Posts filed under 'The End of American Capitalism As We Know It? - Discuss'
Richard Smith, a London-based capital markets information technology manager, was kind enough to provide an advance copy of his review for the book ECONned: How Unenlightened Self Interest Undermined Democracy and Corrupted Capitalism by Yves Smith, the author of the well-known financial blog Naked Capitalism.
Mr. Smith (real name, and no relation to Yves) helped in the proofing of the copy and fact searches, so he was already well familiar with the text. Perhaps this makes him a not entirely dispassionate source, given the regard that even copy editors can obtain for their associated works. But I thought it was a very nice summary of many of the salient points, and that you would enjoy having the opportunity to read it.
I intend to read the book in order to both learn something, and to be entertained as well. I love reading accounts of this period of time that are both authoritative and well-written, and understandable by the non-expert. Given the author’s performance on her blog, and her detailed industry knowledge and experience, it looks to be a ‘must read’ for those following the financial crisis and its associated developments.
Reading ECONned
By Richard Smith
http://jessescrossroadscafe.blogspot.com/2010/03/guest-post-econned-book-review.html
March 6th, 2010
For almost a year now, Democratic pollsters have been pointing out how much the public hates the bank bailout and despises Wall Street. But there was no reason for Democratic leaders in Congress or the White House to pay much attention. After all, it was a Republican president and a Republican Congress that came up with the bank bailout plan to begin with. Some stalwart Republicans had grumbled about it, of course, but Republicans have always been on the side of Wall Street and big business and weren’t likely to call for strong measures to prevent the Street from getting into trouble again.
Larry Summers and Tim Geithner scuttled Paul Volcker’s plan to separate the banks’ commercial and investment functions, and didn’t want to limit the size of banks or the risks they could take on. Summers and Geithner have wanted to get the banks back to profitability as soon as possible. And Dems in Congress have had no stomach to take on Wall Street, a major source of campaign funding.
But suddenly the winds are blowing in a different direction over the Potomac. The 2010 midterms are getting closer, and the Dems are scared. Their polls are plummeting. The upsurge in mad-as-hell populism requires that Democrats become indignant on behalf of Americans, and indignation is meaningless without a target. They can’t target big government because Republicans do that one better, especially when they’re out of power. So what’s the alternative? Wall Street.
Perhaps I’m being too cynical. Maybe the Obama and congressional Democrats are now ready to give up Wall Street trickle-down economics and focus on Main Street trickle-up. “There are two ideas of government,” said William Jennings Bryan at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in 1896. “There are those who believe that you just legislate to make the well-to-do prosperous, that their prosperity will leak through on those below. The Democratic idea has been that if you legislate to make the masses prosperous their prosperity will find its way up and through every class that rests upon it.” He couldn’t have said it better.
January 23rd, 2010
 |
| Flagging: a US sailor stands on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington |
If a week is a long time in politics, a decade is starting to look like an age in geopolitics. Comparing the America that began the 21st century with the America of today is to witness a country that has in some ways quite radically altered its view of itself and its relationship to the world.
In short, the metallic rust of decline has crept into the American soul. “You could argue that the first decade of the 21st century was the last decade of the American century,” says David Rothkopf, a former Clinton administration official and student of US foreign policy. “We are now entering the multipolar century.”
January 16th, 2010
My essay in today’s American Spectator Online looks at why Ben Bernanke should not be confirmed to a second term as Chairman of the Federal Reserve:
Two planks in Bernanke’s recovery strategy: Expand the money supply like a banana republic dictator and throw sackfuls of cash at failed companies with a proven track record of mismanaging their assets. The justification? According to the late John Maynard Keynes, this is supposed to restore the “animal spirits” of the cowed consumer, the benighted creature who foolishly imagines that after a period of prodigality and mismanagement, maybe a country should rediscover its inner Dave Ramsey.
The full essay is here.
December 19th, 2009
Barack Obama ran for president as a man of the people, standing up to Wall Street as the global economy melted down in that fateful fall of 2008. He pushed a tax plan to soak the rich, ripped NAFTA for hurting the middle class and tore into John McCain for supporting a bankruptcy bill that sided with wealthy bankers “at the expense of hardworking Americans.” Obama may not have run to the left of Samuel Gompers or Cesar Chavez, but it’s not like you saw him on the campaign trail flanked by bankers from Citigroup and Goldman Sachs. What inspired supporters who pushed him to his historic win was the sense that a genuine outsider was finally breaking into an exclusive club, that walls were being torn down, that things were, for lack of a better or more specific term, changing.
Then he got elected.
What’s taken place in the year since Obama won the presidency has turned out to be one of the most dramatic political about-faces in our history. Elected in the midst of a crushing economic crisis brought on by a decade of orgiastic deregulation and unchecked greed, Obama had a clear mandate to rein in Wall Street and remake the entire structure of the American economy. What he did instead was ship even his most marginally progressive campaign advisers off to various bureaucratic Siberias, while packing the key economic positions in his White House with the very people who caused the crisis in the first place. This new team of bubble-fattened ex-bankers and laissez-faire intellectuals then proceeded to sell us all out, instituting a massive, trickle-up bailout and systematically gutting regulatory reform from the inside.
