Archive for The Make Believe Middle Class

A Fake Banking History of the United States

Ask yourself this question: was the housing price bubble, which has burst, caused by (a) a Fed policy of too much liquidity, which caused artificially low interest rates, which in turn caused a great deal of malinvestment, or (b) a Fed policy of too little liquidity which caused high interest rates and a credit-starved economy? If you chose answer b, congratulations, you may have a future as a celebrated author, historian, and Wall Street Journal commentator.

Answer b is a theme of a truly ridiculous article by John Steele Gordon in the October 10 issue of the Wall Street Journal online entitled “A Short Banking History of the United States.” The article is an attempt to defend the Fed, its founding father, Alexander Hamilton, and the regime that it finances. (Gordon is the author of a book entitled Hamilton’s Blessing which sings the praises of a large public debt, something that Hamilton himself called a “public blessing.”)

Rather than faulting the Fed for creating yet another boom-and-bust cycle, Gordon blames the current economic debacle on “the baleful influence of Thomas Jefferson.” Jefferson was the foremost opponent of a bank capitalized with tax dollars and operated by politicians and their appointees from the nation’s capital — Hamilton’s Bank of the United States (BUS), a precursor of the Fed. Thus, despite the fact that the real blame for the current economic crisis lies squarely in the lap of the Fed and its ideological underpinnings — particularly the legends and myths surrounding Hamilton — Gordon attempts to convince us that opposition to politicized, centralized banking is the real problem. Anyone who believes this could easily be persuaded that up is down, white is black, and day is night. The purpose of the Fed, according to Gordon, is to serve as a sort of a monetary benevolent despot: “To guard the money supply … regulating the economy thereby.”

Right-wing statists like Gordon, like left-wing statists, have adopted the custom of smearing Jefferson as a slave owner not so much because they are appalled that he owned slaves, but because their objective is to denigrate his laissez-faire/limited-government political philosophy. Gordon includes the Jefferson slavery smear in his article, but fails to mention that his hero Hamilton also owned “house slaves,” which were brought into his marriage by his wife Eliza; he once purchased six slaves at an auction; and he supported the return of runaway slaves to their “owners” under the Fugitive Slave Clause of the original Constitution.

Indeed, nearly all of the “first families” of the New York City of Hamilton’s time — his main social and political circle — were slave owners. As Hamilton biographer Ron Chernow has written, during Hamilton’s time, “New York City, in particular, was identified with slavery … and was linked [economically] through its sugar refineries in the West Indies” (where Hamilton was born and raised). By the late 1790s slaves were “regarded as status symbols” by the wealthiest New York families.

Gordon spreads several other falsehoods about Jefferson in the leading paragraphs of his article. This in itself is telling, for it shows that court historians like John Steele Gordon fully understand the importance of Hamilton’s statist political philosophy in propping up the Fed and the regime that it finances. Gordon claims that Jefferson, a lifelong businessman, “hated commerce,” “hated banks,” and “may not have understood the concept of central banking.” He also argues that Hamilton, by contrast, had a “profound understanding of markets” because he worked as a bookkeeper for British slave-owning sugar-plantation operators and exporters as a teenager on the Caribbean island of St. Croix. This is nonsense on stilts, as the philosopher Jeremy Bentham is supposed to have said with regard to another spurious claim.

What Jefferson opposed was Hamilton’s mercantilist policies of government-controlled banking, corporate welfare, protectionist tariffs, heavy excise taxation, excessive public debt, and other interventions. Unlike Hamilton, Jefferson had read and understood Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations and his Theory of Moral Sentiments, as well as the work of David Ricardo, Jean-Baptiste Say (who Jefferson tried to get to join the faculty of the University of Virginia), Richard Cantillon, and other economic theorists of that era. Hamilton was ignorant of or ignored all of this. His major intellectual influence was a propagandist for the British mercantilist regime named Sir James Steuart.

