwhile, is designed to keep prices for oil and some foodstuffs from rising too high. And all arms of government have tried since the credit crunch began to keep home prices from falling.
Buyers Don’t Play
Efforts to direct prices usually fail because buyers aren’t willing to play along. Financial stocks continued to fall despite the short ban.
And the congressional flip-flop on how banks should value assets shows that such efforts can backfire.
The logjam in the drive to modify troubled mortgages is vexing the Obama administration. It is in some ways a problem of the government’s own making. To try and undo it, the House’s Frank and the Senate’s Dodd wrote late last week to banking regulators complaining about valuations of home-equity loans.
The chairmen said, “We are concerned that the loss allowances associated with these subordinated liens may be insufficient to realistically and accurately reflect their value.”
Fudging Confirmed
Throughout the crisis, investors have worried that banks are fudging their numbers. Now congressional leaders are confirming those fears.
Underlining the political nature of their request, Dodd and Frank didn’t call for an investigation of the supposedly “inflated” values.
That’s no reason for the SEC to stand pat. The agency needs to act, now that it has an allegation from top legislators that potential financial-reporting abuses are taking place at banks.
Failure to follow up will send a message that it is all right for banks to cook their books, so long as the resulting values are seasoned to suit the current political taste.
(David Reilly is a Bloomberg News columnist. The opinions expressed are his own.)
Barney Frank, Chris Dodd Do Banking Back Flip – David Reilly, Bloomberg
July 15th, 2009
In California and a handful of other states, one out of every five people who would like to be working full time is not now doing so.
Part-Time Workers Mask Jobless Woes – David Leonhardt, New York Times
July 15th, 2009
America’s unemployment rate–the worst in 26 years–has stopped the stock market cold. It has moved the recovery goalposts down the field, maybe into next year.
Hope resides with America’s growth companies. But they sit at the epicenter of the credit meltdown and face funding hardships. Forbes.com has a plan to help promising growth companies get the funding they need. More on that in a minute.
The awful, jobless summer was forecast in April, when two conflicting sets of data emerged. One was positive–consumer confidence was soaring–and hinted at growth by summer. But other data was deeply discouraging: America’s large-company CEOs were paralyzed. I wrote about the disturbing anomaly here:
The Fed has done its job. (Maybe too well, but that’s another story for another day.) Consumer sentiment and spending have bounced back. The headwinds that remain have less to do with bank stress tests and more to do with CEO mood. The Business Roundtable, which represents big business, reported “record low” CEO confidence in April:
–71% of CEOs plan more layoffs in the next six months.
–Most see declines in capital spending.
–The CEO Economic Outlook Index was negative for the first time.
Let me say this again: The yield curve predicts growth. Check. Consumer sentiment and spending are up. Check. But CEO confidence is lousy, and CEOs are not investing for growth. Whoops. This raises the question: Why are CEOs in such a low mood?
Answer: If you are a CEO in financial services, manufacturing, energy production or health care, you will see more regulation. Period. End of story. Your response to forthcoming regulation of yet-to-be-determined complexity will be to hunker down. Keep your name out of the news. Improve the balance sheet. Hold tight.
That’s what has happened. Understand that America’s soaring rate of joblessness is not due to mass layoffs. It is due to the fact that CEOs are simply not hiring. They are paralyzed by the fog of uncertainty coming out of Washington.
In past recessions, recovery and new jobs have emerged from start-ups and small growth companies. But during this recession, funding has been very difficult for the small fry.
Forbes.com has a plan. We have teamed with The Venture Alliance (TVA), a boutique investment adviser to early-stage companies, to identify America’s most promising companies. Click here to learn more.
How do venture capitalists evaluate the potential of any growing company? The Venture Alliance has developed a scoring algorithm based on a vast range of variables that determine a company’s potential–and, ultimately, its worth to investors–including: financial projections, current capitalization, market position, market opportunity, intellectual property, management team and others. TVA crunches that data (which it collects by surveying young companies) and reduces it to one “fundability score.”
Companies that score well, theoretically, have a better shot at raising money than those that don’t.
If you are a growth company seeking funding, click here to get your fundability score.