How could Obama let this happen? Is he just a rookie in the political big leagues, hoodwinked by Beltway old-timers? Or is the vacillating, ineffectual servant of banking interests we’ve been seeing on TV this fall who Obama really is?
Whatever the president’s real motives are, the extensive series of loophole-rich financial “reforms” that the Democrats are currently pushing may ultimately do more harm than good. In fact, some parts of the new reforms border on insanity, threatening to vastly amplify Wall Street’s political power by institutionalizing the taxpayer’s role as a welfare provider for the financial-services industry. At one point in the debate, Obama’s top economic advisers demanded the power to award future bailouts without even going to Congress for approval — and without providing taxpayers a single dime in equity on the deals.
How did we get here? It started just moments after the election — and almost nobody noticed.
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December 13th, 2009
November 21st, 2009
“Hindsight is a wonderful thing,” said Timothy W. Long, the chief bank
examiner for the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. “At the height of
the economic boom, to take an aggressive supervisory approach and tell people to
stop lending is hard to do.” Post Mortems Reveal Obvious Risks at Banks, NY Times
November 21st, 2009
One of the federal government’s most opaque methods for bailing out the banking system allowed a handful of giant institutions to save up to $25 billion on their borrowing costs, a Congressional panel estimated on Friday.
Seven companies received about 82 percent of those benefits, the panel estimated. General Electric Capital was able to reduce its borrowing costs by about $1.9 billion, while Goldman Sachs saved an estimated $606 million. The other big beneficiaries were Citigroup, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley and Wells Fargo & Company.
The savings came in the form of federal guarantees on more than $300 billion of bonds issued by banks and other financial institutions, and they were merely one component of a $4.3 trillion safety net of guarantees orchestrated last year by the Treasury Department, Federal Reserve and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
In one of the first systematic efforts to analyze the maze of guarantees and hidden subsidies, the Congressional panel that oversees the Treasury’s $700 billion rescue program said the guarantees had provided a cheap but risky tactic for fighting the financial crisis last year.
The good news for taxpayers, the panel said, is that the government has actually turned a profit thus far on the guarantees. The government has collected $9 billion in fees for guaranteeing bonds issued by the big financial institutions and a total of $17 billion in fees for all its emergency guarantees. Thus far, it has lost only about $2 million.
At the height of the financial crisis late last year, the government provided guarantees to financial institutions, from money-market funds to expanded deposit-insurance for banks and $300 billion in troubled assets held by Citigroup. By providing guarantees instead of direct loans, the Treasury could avoid spending money upfront.
But Elizabeth Warren, director of the oversight panel, warned that the guarantees also exposed taxpayers to potentially huge costs and had created new risks by encouraging financial institutions to count on future bailouts and take bigger risks.
“The guarantees, when they work, provide big market stability at very low cost,” Ms. Warren said. “But they come with a very high risk to the taxpayer and a powerful distortion of market pricing and moral hazard.”
The panel’s most striking finding was about the size of the effective subsidy that G.E. Capital and Wall Street giants like Goldman reaped in the form of below-market borrowing costs.
The panel estimated that the federal guarantees lowered those firms’ borrowing costs by about 39 percent. Using two different approaches to measure the value of the subsidy, the panel said the savings ranged from $12.8 billion to $25 billion.
The oversight panel said it found “no significant flaws” in how Treasury officials and banking regulators designed the guarantees. But Ms. Warren warned that they were a “dangerous tool,” adding that “next time we may not be so lucky.”
Big Breaks for Companies in Bailout’s Fine Print – New York Times
November 14th, 2009
We live in ludicrous times of rewarding good appearance for evil action. President Obama is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize while his war efforts intensify. But those who are true promoters of peace need attention, for they will never likely receive such ostentatious recognition for their noble efforts. Such individuals are those who take risks in a world of uncertainty, and who save or borrow capital to start a business. Such entrepreneurs promote peace by serving the customer better than the next entrepreneur through voluntary transactions in the market, rather than commanding bureaucracy in government.
As part of my entrepreneurship courses, I have students who want to start their own business listen to new entrepreneurs discuss their background, their reasons for starting the business, and of their effort to establish the business. Students usually find these speakers fascinating and inspiring, but also come away with a sense of the enormous amount of effort, capital, risk, and uncertainty that is involved in starting a business. Many of these students decide they no longer want to start their own business. They realize that entrepreneurs, too, have a boss: the customer. Mises put it this way: “Ownership of the means of production is not a privilege, but a social liability.”
[VIEW THIS ARTICLE ONLINE]
November 7th, 2009
I think Calvin Trillin–or at least his bar-room companion–is really on to something here:
“The financial system nearly collapsed,” he said, “because smart guys had started working on Wall Street.” …
I reflected on my own college class, of roughly the same era. The top student had been appointed a federal appeals court judge — earning, by Wall Street standards, tip money. A lot of the people with similarly impressive academic records became professors. I could picture the future titans of Wall Street dozing in the back rows of some gut course like Geology 101, popularly known as Rocks for Jocks. …
“Two things happened. One is that the amount of money that could be made on Wall Street with hedge fund and private equity operations became just mind-blowing. At the same time, college was getting so expensive that people from reasonably prosperous families were graduating with huge debts. So even the smart guys went to Wall Street, maybe telling themselves that in a few years they’d have so much money they could then become professors or legal-services lawyers or whatever they’d wanted to be in the first place. That’s when you started reading stories about the percentage of the graduating class of Harvard College who planned to go into the financial industry or go to business school so they could then go into the financial industry. That’s when you started reading about these geniuses from M.I.T. and Caltech who instead of going to graduate school in physics went to Wall Street to calculate arbitrage odds.”