As Murray Rothbard wrote in an article entitled “A Future of Peace and Capitalism,”

Jefferson was very precisely in favor of laissez-faire, or free-market, capitalism. And that was the real argument between [Hamilton and Jefferson]. It wasn’t really that Jefferson was against factories or industries per se; what he was against was coerced [economic] development, that is, taxing the farmers through tariffs and subsidies to build up industry artificially, which was essentially the Hamilton program. Jefferson … was a very learned person. He read Adam Smith, he read Ricardo, he was very familiar with laissez-faire classical economics. And so his economic program … was a very sophisticated application of classical economics to the American scene … classicists were also against tariffs, subsidies, and coerced economic development…. The Jeffersonian wing of the founding fathers was essentially free-market, laissez-faire capitalists.

Compared to Jefferson, Hamilton was an economic ignoramus. His reputation as some kind of financial genius has been greatly exaggerated and fabricated, as the great late-nineteenth-century Yale sociologist William Graham Sumner wrote in his 1905 biography of Hamilton. In his Report on Manufacturers, for example, Hamilton presented the cockeyed notion that international competition would cause higher prices and protectionism would cause lower prices by causing domestic producers to compete more vigorously with each other. History had proven this to be an absurd idea long before Hamilton’s time.

Hamilton also condemned transportation costs, calling them “an evil which ought to be minimized” through protectionism. Of course, transportation costs also affect interstate trade, but Hamilton never voiced his opposition to them in that context. Hamilton was such a mercantilist that he even argued in favor of “a monopoly of the domestic market” by banning all imports altogether. It is little wonder that William Graham Sumner referred to Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures as a mass of economic confusion, just the opposite of a “profound and practical understanding of markets.”

Jefferson was not the only prominent opponent of Hamilton’s scheme to establish a bank operated by politicians out of the nation’s capital. James Madison also opposed the First Bank of the United States (BUS). The Virginia Senator John Taylor was as learned on the subject of political economy as Jefferson was, and immediately recognized the danger of imitating the Bank of England as a financier of mercantilist subsidies. “What was it that drove our forefathers to this country?” he asked. “Was it not the ecclesiastical corps and perpetual monopolies of England and Scotland? Shall we suffer the same evils in this country?” Hamilton’s answer would have been “why yes, we shall, for it is the surest route to accumulate power and wealth for myself and my fellow Federalists.” As Gordon wrote, “Hamilton wanted to establish a central bank modeled on the Bank of England.”

John Steele Gordon’s “short history” of banking is completely filled with falsehoods. Throughout his article, he blames Jefferson’s opposition to central banking for economic problems that were in fact created by Hamilton’s Bank of the United States.

As Murray Rothbard wrote in A History of Money and Banking in the United States (p. 69), as soon as Hamilton’s bank was established it

promptly fulfilled its inflationary potential by issuing millions of dollars in paper money and demand deposits, pyramiding on top of $2 million in specie. The Bank … invested heavily in loans to the United States government…. The result of the outpouring of credit and paper money by the new bank of the United States was … in increase [in prices] of 72 percent [from 1791–1796].

The BUS charter was not renewed after its first twenty years. Gordon blames Jefferson for this, but the above-mentioned economic instability that was caused by the BUS surely played a role. (And I’m sure Jefferson would have been proud to accept the credit for the demise of the BUS.) The BUS was revived after the War of 1812 (in 1817) and it immediately “ran into grave difficulties through mismanagement, speculation, and fraud,” wrote James J. Kilpatrick in his book, The Sovereign States. Consequently, “a wave of hostility toward the Bank of the United States swept the country,” which eventually led to President Andrew Jackson’s veto of the bank rechartering bill.

In 1817 the BUS quickly lent $23 million with a specie reserve of only $2.3 million. This flood of cheap credit created a brief economic boom, and then the inevitable bust, or depression, known at the time as the Panic of 1819. As Murray Rothbard wrote in The Panic of 1819, personal bankruptcies abounded, especially among farmers who had overextended themselves thanks to the BUS’s cheap credit; and there was for the first time large-scale unemployment in American cities, with manufacturing employment in Philadelphia falling from 9,700 employed persons in 1815 to only 2,100 in 1819. This was all Jefferson’s fault, says John Steele Gordon.

