http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_H2DePAZe2gA/S7_QM0TsZ7I/AAAAAAAAMXw/dCW3JtW0Bv4/s1600/RAMBO.jpg

When asked what advice he would give to residents of Ashtabula County Ohio because of cutbacks in official law enforcement budgets, Judge Alfred Mackey said they should:

“arm themselves. Be very careful, be vigilant, get in touch with your neighbors, because we’re going to have to look after each other.”

http://jessescrossroadscafe.blogspot.com/2010/04/ohio-judge-tells-residents-to-arm.html

 

Washington’s Blog

Greenspan’s big defense is that the financial crisis was caused by a “once-in-a-century” event.

Forget about the fact that the “once-in-a-century event” couldn’t have happened if Greenspan’s Fed hadn’t:

  • Acted as cheerleader in chief for unregulated use of derivatives at least as far back as 1999 (see this and this)
  • Allowed the giant banks to grow into mega-banks. For example, Citigroup’s former chief executive says that when Citigroup was formed in 1998 out of the merger of banking and insurance giants, Greenspan told him, “I have nothing against size. It doesn’t bother me at all”
  • Preached that a new bubble be blown every time the last one bursts
  • Kept interest rates too low
  • And did alot of other hinky things

More importantly, as Nassim Taleb repeatedly points out, financial experts who don’t plan for rare events are like pilots who don’t know about storms.

There are storms out there, Taleb says, and any pilot who doesn’t know how to deal with storms shouldn’t be flying. Similarly, no one should be in a position of financial leadership if they don’t know about – and plan for – the infrequent event:

Greenspan: The Financial Crisis Was Caused By A ‘Once-In-A-Century’ Event • Taleb: Any Pilot Who Doesn’t Know About Storms Shouldn’t Be In the Cockpit

 

As the folks at Standard Poor’s Valuation and Risk Strategies division noted in a research note Monday, the difference between the spread on U.S. sovereign credit default swaps and an equivalent benchmark for AAA-rated euro-zone sovereigns flipped into positive territory March 12. As U.S. CDS spreads expanded to their widest levels in two years, that cross-region gap blew out to 5.7 basis points last Friday before narrowing to 4.7 Tuesday.


Wider CDS spreads indicate that sellers of insurance against a particular issuer’s default are charging more for it. In effect, the positive U.S.-versus-euro zone spread means investors think the risk of a U.S. default–however remote–is greater than that on euro-denominated sovereign debt.

So much for the view that low inflation and loose monetary policy make for a rosier debt outlook for Treasurys than for the debt of crisis-hit euro-zone sovereigns.

Wall Street Journal

 

There is a thesis that the banks are in control of the Fed and as a result have gained control over the issuance of the currency of the United States. This thesis is based on the fact that the shares of the Federal Reserve Bank are held by these private banks. Does that mean that the private banks own the Fed?

The short answer is yes, but it is a hollow ownership with very restricted rights. This ownership basically exists to give credence to the claim that the fed is independent. It is appropriately described as follows in the Fed’s own publication “Federal Reserve System Purposes & Functions”:

The holding of this stock, however, does not carry with it the control and financial interest conveyed to holders of common stock in for-profit organizations. It is merely a legal obligation of Federal Reserve membership, and the stock may not be sold or pledged as collateral for loans. Member banks receive a 6 percent dividend annually on their stock. (p. 12)

This is exactly the manner in which Special Purpose Vehicles (or Special Purpose Entities) are created in the corporate world. There is usually a promoter who does not wish to be seen to own an entity but who wishes to derive some benefit from the existence of such an entity. Usually, overt ownership would adversely impact the presentation of the promoter’s financial reporting.

The authorities and regulators, including the Fed, are very aware of these Special Purpose structures, as is the accounting profession. Rules have been devised and implemented to assess any such arrangement in order to establish its true nature. It is therefore appropriate to assess the Fed’s independence — or, alternatively, interdependence — according to the very rules that it uses to assess Special Purpose Entities. First, let’s draw the simple ownership structure.

Anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of accounting principles would know that ownership of an entity without control over that entity requires further investigation. Consolidation of a group of companies can become complex when ownership and control are split. The GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) method in this case disregards ownership and focuses on control.

For example, a right to appoint the majority of the board of directors even in the absence of ownership would trigger a consolidation of that entity. Thus the controller and the entity would be seen as part of a group and collectively as a single interdependent consolidated entity. It follows that the simple structure of the Federal Reserve Banks drawn above is a split structure, where “ownership” is of limited significance and “control” must be established. Control will tell us whether the entities are independent or interdependent.

All regulation targets “control,” not just the legal form of ownership. Accounting principles of consolidation have evolved from Special Purpose Vehicles, to Special Purpose Entities, and very lately — with the revision in June 2009 for implementation in January 2010 of Financial Accounting Standard 46(R) (“FIN 46(R)”) — they have evolved into the concept of a “Variable Interest Entity.”

In effect, the test of whether one organization is a “Variable Interest Entity” controlled by another organization is similar to a DNA test to determine whether two people are members of the same family. FIN 46 (R) defines a “variable interest” as follows:

The enterprise with a variable interest or interests that provide the enterprise with a controlling financial interest in a variable interest entity will have both of the following characteristics:

a. The power to direct the activities of a variable interest entity that most significantly impact the entity’s economic performance

b. The obligation to absorb losses of the entity that could potentially be significant to the variable interest entity or the right to receive benefits from the entity that could potentially be significant to the variable interest entity. (par. 1A)[1]

The first test is to check for “the power to direct the activities.” Who exactly holds that power?

Here we turn to the Federal Reserve Act, which instructs the Regional Federal Reserve Banks to each elect their own board of directors, of which the chairman and vice chairman of the regional board will be appointed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The regional boards must have nine directors in three classes of three each (A, B and C directors): three A directors chosen by the stockholders; three B directors to represent the “public”; and three C directors to be appointed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System will appoint the chairman and vice chairman from the ranks of the three C directors.

The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System seems to have powers that could indicate “control,” including the appointment of the power positions of chairman and vice chairman. However, we must also ask whether the regional boards have the independent powers normally associated with ownership and control, or if their powers are restricted and controlled in any manner.

The answer again lies in the Federal Reserve Act:

Said board of directors shall administer the affairs of said bank fairly and impartially and without discrimination in favor of or against any member bank or banks and may, subject to the provisions of law and the orders of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, extend to each member bank such discounts, advancements, and accommodations as may be safely and reasonably made with due regard for the claims and demands of other member banks, the maintenance of sound credit conditions, and the accommodation of commerce, industry, and agriculture. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System may prescribe regulations further defining within the limitations of this Act the conditions under which discounts, advancements, and the accommodations may be extended to member banks. (section 3, par. 8)

The regional boards are limited in their ability to perform the primary functions of the Regional Federal Reserve Bank by the terms of the act and by the control of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. It is clear from the Federal Reserve Act that control does not rest in the Regional Federal Reserve Boards, nor are they independent, but they take instruction and are controlled by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

It is now appropriate to update the simplified structure drawn above, in order to add these two steps of control.

The question of who has control is not yet resolved; the nature of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System must be investigated next. Is the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System an independent body or beholden to another entity?

The “Purposes & Functions” document describes the nature of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System:

The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is a federal government agency. The Board is composed of seven members, who are appointed by the President of the United States and confirmed by the U.S. Senate.

The Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the Board are also appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The nominees to these posts must already be members of the Board or must be simultaneously appointed to the Board. (p. 4)

The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is a federal government agency. The power to appoint its members, chairman, and vice chairman is vested in the president of the United States, with the Senate having a veto power over any appointment.

The first requirement for a “variable interest,” “the power to direct the activities” is fulfilled: the federal government at the presidential level holds “the power to direct activities.”

The final version of the structure of control is as follows:

The next requirement that must be met for a “variable interest” is either an “obligation to absorb losses” or a “right to receive benefits.”