I’d put it just slightly differently (and I realize Trillin is only about three-quarters serious): The key change on Wall Street was more sociological than intellectual. That is, it wasn’t so much that the smart guys went to Wall Street–though the intellectual caliber of the financial sector certainly increased with all those quants running around. The relevant change was that a lot of “outsiders” suddenly came to Wall Street, which had previously been dominated by insiders.
October 31st, 2009
I have a column in Financial Express today on the rationale for independence of the central bank, and how this is operationalised in democracies.
The rationale for central bank independence
The starting point of modern thinking on monetary policy is the issue of central bank independence. Watching the world across the centuries, a pattern has been found that non-independent central banks distort monetary policy to support the incumbent political party. When elections are approaching, rates tend to be dropped. This makes households feel a bit happier and more inclined to vote for the incumbent. This threatens the fairness of elections. And after elections, it tends to kick off higher inflation. Non-independent central banks are thus associated with election-induced fluctuations. Instead of monetary policy being a force for stability, it becomes (to some extent) a source of shocks for the economy, and of unfairness in elections.
Major countries have chosen a remarkable solution: politicians relinquish control over the central bank. This is a truly rare feature in public administration. In almost all other elements of government, democracies work by holding politicians accountable in elections, and giving politicians the reins in public administration. In this one area, the world has done something unusual.
This requires accountability mechanisms
Two issues follow hard on the heels of independence. First, independence goes with a narrowing of the functions of the central bank. There is no economic case for having independence from politicians for functions such as running the payments system, regulating or supervising financial markets or banks, running a bond exchange and depository, manning a system of capital controls, etc. The rationale for independence is limited to one specific problem: that of setting the short-term interest rate of the economy. Hence, giving RBI independence requires narrowing down its functions to the core where economic logic suggests independence. All other functions need to be placed in conventional agencies, with control in the hands of accountable politicians.
The second issue is that of accountability. The standard route of accountability through elections is being eschewed in this unique problem. But a central bank cannot be handed over to a set of unelected officials with no accountability. This would induce abuse of power, where the agency will focus on its own interests at the expense of the country.
The solution involves transparency, predictability and inflation targeting. The agency must be fully transparent about everything that it does. It must use rules rather than discretion, so as to limit the extent to which discretionary power is wielded by unelected officials. They must write down a monetary policy rule, discuss this in public, and live by it. The third element of accountability is inflation targeting. Independent central banks must have a quantitative monitorable target. Setting an inflation target for the medium term binds the agency to achieving a goal, as opposed to arbitrary exercise of power without accountability.
Commen sense and monetary economics come together
All this reasoning is rooted in the basic hygeine of good public administration. Once we accept the starting premise — that central bank independence is desirable — then careful thinking about public administration leads us to the remaining conclusions: narrow the functions placed in an independent central bank to only those where independence is required (i.e. setting the short-term interest rate), have full transparency, have a monetary policy rule, and require inflation targeting.
In historical sequence, the above reasoning led the way in monetary policy reform. It was a bit later that the best monetary economists started closing their models by putting in an inflation targeting central bank. They found it works very well. So in this strategy for monetary policy reform, we have a happy consensus between the common sense of good administrators and the state of the art of monetary economics. The central banks of the bulk of OECD GDP are now de facto or de jureDe jure inflation targeting is particularly important in countries with weak institutions, where the behaviour of an agency that is not tied down by law can be more erratic. inflation targeting, and the emerging markets with high standards of governance have also made the switch.
Indian monetary policy reform
The Indian monetary policy debate is about the key ideas of the successor to the RBI Act of 1934, which was drafted by the British in the 1920s. The authors of this act never envisioned the conditions of 2009, either in terms of the Indian economy, or our knowledge of monetary economics. In this debate, RBI staff are interested parties and have to recuse themselves.
Operationalising inflation targeting involves addressing many practical problems. A focus on these practical problems is premature. All these practical problems can be solved – as has been done myriad times in other countries – once the principle is accepted. The existence of these practical problems does not invalidate the basic strategy.
One periodically encounters criticism of low inflation as the prime goal of monetary policy. However, anyone who proposes that inflation targeting is not the answer has to come up with an alternative accountability mechanism, for no democracy can have an independent central bank without accountability. In addition, advocates of novel schemes have to explain why India should be a guinea pig for something not found in good countries.
October 25th, 2009
At the height of the financial panic last fall Goldman Sachs became a bank holding company, which enabled it to borrow directly from the Federal Reserve. It also became subject to supervision by the Federal Reserve Board (with the NY Fed on point) – hence the brouhaha over Steven Friedman’s shareholdings.