Another one of Gordon’s false claims is that “The Civil War ended … monetary chaos when Congress passed the National Bank Act,” which would become the state’s monopolistic monetary regime until the creation of the Fed in 1913. In reality, the so-called Independent Treasury System that existed from the early 1840s to 1863 was arguably the most stable monetary system in US history. Modern economic scholars have evaluated the Lincoln regime’s National Currency Acts and have arrived at the opposite conclusion of Gordon’s. In an article entitled “Money versus Credit Rationing: Evidence for the National Banking Era, 1880–1914″ (in Claudia Goldin, ed., Strategic Factors in Nineteenth-Century American Economic Growth) Michael Bordo, Anna Schwartz, and Peter Rappaport concluded that this Hamiltonian system “was characterized by monetary and cyclical instability, four banking panics, frequent stock market crashes, and other financial disturbances.”

Gordon notes that “inflation took off in the 1960s” but does not blame the actual cause of the inflation — the Fed and its legalized counterfeiting operations. He concludes by praising the regime’s current plans to nationalize the financial markets by assuming stock ownership in banks and appointing the US Treasury secretary as the nation’s first financial dictator. He thinks this will finally, at long last, achieve Hamilton’s dream of a “unified and coherent regulatory system free of undue political influence.”

Of course, no government institution in the history of the world has ever been free of political influence, due or undue. This is perhaps Gordon’s most spectacularly stupid remark.

“Unified” or centralized regulation of industry has long been a goal of statists who favor regulatory dictatorship as opposed to a governmental regime that delegates “too much” regulatory power. Gordon himself bemoans the “conflicting” regulations on the banking industry that have been imposed by the Fed, and the FDIC, FSLIC, SEC, and other federal regulators.

The system of financial regulatory dictatorship that Gordon praises, and which is about to be forced down the throats of the American public, has been tried before in other countries. During one of its own periodic financial crises, Italian government officials complained bitterly, as Gordon does, of regulation that has been “disorganic” and “case by case, as the need arises.” The Italian regime altered its regulatory system so that it could pursue “certain fixed objectives,” just as Gordon argues for a “unified and coherent regulatory system.” This highly centralized or even dictatorial regulatory system, the Italians argued, would supposedly “introduce order in the economic field” and achieve the goal of “unity of aim” with regard to government regulation of industry.

All of the words in quotation marks in the preceding paragraph, except for the last ones, are the words of Benito Mussolini. The “unity of aim” phrase was from Mussolini apologist/propagandist Fausto Pitigliani. There is, after all, a very keen similarity between Hamiltonian mercantilism — or an economy directed and controlled by government, supposedly “in the public interest” but in reality for the benefit of a privileged few — and the economic fascism of Italy (and Germany) of the 1920s and ’30s.

[VIEW THIS ARTICLE ONLINE]

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Thomas DiLorenzo is professor of economics at Loyola College and a member of the senior faculty of the Mises Institute.

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Understanding Capitalism

It is 79 years since the Great Depression. Some fear that this week’s chaos in the financial world means that the curtains are rising on Great Depression II. I don’t have a crystal ball, but I’m sure the immediate future is grim. At the very least we are in for a long and deep recession and our medicine will be very bitter indeed.

Clearly the style of capitalism which has dominated world markets for the last 20 years or so is flatlining. The question now is whether it is worth resuscitating. The answer must be Yes – but only if we jettison the “greed is good” ideology made famous by the slimy character Gordon Gekko in the 1987 film Wall Street. That was a movie. In real life it was the philosophy of Nobel Prize-winning economist Milton Friedman.

Friedman was probably the greatest economist of the 20th century. He influenced Ronald Reagan in the US, Margaret Thatcher in the UK, Brian Mulroney in Canada, and Paul Keating in Australia and his ideas led to critical economic reform in each of their countries. These economies were made stronger by following much of Friedman’s economic rationalism.

But at the heart of Friedman’s thought was the idea that greed is good, that greed works because it drives people to succeed. The reality, as we can now see, is that greed, in its truest sense, does not work.