I would argue that the Fed’s right to create currency, together with the vested interests of federal government, are more than sufficient to infer an “obligation to absorb losses.” The Federal Reserve Act adds a complication to this argument by holding the shareholders responsible to the extent of their stockholding for the liabilities of the Regional Federal Reserve Banks. However, the “obligation to absorb losses” is not a requirement that needs to be met so long as the alternative, the “right to receive benefits” requirement, is met. Since the obligation is not clear cut, it is better to concentrate on the right. Note that neither the obligation nor the right need to be absolute.

Again we can turn to the two sources, the Federal Reserve Act and the Fed publication “Federal Reserve System Purposes & Functions” for guidance.

Federal Reserve Act:

Dividends and Surplus Fund of Reserve Banks

(a)

    1. After all necessary expenses of a Federal reserve bank have been paid or provided for, the stockholders of the bank shall be entitled to receive an annual dividend of 6 percent on paid-in capital stock.
    2. The entitlement to dividends under subparagraph (A) shall be cumulative.
  1. That portion of net earnings of each Federal reserve bank which remains after dividend claims under subparagraph (1)(A) have been fully met shall be deposited in the surplus fund of the bank.

(b) Transfer for fiscal year 2000.

  1. The Federal reserve banks shall transfer from the surplus funds of such banks to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System for transfer to the Secretary of the Treasury for deposit in the general fund of the Treasury, a total amount of $3,752,000,000 in fiscal year 2000.
  2. Of the total amount required to be paid by the Federal reserve banks under paragraph (1) for fiscal year 2000, the Board shall determine the amount each such bank shall pay in such fiscal year.
  3. During fiscal year 2000, no Federal reserve bank may replenish such bank’s surplus fund by the amount of any transfer by such bank under paragraph (1). (section 7)

“Federal Reserve System Purposes & Functions”:

The income of the Federal Reserve System is derived primarily from the interest on U.S. government securities that it has acquired through open market operations. Other major sources of income are the interest on foreign currency investments held by the System; interest on loans to depository institutions; and fees received for services provided to depository institutions, such as check clearing, funds transfers, and automated clearinghouse operations.

After it pays its expenses, the Federal Reserve turns the rest of its earnings over to the U.S. Treasury. About 95 percent of the Reserve Banks’ net earnings have been paid into the Treasury since the Federal Reserve System began operations in 1914. (Income and expenses of the Federal Reserve Banks from 1914 to the present are included in the Annual Report of the Board of Governors.) In 2003, the Federal Reserve paid approximately $22 billion to the Treasury. (p. 11)

The statement that “about 95% of the Reserve Banks’ net earnings have been paid into the Treasury since the Federal Reserve System began operations in 1914″ says it well enough. It is an irrefutable fact that the federal government possesses the overwhelming “right to receive benefits.”

The outright, indisputable conclusion is that the Fed, when tested against GAAP as the Fed itself uses it in the Fed’s assessments of those it regulates, is a Special Purpose Entity of the federal government (or, according to the latest definition, is a Variable Interest Entity of the federal government). The rules of consolidation therefore apply, and the Fed must be seen as controlled by federal government, making it indivisibly part of the federal government. The pretence of independence is no more that that, a pretence.

There is, however, no denying that the banks have tremendous vested interest in influencing the policies of the Fed, nor that the power being so narrowly vested in the president makes him a special target for influence. Still, the power to control the Fed is not in the hands of its “owners” but firmly in the hands of the federal government and the president of the United States.

Sarel Oberholster is a South African living in Johannesburg, Gauteng province. He is an economist by training, a specialist financial engineer by craft, and an inquisitive spirit by nature. He has been involved in banking for over 30 years. His quest for understanding complex economic phenomena is his muse for writing and he shares his insights on his blog.

Notes

[1] Financial Accounting Standards Board of the Financial Accounting Foundation; Connecticut, No 311; June 2009, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No 167.