Goldman is also currently engaged in private equity investments in nonfinancial firms around the world, as seen for example in its recent deal with Geely Automotive Holdings in China (People’s Daily; CNBC). US banks or bank holding companies would not generally be allowed to undertake such transactions - in fact, it is annoyed bankers who have asked me to take this up.
Would someone from the NY Fed kindly explain the precise nature of the waiver that has been granted to Goldman so that it can operate in this fashion? If this is temporary, is it envisaged that Goldman will cease being a bank holding company, or that it will divest itself shortly of activities not usually allowed (and with good reason) by banks? Or will all bank holding companies be allowed to expand on the same basis. (The relevant rules appear to be here in general and here specifically; do tell me what I am missing.)
Increasingly, the issue of “too big to regulate” in the public interest is being brought up – an issue that has historically attracted the interest of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division in sectors other than finance. Should Goldman Sachs now be placed in this category?
Given that the Fed has slipped up so many times and in so many ways with regard to regulation over the past decade, and given the current debate on Capitol Hill, now might be a good time to get ahead of this issue.
In addition, there is the obvious carry trade (borrow cheaply; lend at higher rates) developing from cheap Fed dollar funding to the growing speculative frenzy in emerging markets, particularly China. Are we heading for another speculative bubble that will end up damaging US bank balance sheets and all American taxpayers?
By Simon Johnson
A Short Question For Senior Officials Of The New York Fed Baseline Scenario
October 4th, 2009
The expansion of international “supply chains” from Asian factories to American consumers has certainly created global trade imbalances and international currency flows that are not necessarily sustainable over the long run. A readjustment of the world economy, not a slackening demand for inexpensive consumer products, strikes me as the greatest threat to the Wal-Mart business model. And, for its part, the chain is already adapting to new circumstances. In recent years, Wal-Mart has expanded well beyond the borders of North America into Europe, Mexico and Asia. It imports factory goods from China and also operates its own retail stores there. But the stores look very different from their American counterparts. In Kunming, near the border with Myanmar, Wal-Mart rents space inside its store to independent vendors, who pay $1.20 per day to hawk Yunnan coffee, tobacco bongs filled with local rice wine and condiments made from eggplant, soybeans and ginger. The atmosphere is “festival-like, even chaotic,” as vendors shout out their wares, sometimes through loudspeakers or while pounding on drums, and customers crowd a stall to fish pears out of a solution of sugar, salt and licorice root–”a Wal-Mart store sans Wal-Martism,” according to sociologist Eileen Otis. Another Chinese employee explains his loyalty to the company by suggesting that Sam Walton was, in fact, a student of Chairman Mao who “adopted the revolutionary strategy of ‘the countryside encircling the city.’&nthinsp;” And so the revolution continues.
How Wal-Mart’s Ruthlessness Led to Its Undoing – Jefferson Decker, Nation
September 18th, 2009
The recession is probably over. So said Ben Bernanke this week. His timing is exquisite. President Obama has reappointed him to be Fed chairman, and he can now head into his Senate confirmation hearings this fall with the reputation that he nipped another Great Depression in the bud.
But did he?
Trying to challenge Mr. Bernanke’s job performance is like trying to convince your average ancient Greek that Zeus was a bumbling weakling. That’s because the mystique surrounding the Fed’s ordinary actions – let alone its recent, extraordinary ones – is thicker than the fog at Mt. Olympus’s summit. People entertain perfectly absurd beliefs concerning what the Fed can – and what it can’t – do; and while some like to blame the Fed for every economic hiccup, others are no less convinced that the economy would drop dead were it not for its constant care.
Did Bernanke Prevent a Great Depression? – George Selgin, CS Monitor
Also,
Transparency and the Fed
Taxpayers have a right to know where all the bailout money went.
Transparency & the Bernanke Fed – Matthew Winkler, Wall Street Journal
September 18th, 2009
Stiglitz Says U.S. Economic Recovery May Not Be ‘Sustainable’
By Michael McKee
Sept. 4 (Bloomberg) — The U.S. economy faces a “significant chance” of contracting again after emerging from its worst recession since the 1930s, Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz said.
“It’s not clear that the U.S. is recovering in a sustainable way,” Stiglitz, a Columbia University professor, told reporters yesterday in New York.
Economists and policy makers are expressing concern about the strength of a projected economic recovery, with Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner saying two days ago that it’s too soon to remove government measures aimed at boosting growth.
Stiglitz said he sees two scenarios for the world’s largest economy in coming months. One is a period of “malaise,” in which consumption lags and private investment is slow to accelerate. The other is a rebound fueled by government stimulus that’s followed by an abrupt downturn — an occurrence that economists call a “W-shaped’ recovery.
“There’s a significant chance of a W, but I don’t think it’s inevitable,” he said. The economy “could just bounce along the bottom.”
Stiglitz said it’s difficult to predict the economy’s trajectory because “we really are in a different world.” He said the crisis of the past year was made worse by lax regulation that allowed some financial firms to grow so large that the system couldn’t handle a failure of any of them.
Big Banks
“These institutions are not only too big to fail, they are too big to be managed,” he said.