A deadly sin

I have no doubt that greed is the cause of the current crisis. It was the greed of those who took easy money to buy houses beyond their means and the greed of bankers who lent to people borrowing beyond their means. The depth of this depravity can be seen in the Wall Street bankers who were collecting salaries over US$100 million per year even as their banks were collapsing.

Right now, even as the dominoes fall, disciples of Friedman are still contending that the culprit is not capitalist greed but excessive government regulation. However, while poor legislation and regulation may have contributed to the subprime mortgage market crisis that sparked the conflagration, it is absurd to suggest that the solution is merely a less regulated market.

Friedmanistas claim that the US subprime mortgage crisis didn’t happen in markets like Australia and the EU because their consumers are more sophisticated. Nothing could be further from the truth. Australians and Europeans are not smarter; they were protected by more stringent regulatory frameworks. If foreign banks have been dragged into the American crisis, it was mainly because they had joined the orgy on Wall Street.

Less regulation may be a good thing; but good regulation trumps it any day. How many ordinary Americans have to lose their jobs and homes before the ideology of laissez-faire capitalism is finally debunked?

Greed needs to be kept in check. Governments the world over should take the matter of bank regulation more seriously. The US’s subprime mortgage mess was created by politicians pandering to the not-unreasonable desire of Americans to own their own homes. But Congressmen who are currently skewering greedy Wall Street bankers should have protected ordinary consumers aspiring to home ownership. Their negligence points to a failure of leadership that reaches to the very top of the American political totem pole.

Tough choices

So, should governments be putting together rescue packages like the US Federal Reserve’s US$800 billion one to save the banks? Aren’t these rescue packages throwing good money after bad? After all, it was bad, even unethical, business decisions that have sunk the biggest financial institutions. If only that money were available now to help the people who are losing their homes, who face unemployment and who need to feed and educate their children.

But leaving the financial institutions that created the mess to stew in their folly is not a solution.

The viability of the world’s banking system needs to be ensured. If the banking crisis gets worse and more banks go under, it will be harder for businesses, big and small, to expand. Markets — which ultimately thrive on confidence — will shrink. That will mean more job losses and more pain. It could bring the world to Great Depression II, complete with soup kitchens and Hoovervilles. Right now, not bailing out the banks and other financial institutions is unthinkable.

Modern day capitalism may well be wanting. But – to paraphrase Winston Churchill’s description of democracy – it is the worst economic system except for all the others. The Great Depression played a part in the rise of communism, socialism, fascism and Nazism in the 1930s. That is, I am sure, not an outcome many would want from this crisis.

Saving the financial institutions that caused this crisis is the only way to keep the world from sliding into worse turmoil. But we have to learn from this calamity. Greed is not good. We need to inoculate our children against idolising Gordon Gekko. And we need to demand that governments regulate the markets more tightly . Capitalism works; but not when it is based on every man for himself. We need to find our way to a capitalism based on values and virtue.

Alistair Nicholas lives in Beijing where he runs a consultancy firm. He has been an economic researcher, political adviser, and Australian diplomat. In his consultancy he advises international corporations on business ethics and communications in China. He is the co-author of a study on the privatisation of welfare in Australia.

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Quote of the Day

Caveat Emptor!     http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/

Long-standing readers and finance junkies may remember the Treasury’s structured investment vehicle fiasco of last fall. By way of background, banks had created off balance sheet entities called structured investment vehicles (SIVs) which contained subprime (and sometimes other) assets, funded by commercial paper and short-term debt. Like a regular bank, the economics worked because the assets were of longer maturity (3-5 years) than the funding sources, and short term money is generally cheaper than long-term funding.

Then the subprime crisis hit, lenders became very leery of funding subprime related assets, and the SIVs looked pretty certain, as it indeed played out, to produce losses. The banks had assumed they could simply let the SIVs fail, but were told in no uncertain terms by the debt investors that There Would Be Consequences if the SIVs went bust. Suddenly an off balance sheet exposure was not off balance sheet at all.