 

“I have to think this train is probably going to leave the station soon and we need to focus our efforts on explaining the story as best we can. There were too many people involved in the deals — too many counterparties, too many lawyers and advisors, too many people from AIG — to keep a determined Congress from the information.” James P. Bergin, NY Fed, in an email to his Fed colleagues


‘Though it is hard to divine much understanding from the unredacted filing, it has become clear that Goldman had more involvement than previously believed: In addition to the credit default swaps it bought from AIG, the filing shows that Goldman Sachs also originated many of the underlying assets that AIG and the New York Fed bought back from Société Générale.

The American people have the right to know how their tax dollars were spent and who benefited most from this back-door bailout,” said Kurt Bardella, spokesman for Issa. “Now that it’s public, let’s see if the sky really does fall as the New York Fed said it would to justify its coverup.”

Other lawmakers believed that the New York Fed was trying to hide its ties to Goldman Sachs.’ AIG Reveals the Story – CNN


“Wednesday’s hearing described a secretive group deploying billions of dollars to favored banks, operating with little oversight by the public or elected officials.

We’re talking about the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, whose role as the most influential part of the federal-reserve system — apart from the matter of AIG’s bailout — deserves further congressional scrutiny…

By pursuing this line of inquiry, the hearing revealed some of the inner workings of the New York Fed and the outsized role it plays in banking. This insight is especially valuable given that the New York Fed is a quasi-governmental institution that isn’t subject to citizen intrusions such as freedom of information requests, unlike the Federal Reserve.

This impenetrability comes in handy since the bank is the preferred vehicle for many of the Fed’s bailout programs. It’s as though the New York Fed was a black-ops outfit for the nation’s central bank

New York Fed staff and outside lawyers from Davis Polk & Wardell edited AIG communications to investors and intervened with the Securities and Exchange Commission to shield details about the buyout transactions, according to a report by Issa.

That the New York Fed, a quasi-governmental body, was able to push around the SEC, an executive-branch agency, deserves a congressional hearing all by itself.” Secret Banking Cabal Emerges From AIG Shadows – Reilly – Bloomberg

Hat Tip to : Jesse

NY Fed Conspired to Hide Details of AIG Bailouts from Public and Congress

Sic transit America?

 A Growing List Of One Term Presidents, A State of Distress, A Time To Repent, AIG and all that....., “the Greenspan doctrine”, Back to the basics, Collateral Damage, Coming Social Unrest, Commercial Real Estate Bust, Consumption Ran the Old Economy, Coup d'etat in America, Death of the Dollar, Deflation-Inflation-Stagflation, Devaluation, Dismal Science-Ignorant Scientists?, Even the Terminator Can't Help California, Federal Reserve-Discussion, Figures don't lie but Liars can figure, Integrity and Responsibility, Is The Market Rally Real?, It Is Nice To Be Part of the Elite!, It starts with a foundation, IT'S ALL ABOUT POWER AND MONEY, Monetary Policy - Discussion, Our phony middle class, Patience is a virtue...Delusion is a vice, Political Chaos, Politicians, Prostitutes and Pimps All Rhyme, Small Business-Bedrock of America, Sub-Prime anytime, TARP fruit loops, The Arrogance of Power, The Consequences of Greed, The Democrats Blew It Again, The End of American Capitalism As We Know It? - Discuss, The excellent adventures of Ben Bernanke, The Financial Elite, The Global Economy, The Habits of Hedge Funds, The Importance of Strategic Planning, The Inherent Disorder of Empires, The Intrusion of UNLAWFUL Authority, The Judeo-Christian Political Coalition, The New American Socialism, The Sorry State Of American Manufacturing, Time For A New Third Party, Truth In Charity, Unemployment Catastrophe, US Trade Imbalance, USA Is the New Japan, We Are All Cooked, We Are All Guilty, We Have Become Beggars To The World  No Responses »
Jan 162010
 
An American sailor stands on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington
Flagging: a US sailor stands on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington

If a week is a long time in politics, a decade is starting to look like an age in geopolitics. Comparing the America that began the 21st century with the America of today is to witness a country that has in some ways quite radically altered its view of itself and its relationship to the world.