Finance ministers and central bankers from the Group of 20 nations meet in London Sept. 4-5 to lay the groundwork for a summit in Pittsburgh later this month, where leaders will consider measures to overhaul supervision of the financial system…
With so much excess capacity, the American economy faces a short-term threat of disinflation and possibly deflation, Stiglitz said. Wages may even decline, given recent high productivity and the likelihood of an extended period of high unemployment, he said.
Longer term, he said the Fed’s aggressive monetary policy will mean inflation becomes the greater threat. “With the magnitude of the deficits and the balance sheet of the Fed having been blown up, it’s understandable why there are anxieties about inflation,” he said.
While the Fed says it has the tools to deal with it, there are still concerns, Stiglitz said. Because monetary policy takes six to 18 months to have its full effect, the central bank will have to begin withdrawing monetary stimulus on the basis of forecasts.
The Fed’s record on its economic forecasts isn’t enough to reassure investors and, as a result, the U.S. currency may suffer, he said.
Dollar ‘Weakness’
“Whether or not they’re able to do it, the uncertainty today about whether they can do it can contribute to the weakness of the dollar,” Stiglitz said. “That’s one of the reasons there is increasing interest around the world in discussing alternatives to the dollar system.”
Stiglitz, who is a member of a United Nations commission that will study the global financial system and currency regimes, said “the logic is compelling” for a new global currency.
The current system creates instability, weakens global confidence, and is fundamentally unfair to developing countries that are in essence lending the U.S. trillions of dollars and bearing the risk, he said.
“In most quarters, there is a feeling we should move away from the dollar system. The question is do we do it in an orderly way, or a chaotic way,” Stiglitz said. “The size of the deficit and the size of the balance sheet of the Fed have just increased the anxiety and the desire that something be done.”
While some think it would hurt the U.S. to no longer be able to borrow cheaply in dollars, “that era is over,” he said. “We’re moving to a more multi-polar world.”
Between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of Lehman Brothers was “the short period of American triumphalism, where we dominated the global scene. That period is over,” Stiglitz said.
September 4th, 2009
From the Mises Institute:
August 8th, 2009
As U.S. deficits increased, global investors edged away from the dollar into the German mark, the Japanese yen, the Swiss franc, the Euro, and more recently baskets of Asian currencies.
Which brings us to today. Only goodwill (defined both as an accounting term and as political deference to military might) now supports the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency, which is what allows the United States to issue dollar-denominated bonds in world money markets.
It is this borrowing capacity that allows the Obama administration to bailout the banking industry, offer to pay for universal health care, fight colonial wars in the Middle East, stimulate the economy, send billions to Egypt and Israel, buy out General Motors, and subsidize every windmill start-up company in Nancy Pelosi’s home district. (Madoff’s problem was that he failed to set himself up as a country. He otherwise understood deficit spending.) But the shell game requires full faith in the dollar.
For those riding out financial storms by “sitting on cash,” here is what’s under your seat: in recent months U.S. federal debt has grown to $11.3 trillion, almost equivalent to gross domestic production. About one quarter of this indebtedness, or $2.8 trillion, is held abroad, and China and Japan hold just under half of those assets (liabilities to Uncle Sam).
Elsewhere on the American balance sheet is another $11.4 trillion in household debt, an annual trade deficit of about $725 billion, and a federal budget deficit that is estimated in 2009 to be approaching $1.8 trillion. That’s if the economy grows at 3 percent.
Off-balance sheet risks, what accountants call contingent liabilities, include about $10 trillion in new bailout guarantees (Fannie Mae, Bear Stearns, Countrywide, and whatever the administration launches as its New Deal of the Day). None of the above includes the unfunded liabilities of Social Security ($41 trillion), which, by comparison, make the shares of Lehman Brothers and AIG look like Scottish bonds held for widows and orphans.
The geese laying the golden eggs of U.S. financial stability are the printing presses of the U.S. Treasury, and, for now, those collecting them in their Easter baskets include a number of countries and regions perhaps tiring of American arrogance, if not of the drop in the dollar’s value. Who would blame such popular targets of moral abuse as China, Russia, Switzerland, Arabia, or Latin America for dumping their dollar-denominated assets?
All that lies between the U.S. dollar and a financial Armageddon is the Faustian house of credit cards under which Asian economies invest their trade surpluses in U.S. Treasury instruments — to keep the dollar strong, their own currencies weak, and purchases brisk between the likes of Wal-Mart and the Asian Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere.
Sooner than we think, China and Japan, like all nervous creditors, may send the United States a letter, suggesting that, henceforward, if Washington needs to borrow money, the bonds be issued in renmimbi, yen, or a basket of Asian currencies (a Pacific Euro).
Wall Street bankers did the same to the farm interests in the late nineteenth century, when they insisted that debt be based on a gold standard, as opposed to “free silver.” President Obama may be as eloquent as William Jennings Bryan. But at that point he will need to use all his oratory for the business of selling junk bonds.
The Dollar: Running On Reserve – Matthew Stevenson, newgeography
August 2nd, 2009
New York Fed President William C. Dudley served 10 years as Goldman Sachs’s chief economist. (By Kevin Clark — The Washington Post)
By
Washington Post Staff Writer Monday, July 20, 2009
NEW YORK — The low-slung cubicles wrap around the ninth floor of a building three blocks from Wall Street, each manned by a young staffer staring at flashing numbers on a flat-screen computer monitor and working the phones to gather the latest chatter from financial markets around the world.