Hank Paulson attempted to ride to the rescue with an idea, the so called Master Liquidity Enhancement Conduit, that we said virtually from the get-go would not work. He wanted to set up a vehicle, to be managed by a third party that would buy the junky SIV holdings, which included risky real estate assets and murky stuff like collateralized debt obligations, and be funded by private investors. The problem was that there was no price which would solve the basic conundrum: investors were not willing to pay above market prices, and the banks were unwilling to sell at market. Paulson & Co. wasted nearly two months trying to breathe life into this stillborn idea, then abandoned the effort.

Ah, but the MLEC lives! It’s been retooled into the Paulson plan We still have a fund that will be managed by third parties. We still have the buying of drecky, hard to value assets, with emphasis on mortgage-related paper. And the taxpayer is being told that it is an investor, that it might actually make a profit on this venture.

And as with the MLEC, the big issue will be how to price the paper or at least some commentators treat that as an open question. But by foisting this on to chumps taxpayers, the problem goes away. It is clear now that the intent is to pay over whatever the book value of the paper is, both to recapitalize the banks and to generate high valuations that let other financial firms use these phony favorable prices for preparing their financial statements.

But the MLEC was designed to address the pressing problems of a year ago. The crisis has advanced considerably since then.

Remaining fixated on a solution that is badly out of date is tantamount to fortifying the Maginot Line when the blitzkrieg has rolled into the fields of France and the British are beating a retreat to Dunkirk. And I expect it will prove every bit as effective.

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Supply-Side Economics Contradictions Live on in Washington

Jeffey Frankel
Politicians have always faced the temptation to give their constituents tax cuts. But in recent decades “conservative” presidents have enacted large tax cuts that have been anything but conservative fiscally, and have justified them by appealing to theory. In particular, they have appealed to two theories: the Laffer Proposition, which says that cuts in tax rates will pay for themselves via higher economic activity, and the Starve the Beast Hypothesis, which says that tax cuts will increase the budget deficit and put downward pressure on federal spending. It is insufficiently remarked that the two propositions are inconsistent with each other: reductions in tax rates can’t increase tax revenues and reduce tax revenues at the same time. But being mutually exclusive does not prevent them both from being wrong.

The Laffer Proposition, while theoretically possible under certain conditions, does not apply to US income tax rates: a cut in those rates reduces revenue, precisely as common sense would indicate. As detailed in a new paper of mine “Snake-Oil Tax Cuts,” for the Economic Policy Institute, this conclusion was the outcome of the two big experiments of recent decades: the Reagan tax cuts of 1981-83 and the Bush tax cuts of 2001-03. It is also the conclusion of more systematic scholarly studies based on more extensive data. Finally, it is the view of almost all professional economists, including the illustrious economic advisers to Presidents Reagan and Bush, even though it contradicted the views of their employers. So thorough is the discrediting of the Laffer Hypothesis, that many deny that these two presidents or their top officials could have ever believed such a thing. But abundant quotes show that they did.

The Starve the Beast Hypothesis claims that politicians can’t spend money that they don’t have. In theory, Congressmen are supposedly inhibited from increasing spending by constituents’ fears that the resulting deficits will mean higher taxes for their grandchildren. The theory fails on both conceptual grounds and empirical grounds. Conceptually, one should begin by asking: what it the alternative fiscal regime to which Starve the Beast is being compared? The natural alternative is the regime that was in place during the 1990s, which I call Shared Sacrifice. During that time, any congressman wishing to increase spending had to show how they would raise taxes to pay for it. Logically, a Congressman contemplating a new spending program to benefit some favored supporters will be more inhibited by fears of constituents complaining about an immediate tax increase (under the regime of Shared Sacrifice) than by fears of constituents complaining that budget deficits might mean higher taxes many years into the future (under Starve the Beast). Sure enough, the Shared Sacrifice approach of the 1990s succeeded. Compare this outcome to the sharp increases in spending that took place when President Reagan took office, when the first President Bush took office, and when the second President Bush took office. As with the Laffer Hypothesis, more systematic econometric analysis confirms the rejection of the hypothesis.