Small Companies Aren’t Filling Job Slack – Rich Karlgaard, Digital Rules
July 7th, 2009
W
ith U.S. unemployment set to climb to 10%, and Canada not far behind, the North American market economies will soon be looking at what used to be derisively termed “European levels” of unemployment. The question is whether these high unemployment rates are merely short-term blips that will be followed by quick recoveries, or whether high jobless numbers will persist, turning Canada and the United States into grim replicas of sclerotic Europe.
Recent economic history suggests both Canada and the United States can quickly rebound from economic slumps. Unemployment in the United States, for example, hit a peak of 10.8% in the midst of the 1982 recession, but it was all over six months later.
Almost all recessions are followed by economic chatter about a looming “jobless recovery.” And all such chatter has, in the past, been proven wrong. Markets quickly adjusted to changing economic circumstances. Investors began investing, capital spending rose, workers and employees moved on to new jobs, consumers began spending again. Markets, left alone, function quickly.
The keys to these quick employment recoveries were the functioning markets for investment, employment and consumption. The current economic crisis, however, looks a little different. In the United States, and to a lesser degree so far in Canada, the open markets that cleared the way to rapid economic recovery have been severely undermined. The ways of capitalism in North America are giving way to the social-planning models and interventionism that have long restrained and paralyzed European economic development.
The Europeanization of American economic policy is well underway. President Barack Obama, backed by an army of anti-capitalist spear-carriers on the left, has moved to install the U.S. government as the overseer of this Europeanization.
One of Mr. Obama’s spear-carriers is Joseph Stiglitz, 2001 Nobel Prize-winning economist at Columbia University, who told the Financial Times earlier this year that “the view of American capitalism has changed. I hear a lot more of a sense of confidence in the European social model — the view that Europeans are very thankful that they have better social protections.”
Edmund Phelps, 2006 Nobel Prize-winning economist at Columbia, disagreed. “The unpleasant truth is that the European social model has been complete failure. They don’t have high employment, they have massive problems of social groups within societies. It’s a social catastrophe in Europe, so there’s no chance that Americans are going to go for a paralyzed, uninnovative economy with stagnant productivity.”
To say that there’s “no chance” Americans will tolerate massive government takeover and regulation of vast chunks of the U.S. economy seems overly optimistic today. The train has already left the station, ready to unload its burden of productivity-killing taxation and programs across the country.
Rapid economic recovery and job creation requires business and consumer confidence about the structure of the economy, free of uncertainty about the future course of governments and politics. Investors and corporations would be hard-pressed today to feel that the U.S. economic environment will soon be a place where market forces will prevail.
The Obama administration has politicized the financial system, taken over auto manufacturing, is seizing control of energy industries, health care, housing and others. Combined, these sectors make up more than 60% of the U.S. economy. New laws expanding minimum wages, union power and deficit spending will impose severe limitations of the functioning of markets for decades to come. The country’s central bank and its currency are covered by a huge overhang of dubious assets. Taxation is about to skyrocket and protectionist measures are already hampering global trade.
By comparison, the U.S. economy circa 1982 looks like an economic utopia. Ronald Reagan was still in his first term, having fired striking air traffic controllers in 1981, sending a message to unions. American capitalism was on the rise and Europe was busy expanding its social model.
Under Reagan capitalism, U.S. unemployment, at 10.8% in December, 1982, was down to 7.7% within a year and a half. And soon, the jobless numbers began a long decline — briefly interrupted in 1992 — to rates as low as 4% in 2000. The chance of a repeat performance under Barack Obama’s Europeanization are…?
Obama’s ‘Europeanization’ of the U.S. – Terence Corcoran, National Post
July 5th, 2009
To read “Our Lot: How Real Estate Came to Own Us” is to relive, in painful, anecdotal detail, the real estate bust that brought our economy low. Through Alyssa Katz, a journalism professor at New York University and the former editor of the magazine City Limits, we remeet the exploited homeowners and the naive investors, and we cringe again at the blundering politicians and opportunistic lenders.