It could be any investment bank or hedge fund. Instead, it is the markets group of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which has been on the front lines of the government’s response to the financial crisis. Federal Reserve and Treasury Department officials make the major decisions, but the New York Fed executes them. The information gathered there provides crucial insights into the financial world for top policymakers. But the bank is so close to Wall Street — physically, culturally and intellectually — that some economic experts worry that the New York Fed puts the interests of the financial industry ahead of those of ordinary Americans. “The New York Fed sticks out as being not just very, very close to Wall Street, but to the most powerful people on Wall Street,” said Simon Johnson, an economist at MIT. “I worry that they pay too much deference to the expertise and presumed wisdom of a sector that screwed up massively.” Even some former insiders at the Fed say the bank does not pay enough attention to the fundamental flaws in the country’s financial system or to the risks associated with bailing out financial firms — for instance, the chance that banks will be encouraged to take more unwise gambles. These experts worry that the New York Fed has adopted the mindset of a trading floor: well attuned to ripples in financial markets but not to long-term trends and dangers. Last month, for instance, Wall Street bond traders wanted the central bank to ramp up its purchase of Treasury bonds, which would help the traders by driving up prices. But Fed officials in Washington and around the country concluded that such a move would be counterproductive in the longer run, in contrast to some New York Fed staffers, whose views more closely mirrored those on Wall Street. New York Fed employees “play a very valuable role, day in, day out, with detailed contacts with the big financial firms,” said William Poole, a former president of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis who is now at the Cato Institute. “What I think is missing is a longer-run perspective. They tend to be sort of short-term in their outlook, which is true of a lot of the financial firms. Traders have a horizon of a few hours or a few weeks, at most.” The New York Fed’s home is a fortresslike building, with bars securing the windows on lower floors. Its main lobby resembles a Gothic cathedral: dim, quiet, with stone walls, as if to inspire a mix of fear and awe. Like the other 11 regional Federal Reserve banks, the New York Fed is a curious mix of public and private, part of a system Congress created in 1913 to avoid concentrated power in Washington or New York alone. Its board of directors is composed of bankers, businesspeople and community leaders, who select the bank president with approval from Fed governors in Washington. Banks in New York, Connecticut and parts of New Jersey own shares in the New York Fed, though its profits are returned to the U.S. Treasury. The man in charge is a soft-spoken economist named William C. Dudley, who took over as president in January, replacing Timothy F. Geithner when he became Treasury secretary. With a proclivity for button-down Oxford shirts and rumpled suits, Dudley does not fit the mold of a Wall Street executive. He has won fans across the Federal Reserve System for a collaborative style, as well as a talent for explaining complicated problems in the financial world and drawing up solutions to them. It is his résumé that alarms some critics, who see an example of a too-cozy relationship between financial firms and their lead regulator. One of several bank officials who have worked in the private sector, Dudley was at
Goldman Sachs for two decades, including 10 years as chief economist, before joining the New York Fed in 2007.
Some Fear N.Y. Fed Too Influenced by Wall Street – Washington Post
July 24th, 2009
The reason that the savings gauge has leapt is not that Americans are saving more, but only that they are paying off their past, huge borrowings because of financial distress. Americans actually cut savings in the form of financial assets held by 0.5 per cent of their incomes in the first quarter, while cutting borrowing even more aggressively, by 5 per cent of income. This telling data leads to two important conclusions.
First, it suggests that immediate US recovery prospects may be even more frail than supposed, and than Mr Bernanke is liable to admit. With Americans now battling to pay down debt against a backdrop of still-plunging house prices and soaring unemployment, while shoring up spending power with cuts in their savings, the resurgence of consumer demand on which recovery hopes are pinned may well prove elusive. The position could grow worse still once the boost to US personal incomes from the Obama Administration’s fiscal giveaway also fades, as it soon will.
Second, and critically, it is clear that America has yet to begin to address the real roots of this crisis and embark on the long road to a more sustainable economic future. Until it does so, the future will remain a hostage to fortune.
The U.S. Is Not Yet Free of Economic Peril – Gary Duncan, Times of London
July 21st, 2009
Despite the administration’s aggressive and costly economic policy initiatives, there is trouble all around.
Barely six months in office, President Obama already finds himself in an economic box. For despite his aggressive and costly economic policy initiatives, the jobs market shows no sign of healing. At the same time, the housing market foreclosure crisis continues apace, while renewed questions are again surfacing about the soundness of the U.S. banking system. To complicate matters, financial markets are now starting to fret about the longer-run inflationary consequences of the unusually large budget deficits in prospect for as far as the eye can see.
In January 2009, on presenting its $780 billion fiscal stimulus package, the Obama administration assured the public that because of that stimulus package U.S. unemployment would not exceed 8 percent. Yet already by June 2009, unemployment had risen to 9.5 percent; including part-time workers, who would prefer to be working full time, unemployment rose to a staggering post-war high of over 16 percent. Worse still, the jobs market shows every sign of being far from bottoming out.