These matters are not solely of interest to historians or economists. The presidential campaign of Senator John McCain appears set to drive its wagon down the same road in which Reagan and Bush have already worn deep ruts. The candidate is apparently selling the same snake oil: he says he believes that tax cuts increase revenues. His principle policy director disavows the Laffer Principle, just as the economists who advised Presidents Reagan and Bush did. But the views of the economic advisers are not what determines what these presidents do.

“The Queen in Alice in Wonderland said that, with practice, she was able to believe as many as six impossible things before breakfast. Most of us are more limited in our capacity for credulity. If John McCain believes both the Laffer Proposition (tax cuts raise revenues) and Starve the Beast (higher revenues lead to higher spending, anathema to conservatives), then as a good conservative, his duty is clear. He ought to run on a truly novel platform of higher tax rates! Why? Higher tax rates would reduce revenues (this is what Laffer says would happen) and thereby reduce spending (this is what Starve the Beast says would happen).

Seriously folks. If McCain continues to propose extending the Bush tax cuts, he should at least be forced to choose between the Lafferite defense and the “Starve the Beast” defense. Only then can the rest of us know which of the two mutually inconsistent propositions to refute.

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the Fannie and Freddie Bailout Real Cost: At Least $1.3 Trillion

A recent study from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has zero credibility. It pegged likely taxpayer losses in the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bailouts at $25 billion. For those with a sense of history, it is worth remembering that the S&L bailout had a $160 billion price tag. The numbers diverge so far from reality as to be laugh-out-loud funny. Funny, that is, except that the CBO estimate demonstrates a willful disconnect with the actual consequences of federal government actions.

As demonstrated below, the real cost of the bailouts will easily exceed $1.3 trillion. In fact, the real cost is likely to range between $1.3 trillion to $1.6 trillion, and is not unlikely to reach $2.5 trillion.

Between 2001 and 2007, Fannie and Freddie purchased or guaranteed $700 billion of Alt-A and subprime loans. Given the default rates on these loans — and the fact that the price of the housing that is the ultimate security of the loans will, for reasons demonstrated below, fall by at least thirty percent — this alone implies a loss for Fannie and Freddie on the order of $210 billion.

Fannie and Freddie acknowledge already-impaired loans on the balance sheet of $19 billion, which they have used creative accounting to avoid deleting from the shareholder equity account. This means that Fannie and Freddie have a maximum of $64 billion in capital remaining.

Given the inevitable losses on the Alt-A/subprime portion of their portfolio, it must be the case that if the federal government, as it is doing, guarantees Fannie and Freddie’s solvency, the difference between the loss and the capital to be made up by the government (i.e., the taxpayers) must equal, not $25 billion but $147 billion.

That alone would mean that the CBO is blowing smoke with their estimated cost figures, and if you think back to the S&L cost of $160 billion, this is not a surprising result. The real picture is so much worse that it is pretty obvious the CBO is flat out inventing figures just to get the politicians through November.

The real story is simple. We have witnessed the largest asset-price bubble in US history, making the tech-stock bubble seem like an overdone weekly rally.

When you look at the graph of the Case-Shiller residential real-estate index, an index dating from 1890 to the present and an index which measures the cost of housing in comparison to other goods, the first thing you see is that the 2001 to 2006 bubble stands out like a fifty foot saguaro cactus in a patch of daisies. There simply has never been anything like it before.

When you know what you are looking at — the biggest bubble in history — it is scary.

To be precise, the Case-Shiller Index in its entire 110-year history had never crossed 140 until the recent bubble. In 2006, it reached 210. Every single real-estate bubble in the past has at best been followed by a fall back to at least the 110 level in the postwar era, although the bubble preceding the Great Depression witnessed a fall to 60.

What this means is that in the best-case scenario, real-estate prices have to fall in the medium to long run by almost half.

Now consider Fannie and Freddie. Just looking at their portfolios on the balance sheet without the guarantees, let us accept (for no particular reason other than a desire that the reader sleep better at night) that real-estate prices only fall by thirty percent.