In short, the metallic rust of decline has crept into the American soul. “You could argue that the first decade of the 21st century was the last decade of the American century,” says David Rothkopf, a former Clinton administration official and student of US foreign policy. “We are now entering the multipolar century.”

Self-doubt tarnishes Brand America

 

Barack Obama ran for president as a man of the people, standing up to Wall Street as the global economy melted down in that fateful fall of 2008. He pushed a tax plan to soak the rich, ripped NAFTA for hurting the middle class and tore into John McCain for supporting a bankruptcy bill that sided with wealthy bankers “at the expense of hardworking Americans.” Obama may not have run to the left of Samuel Gompers or Cesar Chavez, but it’s not like you saw him on the campaign trail flanked by bankers from Citigroup and Goldman Sachs. What inspired supporters who pushed him to his historic win was the sense that a genuine outsider was finally breaking into an exclusive club, that walls were being torn down, that things were, for lack of a better or more specific term, changing.

Then he got elected.

What’s taken place in the year since Obama won the presidency has turned out to be one of the most dramatic political about-faces in our history. Elected in the midst of a crushing economic crisis brought on by a decade of orgiastic deregulation and unchecked greed, Obama had a clear mandate to rein in Wall Street and remake the entire structure of the American economy. What he did instead was ship even his most marginally progressive campaign advisers off to various bureaucratic Siberias, while packing the key economic positions in his White House with the very people who caused the crisis in the first place. This new team of bubble-fattened ex-bankers and laissez-faire intellectuals then proceeded to sell us all out, instituting a massive, trickle-up bailout and systematically gutting regulatory reform from the inside.

How could Obama let this happen? Is he just a rookie in the political big leagues, hoodwinked by Beltway old-timers? Or is the vacillating, ineffectual servant of banking interests we’ve been seeing on TV this fall who Obama really is?

Whatever the president’s real motives are, the extensive series of loophole-rich financial “reforms” that the Democrats are currently pushing may ultimately do more harm than good. In fact, some parts of the new reforms border on insanity, threatening to vastly amplify Wall Street’s political power by institutionalizing the taxpayer’s role as a welfare provider for the financial-services industry. At one point in the debate, Obama’s top economic advisers demanded the power to award future bailouts without even going to Congress for approval — and without providing taxpayers a single dime in equity on the deals.

How did we get here? It started just moments after the election — and almost nobody noticed.

Previous Page

 

http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_H2DePAZe2gA/SwVeYK_iRhI/AAAAAAAAKfo/1cF46qmVe0Q/s1600/mask_-_weil.JPG

 

“Hindsight is a wonderful thing,” said Timothy W. Long, the chief bank
examiner for the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. “At the height of
the economic boom, to take an aggressive supervisory approach and tell people to
stop lending is hard to do.” Post Mortems Reveal Obvious Risks at Banks, NY Times

 

An Inside Look at How Goldman Sachs Lobbies the Senate, by Matt Taibbi: …Later on this week I have a story coming out in Rolling Stone that looks at the history of the Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers collapses. The story ends up being more about naked short-selling and the role it played in those incidents than I had originally planned…, but it turns out that there’s no way to talk about Bear and Lehman without going into the weeds of naked short-selling…

It’s the conspicuousness … that is the issue here, and the degree to which the SEC and the other financial regulators have proven themselves completely incapable of addressing the issue seriously, constantly giving in to the demands of the major banks to pare back (or shelf altogether) planned regulatory actions. There probably isn’t a better example of “regulatory capture” … than this issue.

In that vein, starting tomorrow, the SEC is holding a public “round table” on the naked short-selling issue. What’s interesting about this round table is that virtually none of the invited speakers represent shareholders or companies that might be targets of naked short-selling, or indeed any activists of any kind in favor of tougher rules against the practice. Instead, all of the invitees are either banks, financial firms, or companies that sell stuff to the first two groups.

In particular, there are very few panelists — in fact only one, from what I understand — who are in favor of a simple reform called “pre-borrowing.” Pre-borrowing is what it sounds like; it forces short-sellers to actually possess shares before they sell them.