The degree to which unemployment has exceeded the administration’s forecasts has to raise basic questions about the appropriateness and coherence of President Obama’s economic policy approach.
The degree to which unemployment has exceeded the administration’s forecasts has to raise basic questions about the appropriateness and coherence of President Obama’s economic policy approach. These questions pertain not simply to the very poor design of the fiscal stimulus package. Rather they pertain to the adequacy of the measures aimed at stabilizing the housing market and at resolving the country’s most wrenching credit crisis in the post-war period.
At the most basic level, one has to question how much sense it made for President Obama to allow the fiscal package to become excessively back-loaded at time when the economy needed immediate large scale support. If a large fiscal stimulus was indeed needed, why has only $60 billion of that package been dribbled out by June? And why is less than a third of the package scheduled to come into effect in 2009, the year when the package is most sorely needed?
Similarly one has to wonder about the heavy price that the Obama administration paid for effectively outsourcing the package’s design to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and the rest of the Democratic congressional leadership. Should it really have come as a surprise to us that the resulting stimulus package would be laden with pork and with expenditures that are going to be very difficult to roll back? Or should we now be shocked that the package fell sadly short of including fast acting and effective fiscal stimulus measures that might have gotten the most bang for the buck?
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Obama fiscal stimulus package is the serious way in which it compromises the country’s long-run public finances and fans long-run inflationary expectations. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office estimates that the Obama budget not only implies unusually large budget deficits over the next two years but it implies that, even when the economy eventually fully recovers, the deficit will remain in the region of between 4 and 6 percentage points of GDP. As a result, over the next decade, the public debt will rise in a manner that has never occurred before in peacetime, from around 41 percent of GDP in 2008 to 82 percent of GDP by 2019.
Over the next decade, the public debt will rise in a manner that has never occurred before in peacetime from around 41 percent of GDP in 2008 to 82 percent of GDP by 2019.
The rising tide of unemployment must also raise questions about the Obama administration’s efforts to stabilize the housing market, which the administration correctly views as a necessary condition for producing a meaningful economic recovery. One has to expect that a weaker job market will only exacerbate the country’s present foreclosure crisis, which is adding supply to an already glutted housing market. The Center for Responsible Lending estimates that 2.4 million homes could be in foreclosure in 2009 and as many as 8.1 million homes over the next four years. Yet, the Obama administration’s loan modification program announced earlier this year has to date only resulted in 190,000 offers at mortgage loan modification.
Rising unemployment also has to raise questions about whether the Obama administration is not being overly sanguine about the health of the U.S. banking system. For it would seem that unemployment will now well exceed the worst-case scenario in the bank stress test presented by the administration earlier this year. Yet, despite a weakening unemployment outlook that is sure to boost bank losses, the Obama administration is now cavalierly backing away from its earlier initiatives to reduce the toxic assets that remain on the banks’ balance sheets.
Less than six months into his term, President Obama already faces difficult economic policy choices. He can choose, as he now seems to be doing, to counsel patience and assure us that all is well at considerable cost to his credibility on economic policy management. Or he can own up to the facts that he misread the economy in January and that his economic team now needs to go back to the drawing board. For the sake of the U.S. economy, one has to hope that he has the courage to review the overall coherence of his policy approach before it is too late.
Desmond Lachman is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. He was managing director and chief emerging market economic strategist at Salomon Smith Barney and a deputy director in the International Monetary Fund’s policy and review department.
Obama Is Stuck In an Economic Box – Desmond Lachman, The American
July 15th, 2009
What’s the best way to express just how bad the job market is? You could look at the soaring unemployment rate, or perhaps the ever-shortening work week. How about this: Total nonfarm payrolls, notes economist James Hamilton, are now back to where they were in mid 2000, and in a few months they’ll certainly be back to pre-2000 levels. 21st century job creation: gone.
All Jobs Created in the 21st Century Are Now Gone – Clusterstock
July 10th, 2009
Why the oft-marginalized congressman is the greatest threat to Obama’s regulatory plan.
July 9th, 2009
How a Loophole Benefits GE in Bank Rescue
Industrial Giant Becomes Top Recipient in Debt-Guarantee Program
General Electric Co. CEO Jeffrey Immelt, center, is applauded by Michigan Gov. Jennifer Granholm during a news conference Friday, June 26, 2009, in Birmingham, Mich. Immelt announced GE will build a $100 million manufacturing technology center in Michigan that will eventually employ more than 1,100 workers. At right is Ed Montgomery, President Barack Obama’s director of recovery for auto communities and workers. (AP Photo/Carlos Osorio) (Carlos Osorio – AP)
ProPublica and Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, June 29, 2009
General Electric, the world’s largest industrial company, has quietly become the biggest beneficiary of one of the government’s key rescue programs for banks.
How a Loophole Benefits GE in Bank Rescue – Washington Post
July 1st, 2009
THE FEDERAL RESERVE IS NOT PROVIDING HINTS about any exit strategy from its policy easing.
Following its two-day policy meeting, the Federal Open Market Committee Wednesday reaffirmed its rock-bottom 0%-0.25% federal-funds rate target and its plans to purchase up to $1.75 trillion of Treasury, agency and mortgage-backed securities.