Well, since Uncle Sam is now committed to “doing whatever it takes,” that is a loss right there of $1 trillion. This committment to keep financial markets open as usual is made in spite of the overwhelming evidence that what we have been taught is usual is in fact delusional, given that Fannie and Freddie own $3 trillion and change of mortgages.

The CBO is not fence-post stupid, so obviously just as in the S&L fiasco in 1988, they are outright inventing figures so that the politicians can slither into November and then announce, Whoops! our numbers were a little low.

The more realistic scenario is actually worse. Fannie and Freddie own and guarantee a total of more than $5 trillion in mortgages.

Given the long-run historically plausible equilibrium values of residential real estate as embodied in the Case-Shiller Index, that means that the taxpayer loss definitely reaches $1.3 trillion, easily ranging up to $1.6 trillion.

Unfortunately, that is the good news. The bad news is that if real-estate prices were to replicate the Great Depression (as would surely occur in the case that hedging instruments of Fannie and Freddie were to catastrophically fail due to counterparty failure — and given the absurdly low risk premiums on credit-default swaps at the height of the bubble, such an event cannot be considered unlikely) the Case-Shiller Index tells us that the loss to the taxpayers could exceed $2.5 trillion dollars.

I don’t know what those people in Washington are taking to sleep at night after all their electorally driven accounting and finance exercises, but I can tell you what they will be doing to keep the government open for business: printing a whole lot of money.

Chairman Bernanke has the discount window open to any collateralization not worth the paper it is written on, so in effect he has the helicopters ready to drop hundred-dollar bills over Wall Street — as he once famously described the ultimate policy instrument of a fiat-money system.

Of course, if he does that, we will have to change his nickname from Helicopter Ben to Hyperinflation Ben, which answers the question of who picks up the tab of bailing out Fannie and Freddie: anyone owning dollars.

Produce a lot of something, and it becomes worth less. And given the losses at Fannie and Freddie, the taxpayer guarantee, and the ongoing initiation of Boomer retirement, only the inflation tax will work to pay for keeping Fannie and Freddie afloat.

Like it or not, we are about to enter interesting times, and it is too bad our supposed professional civil servants at the Congressional Budget Office have failed to tell the emperor the truth: that he is buck-naked bankrupt and getting ready to take a lot of people with him.

Our only hope is to (1) accept up front a twenty-percent fall in American living standards for a people living beyond their means for the past twenty-five years on the delusions made possible by fiat money, and (2) simultaneously discipline the creature from Jekyll Island, a.k.a. the Federal Reserve System, not to create new money just to prop up asset-price bubbles.

Don A. Rich is an instructor of economics, finance, and political science at Montgomery County Community College in Blue Bell, PA. He also teaches economics, government, and history at Delaware County Community College in Exton, PA.

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The Market, Part 1

by Ludwig von Mises

  1. The Characteristics of the Market Economy
  2. Capital
  3. Capitalism
  4. The Sovereignty of the Consumers
  1. Competition
  2. Freedom
  3. Inequality of Wealth and Income
This article is excerpted from chapter 15 of Human Action. Robert Murphy has written a study guide for this chapter, available in HTML and PDF. This chapter follows “The Scope and Method of Catallactics.”

1. The Characteristics of the Market Economy

The market economy is the social system of the division of labor under private ownership of the means of production. Everybody acts on his own behalf; but everybody’s actions aim at the satisfaction of other people’s needs as well as at the satisfaction of his own. Everybody in acting serves his fellow citizens. Everybody, on the other hand, is served by his fellow citizens. Everybody is both a means and an end in himself; an ultimate end for himself and a means to other people in their endeavors to attain their own ends. This system is steered by the market. The market directs the individual’s activities into those channels in which he best serves the wants of his fellow men.

There is in the operation of the market no compulsion and coercion. The state, the social apparatus of coercion and compulsion, does not interfere with the market and with the citizens’ activities directed by the market. It employs its power to beat people into submission solely for the prevention of actions destructive to the preservation and the smooth operation of the market economy. It protects the individual’s life, health, and property against violent or fraudulent aggression on the part of domestic gangsters and external foes. Thus the state creates and preserves the environment in which the market economy can safely operate.