But “Our Lot” is also a reminder that our memories are short, and that the same mix of hope, greed, good intentions and bad policy has been inflating and popping real estate bubbles since the days of LBJ. Behind it all is a conviction shared by nearly all Americans, be they Democrats or Republicans, Wall Streeters or the ARMed and desperate masses, that home ownership is a good thing — good for the neighborhood, the country and the average citizen holding the deed and the debt. “Our Lot’s” long view is perhaps most unnerving for the doubt it casts on that timeworn belief. Salon interviewed Katz by phone.
Isn’t homeownership actually good for you? I thought it was the panacea for almost all social ills, it drove the crime rate down, educational achievement up, and so on.
Yes, well, homeownership is only as good as the amount of home you actually own, and I think the big problem in the last generation or so is that Americans have turned to more and more and more debt to reach for the American dream.
There’s a lot of great examples out there — the Nehemiah homes that transformed East New York in Brooklyn from a really devastated and dangerous place to someplace that’s still really poor and has a high crime rate but has an opportunity to really grow and have a stable bunch of families really invested in building a home there. So all that’s great. Certainly there’s a lot of evidence that homeowners do tend to stay in one place for longer, their kids perform better in school. They tended to be more involved in local politics, community affairs, and block cleanups. The problem is, it’s very hard to separate out the effects of homeownership itself from the fact that people who have a certain economic or social standing are more likely statistically to be homeowners in the first place.
Does this mean that we shouldn’t actively encourage homeownership, using government money or government policy?
I think there’s nothing wrong with using government money, policy, pressure, all those tools to make homeownership more of a possibility than it would otherwise be in the marketplace, simply because the market left to its own devices discriminates aggressively. It rewards people who already have wealth, who have already had a leg up economically, and it’s great to give other people the opportunity as well.
The problem is that homeownership is the only housing policy that this country has ever shown any commitment to. Renters are treated miserably.
And that’s one big distinction you see between the U.S. and European countries that also had very loosely regulated mortgage-security markets and have had problems there. I think one reason you’re not seeing mass foreclosures on quite the scale that you had in the U.S. is that for large proportions of the population in many European countries, including the Netherlands, Germany, France, Switzerland, renting is supported through government policies that, for instance, protect tenants so that they don’t have to worry about getting kicked out at the end of the year.
Whereas in the U.S., homeownership was always the only option. And anyone who can afford to, or thought they could afford to, would choose that option. So that’s really the problem here.
Whose fault is the mess that we’re in now? And how far back do we need to go to start tracing the blame?
I think the message of my book, unfortunately, is that it’s to some degree everybody’s fault, including, I should say, liberal activists, with whom I’m extremely sympathetic, and think were right.
But what we really had was a collision of ideologies over this question of: How do we make it possible for everyone to be a homeowner? How do we eradicate this horrible legacy of discrimination, which had left the homeownership rate for whites much, much higher than that for blacks and Latinos? There was real work that needed to be done there. So I think we really have to go back to the 1970s, when we started to see pretty aggressive policy measures on the part of the federal government to try to level the playing field.
You talk about another real estate bubble in the early ’70s, when everybody who wanted one could get a mortgage. The wreckage that was left behind looks totally familiar.
Yes. Rather infamously, the federal housing administration, which is the government agency that insures mortgages — it’s what built Levittown and all those 1950s suburbs after the war — discriminated very aggressively, on the basis of what was thought to be sound statistical evidence, that the insurance fund would only be safe if it were to insure suburban and overwhelmingly white areas.
So what happened in ‘67 and ‘68 was that federal housing officials reversed that entirely. They proclaimed, initially just in the riot areas and then more broadly across cities, that FHA, the Federal Housing Administration, would now be open everywhere! And in fact, as I note in the book, the only circumstances under which HUD did not insure mortgages is if the house is literally falling down.
Real estate agents and loan brokers descended on inner cities, trying to find borrowers who would be unlikely to pay their mortgages back, because the real-estate speculator would get paid in full by the federal government, and paid more quickly and more generously, because of forgone interest that they would get compensated for. The sooner that borrower went into foreclosure the more generously that entrepreneur would get paid.
When was that mess cleaned up?
About ‘73, ‘74. There were tens if not hundreds of thousands of abandoned houses all over the country as a result of the FHA debacle, and it got a lot of attention at the time and was almost forgotten to history after that.