But for bond-market vigilantes looking for Bernanke & Co. to set a timetable to begin to reverse their policy of aggressive credit easing, it was a disappointment. Treasury yields ticked higher.
Since the FOMC’s previous meeting on April 29, the Fed’s policy-setting panel noted, “Conditions in financial markets have generally improved in recent months,” a nod to the sharp rallies in the equity and corporate fixed-income markets, both investment-grade and high-yield.
The Committee also noted, “The prices of energy and other commodities have risen of late.” That was a reversal from the observation at previous meetings that “inflation could persist for a time below rates that best foster economic growth and price stability in the longer term.” In other words, the dreaded D word, deflation.
But the FOMC was quick to add this time: “However, substantial resource slack is likely to dampen cost pressures, and the Committee expects that inflation will remain subdued for some time.”
Indeed, by pointing out that “economic activity is likely to remain weak for a time,” the monetary authorities clearly signaled their policy stance remains on hold for “an extended period.” The panel’s vote on the policy action was unanimous, as it was at the April meeting.
While the Fed did not lay out any exit strategy for its current program of aggressive easing to combat the worst credit contraction since the Great Depression, it left itself some wiggle room to reassess its program of securities purchases.
“The Federal Reserve is monitoring the size and composition of its balance sheet and will make adjustments to its credit and liquidity programs as warranted,” a slightly more definite and less-conditional tone than it took in the previous statement.
That could be significant should the central bank decide to alter the mix of its securities purchases, which currently are projected to consist of $1.25 trillion of agency MBS and $200 billion of agency debt purchased by the end of the year and $300 billion by autumn. Given the rise in mortgage rates, the Fed might want to tilt more to MBS purchases to try to bring down the cost of loans for home purchases and refinancings, which have been flagging in recent weeks.
Even with the Fed’s acknowledgement that “the pace of economic contraction is slowing” — a far cry from a recovery — the financial futures markets continue to put better than two-to-one odds on a rate hike by year’s end.
The December fed-funds futures contract puts a 69% probability on a half-point hike in the current funds target at the Dec. 15-16 FOMC meeting, unchanged from Tuesday, Dow Jones Newswires reports. The February 2010 contact fully prices a half-point hike for the Jan. 26-27 meeting.
Yet, the overall outlook for Fed policy remains unchanged among economists.
The Fed Offers No Hints on an Exit Strategy – Randall Forsyth, Barron’s
June 26th, 2009
Diane Francis, Financial Post Published: Monday, June 22, 2009
American opponents to President Barack Obama’s announced reregulation of the financial sector are billing the issue as capitalism versus socialism or even communism.
It is not the case. This is not the economic version of the Cold War, and the search for a new architecture does not mark the death of capitalism.
In fact, free enterprise was nearly murdered by Wall Street, AIG and other reckless financial institutions. They did not meet their defined responsibilities. They bent the law to bypass rules governing their behaviour. Many of them abandoned traditional banking and got into the gaming business. And they brought the world to the brink in the fall.
The role of government is appropriate in the financial sector because of its importance to sustaining a healthy capitalist system. Banks, brokers, insurers and others are licensed by the government to benefit society by being astute gatekeepers to success. They deploy their own capital and savings from the public honestly by investing in worthy individuals and entities that will create wealth, then repay their loans.
Government’s role is necessary because these institutions, in turn, exist as a result of deposits from the public and shareholders’ money. They have a fiduciary obligation to responsibly use other people’s money for the benefit of all. The rules dictate who, what and how they lend or insure, as well as how they leverage.
But what Wall Street and the others did was lend, or insure, obscene amounts of money to inappropriate entities for inappropriate reasons without any market discipline. There were no clearing houses for the trillions in derivatives they created, no markets for them, no pricing mechanisms, no leverage restrictions, no capital allocation and no transparency or proper accounting.
They were not players in a free-enterprise system, but were gamblers rigging the system for their own benefit.
America’s financial punters sank the legitimate and regulated credit system. They collected upfront fees and played fast and loose with credit instruments; witness estimates that the notional value of credit default swaps and other risky “derivatives” could total up to US$600-trillion, or 10 times the world’s GDP.
Last fall, Washington was told by AIG and Lehman Brothers that the world had gone bust. Thanks to trillions in bank bailouts, and shotgun marriages, total collapse was averted.
Months later, there are positive signs. Consumer confidence has a pulse, at long last, though this has yet to translate into spending. Some 53 million people have lost their jobs worldwide and governments are in hock to the tune of trillions. Innocent victims include the world’s poorest nations and their citizens, including those who ran their fiscal and monetary houses in a responsible way.
Wall Street’s recklessness, and in some instances criminality, has destroyed credit, which continues to afflict third-party, real-economy businesses from Detroit (which already had problems) to retailers and most others.
The fix will take years, require international co-operation and wasn’t the fault of government or the rest of us. So the next time some Wall Streeter or financial-sector apologist is blabbing about how reregulation will kill capitalism, just remember it was capitalists, so-called “champions” in pinstripes, who nearly destroyed free enterprise by driving it into a wall.
June 24th, 2009
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