The Marxian slogan “anarchic production” pertinently characterizes this social structure as an economic system which is not directed by a dictator, a production tsar who assigns to each a task and compels him to obey this command. Each man is free; nobody is subject to a despot. Of his own accord the individual integrates himself into the cooperative system. The market directs him and reveals to him in what way he can best promote his own welfare as well as that of other people. The market is supreme. The market alone puts the whole social system in order and provides it with sense and meaning.

The market is not a place, a thing, or a collective entity. The market is a process, actuated by the interplay of the actions of the various individuals cooperating under the division of labor. The forces determining the — continually changing — state of the market are the value judgments of these individuals and their actions as directed by these value judgments. The state of the market at any instant is the price structure, i.e., the totality of the exchange ratios as established by the interaction of those eager to buy and those eager to sell. There is nothing inhuman or mystical with regard to the market. The market process is entirely a resultant of human actions. Every market phenomenon can be traced back to definite choices of the members of the market society.

The market process is the adjustment of the individual actions of the various members of the market society to the requirements of mutual cooperation. The market prices tell the producers what to produce, how to produce, and in what quantity. The market is the focal point to which the activities of the individuals converge. It is the center from which the activities of the individuals radiate.

The market economy must be strictly differentiated from the second thinkable — although not realizable — system of social cooperation under the division of labor: the system of social or governmental ownership of the means of production. This second system is commonly called socialism, communism, planned economy, or state capitalism. The market economy — or capitalism, as it is usually called — and the socialist economy preclude one another. There is no mixture of the two systems possible or thinkable; there is no such thing as a mixed economy, a system that would be in part capitalistic and in part socialist. Production is directed either by the market or by the decrees of a production tsar or a committee of production tsars.

If within a society based on private ownership of the means of production some of these means are publicly owned and operated — that is, owned and operated by the government or one of its agencies — this does not make for a mixed system which would combine socialism and capitalism. The fact that the state or municipalities own and operate some plants does not alter the characteristic features of the market economy. These publicly owned and operated enterprises are subject to the sovereignty of the market. They must fit themselves, as buyers of raw materials, equipment, and labor, and as sellers of goods and services, into the scheme of the market economy. They are subject to the laws of the market and thereby depend on the consumers who may or may not patronize them. They must strive for profits or, at least, to avoid losses. The government may cover losses of its plants or shops by drawing on public funds. But this neither eliminates nor mitigates the supremacy of the market; it merely shifts it to another sector. For the means for covering the losses must be raised by the imposition of taxes. But this taxation has its effects on the market and influences the economic structure according to the laws of the market. It is the operation of the market, and not the government collecting the taxes, that decides upon whom the incidence of the taxes falls and how they affect production and consumption. Thus the market, not a government bureau, determines the working of these publicly operated enterprises.

Nothing that is in any way connected with the operation of a market is in the praxeological or economic sense to be called socialism. The notion of socialism as conceived and defined by all socialists implies the absence of a market for factors of production and of prices of such factors. The “socialization” of individual plants, shops, and farms — that is, their transfer from private into public ownership — is a method of bringing about socialism by successive measures. It is a step on the way toward socialism, but not in itself socialism. (Marx and the orthodox Marxians flatly deny the possibility of such a gradual approach to socialism. According to their doctrine the evolution of capitalism will one day reach a point in which at one stroke capitalism is transformed into socialism.)

Government-operated enterprises and the Russian Soviet economy are, by the mere fact that they buy and sell on markets, connected with the capitalist system. They themselves bear witness to this connection by calculating in terms of money. They thus utilize the intellectual methods of the capitalist system that they fanatically condemn.

For monetary economic calculation is the intellectual basis of the market economy. The tasks set to acting within any system of the division of labor cannot be achieved without economic calculation. The market economy calculates in terms of money prices. That it is capable of such calculation w-as instrumental in its evolution and conditions its present-day operation. The market economy is real because it can calculate.

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