And then we have the Reagan presidency and — correct me if I’m wrong — but that’s when the securities market for mortgages really blossoms, right?
Absolutely. Mortgage-backed securities had existed since about 1970. They existed in the ’20s too, and that was part of why the Depression happened — they had been made illegal after that. But they came back as a government product in 1970. As I recount in the book, Lewis Ranieri of Salomon Brothers, which was trading in government-backed securities, thought, “Couldn’t we just do this ourselves? Why do we need to have Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae in the middle, why don’t we create these securities?”
In order to do that, they needed to rewrite all those laws that had been passed following the crash in 1929 and thereafter, which was as much a housing and real estate bubble crash as it was a stock market crash.
Who’s to Blame For the Housing Crash? – Mark Schone, Salon
July 2nd, 2009
By Kathleen M. Howley
June 29 (Bloomberg) — Driving through Riverside, California, Bruce Norris pointed to a half-dozen empty houses with “For Sale” signs stuck in untended lawns that he said investors might buy if banks would just extend some credit.
“People today look at us as the enemy,” said Norris, 57, head of Riverside-based Norris Group, which purchases and renovates homes to rent or sell. “That’s a big problem for housing because if we can’t get the financing we need, a lot of these properties are going to sit vacant.”
Four months after President Barack Obama pledged $275 billion to shore up home sales, the engine that powered every U.S. recovery since 1960 is stalled. Bankers’ reluctance to finance buyers who won’t live in properties is one barrier to a turnaround. Stricter qualifying rules and a rise in the cost of residential loans to 5.42 percent have impeded new mortgage lending, which is at a 13-year low. An inventory of 2.1 million unoccupied houses on the market, created by the fastest foreclosure pace in history, may be a drag on a revival.
The $8,000 first-time homebuyer tax credit in the U.S. economic stimulus package and a government program to subsidize some mortgage payments have had little effect, according to Eric Belsky, executive director of Harvard University’s Joint Center for Housing Studies in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
“It hasn’t been much more than a see-sawing of data,” Belsky said in an interview. “Housing has led the U.S. economy out of every recession for at least 50 years, and for that to happen again more stimulus is going to be needed.”
Leading Indicator
The residential real estate market improved ahead of the end of the past seven contractions, with home construction starts beginning to climb an average of seven months before gross domestic product picked up and sales gaining about four months in advance, according to data compiled by David Berson, chief economist of PMI Group, a mortgage insurer in Walnut Creek, California.
Expenditures by homeowners — first on transaction fees, then on necessities and luxuries including furniture, gardening tools, kitchen renovations, basic upkeep and property taxes — kept the momentum going, Belsky said.
Existing U.S. home sales in May rose 2.4 percent to an annual rate of 4.77 million, lower than forecast, and the median price was down 16.8 percent from the same month in 2008, according to the Chicago-based National Realtors Association.
There’s little chance the turnover will increase enough this year to end the housing recession, said Andres Carbacho- Burgos, an economist with Moody’s Economy.com in West Chester, Pennsylvania.
‘Lousy Job Market’
“We have a lousy job market and an excess of around 1 million extra homes that has to be worked off,” he said in an interview. “The housing market is not going to hit bottom before mid-2010.”
Housing starts are at their lowest level since 1945, even with a 17 percent increase in May that pushed the annual rate to 532,000 from a 454,000 pace the prior month. So many properties are for sale — 3.8 million as of last month — that it would take 9.6 months to unload them at the current sales pace, according to the Realtors group. The inventory averaged 4.5 months in the six years from 2000 to 2005.
While there is pent-up demand that would eat away at the stock, “people are scared to spend the money because they’re worried about losing their jobs,” said Nariman Behravesh, chief economist at IHS Global Insight in Lexington, Massachusetts, in an interview.
6 Million Jobs
The unemployment rate, which reached a 26-year high of 9.4 percent in May, will probably exceed 10 percent this year, Obama said at a June 23 White House news conference.
“The American people have a right to feel like this is a tough time right now,” Obama said, calling it “pretty clear” payrolls will continue to shrink. About 6 million jobs have disappeared since January 2008, marking the biggest employment loss of any retrenchment since the Great Depression.
Personal bankruptcies rose 37 percent in May from a year earlier, according to the American Bankruptcy Institute, based in Alexandria, Virginia. Credit card defaults in the first quarter went to 7.79 percent from 4.83 percent a year ago, Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. data show. While the share of loans entering foreclosure moved to 1.37 percent, the highest ever, the first-quarter mortgage delinquency rate climbed to a record 9.12 percent, the Washington-based Mortgage Bankers Association said.
Housing in Peril as Financing Breakthrough Fails – Bloomberg
July 1st, 2009
ILLITERACY IN HIGH PLACES
by Paul Craig Roberts
If a person lives long enough, he can watch everyone forget everything they learned.
Everyone includes Federal Reserve Chairmen, economists, Bank of America “strategists,” and even Bloomberg.com.
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke thinks he can hold down US long-term interest rates by purchasing mortgage bonds and US Treasuries. Sixty years ago the Federal Reserve understood that this was an impossible feat. After an acrimonious public dispute with the US Treasury, in 1951 the Federal Reserve forced an “Accord” on the government that eliminated the Fed’s obligation to monetize Treasury debt in order to hold down long term interest rates.
President Truman and Treasury Secretary John Snyder wanted to protect World War II bond purchasers by preventing any rise in interest rates, which would mean a decline in the price of the bonds.
The Fed understood that monetizing the debt to hold down interest rates meant loss of control over the money supply. The policy of suppressing interest rates could only work until the financial markets anticipated rising inflation and bid down the bond prices. If the Fed responded by buying more Treasuries, the money supply and inflation would rise faster.
Since Fed Chairman Bernanke announced his plan to purchase $1 trillion in mortgage and Treasury bonds in order to help the housing market with low interest rates, interest rates have risen. When will the Fed remember that printing money does not lower long-term interest rates?
According to Bloomberg (June 3), Bank of America strategists are recommending that investors buy Fannie Mae bonds because the rise in interest rates means the Fed will ramp up its purchases in order to prevent rising interest rates from adversely impacting the struggling housing market. When will financial gurus remember that printing money does not lower interest rates?
Treasury Secretary Geithner is another economic incompetent. He told China that he stood for a “strong dollar,” but that China should let its currency appreciate relative to the dollar, which, of course, would mean a weaker dollar. He simultaneously told China that their investments in US Treasury bonds were safe.
His Chinese university audience, being economically literate, laughed at Geithner. It apparently did not dawn on the US Treasury Secretary that if Chinese money is rising in value relative to the US dollar, the value of Chinese investments in dollar-denominated US Treasury bonds is falling.
Congressional Democrats are proving themselves to be as stupid as the Republicans. According to the Associated Press, the Democrats have reached agreement to appropriate another $100 billion to continue the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan through the end of the year. What are the Democrats thinking? The federal budget for this year is already 50% in the red. Why add another $100 billion to the red ink, which has to be monetized, thus causing inflation, higher interest rates, and a weaker dollar.
The red ink that Washington is generating is a far greater threat to Americans than any foreign “enemies.”
The hubris is extraordinary. A bankrupt government that has to send its Treasury Secretary begging to China thinks it can spend limitless amounts in a futile effort to control the culture, mores, and political system of distant Afghanistan.
June 6th, 2009
This recession is now the worst since at least 1958, which is as far back as the index of coincident indicators stretches back.
The Conference Board reported today that the index, which is intended to measure how the economy is doing on an overall basis, slipped a little in April. The decline was smaller than in previous months, and two of the four indicators edged up, which could be taken as a sign that the economy is at least getting worse at a slower pace.
As I noted last month, the index was nearing the 5.6 percent decline that it experienced in the 1973-1975 recession. Now it is down 5.7 percent.
One way to put that into perspective is that the decline so far in this recession is more than the maximum falls combined in the two previous recessions, in the early 1990s and then in 2001.
“..the decline so far in this recession is more than the maximum falls combined in the two previous receptions, in the early 1990s and then in 2001.” (Floyd Norris)
May 27th, 2009
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