It’s been proven to work, as last summer the SEC, concerned about predatory naked short-selling of big companies in the wake of the Bear Stearns wipeout, instituted a temporary pre-borrow requirement…

The lack of pre-borrow voices invited to this panel is analogous to the Max Baucus health care round table last spring, when no single-payer advocates were invited. So who will get to speak? Two guys from Goldman Sachs, plus reps from Citigroup, Citadel (a hedge fund that has done the occasional short sale, to put it gently), Credit Suisse, NYSE Euronext, and so on.

In advance of this panel and in advance of proposed changes to the financial regulatory system, these players have been stepping up their lobbying efforts… Goldman Sachs in particular has been making its presence felt.

Last Friday I got a call from a Senate staffer who said that Goldman had just been in his boss’s office, lobbying against restrictions on naked short-selling. The aide said Goldman had passed out a fact sheet about the issue that was so ridiculous that one of the other staffers immediately thought to send it to me. When I went to actually get the document, though, the aide had had a change of heart.

Which was weird, and I thought the matter had ended there. But the exact same situation then repeated itself with another congressional staffer, who then actually passed me Goldman’s fact sheet.

Now, the mere fact that two different congressional aides were so disgusted by Goldman’s performance that they both called me on the same day — and I don’t have a relationship with either of these people — tells you how nauseated they were.

I would later hear that Senate aides between themselves had discussed Goldman’s lobbying efforts and concluded that it was one of the most shameless performances they’d ever seen from any group of lobbyists, and that the “fact sheet” … was, to quote one person familiar with the situation, “disgraceful” and “hilarious.” …

 

On September 15th, like many Americans, I made my third-quarter estimated state and federal income tax payments.   I spent about an hour figuring out how much money I needed to send in, and about another hour driving to and from, and dealing with, the post office.    I can’t get those two hours back.   But it wasn’t the large checks that really got me steamed, as much as the thought of how the money would be spent.

Imagine a scenario where a genuine solution to a long-time affliction against humanity could be reached simply by raising a large sum of money, but at the same time, there were no income taxes.   Say it was going to cost, in the form of a one-time payment, 10% of your annual income, to cure cancer.   To truly cure it.  To be able to relegate it to the proverbial dustbins of history.   Who wouldn’t gladly write the check?

By tremendous contrast, what form of government spending produces such a feeling?    I believe it is exactly this contrast that gets to the root of the anger we see today about a government running itself seemingly out of control.   There is a gut-feeling that much of our tax money, much of the costs of government, much of the regulatory barriers to whatever, much of the debt we’re incurring, just amounts to so much waste.

September 12, 2009 Washington DC protests

Try to think for a moment of the specific things that you think the government should be charged with doing.    Beyond the important but abstract things like enforcing the rule of law, most of us would consent to pay for some specific services, such as a national defense or even a public highway system.   But it’s tough for any one person to come up with a long list of things.     The framers of the US Constitution thought about such things and came up with their own list.   It’s very short, and it’s spelled out largely in Article I, section 8 This, of course only deals with the federal level, and notably, the tenth Amendment ascribes all other powers to the states.   Almost none of the issues that occupy today’s headlines remotely fit the list, and as of 2004 the Federal Register had nearly 80,000 pages. It’s safe to say there are more today.

So have we cured cancer?  Or hunger?   Or homelessness?  Is there a chicken in every pot?  How about an iPod? Can government succeed in such efforts?

To suggest that it can not is not to be pessimistic, or unpatriotic, or even anarchistic.    To suggest that it can not does not mean that individuals should not try on their own, or even in groups both big and small, to do what they can.  It boils down to a question of who decides. Who decides what problems should be tackled?   Who decides what should be spent on them?  Who decides what level of service or result is appropriate, and at what cost?

Are there incentives in place for government to succeed?   What happens when it fails?   In the private sector, capital is raised through voluntary means based on a  service provider’s potential to meet some need.   Often, but not always, there is a rate of return for the capital provider.   When the service provider succeeds it is rewarded with more capital.  If it should fail, capital providers look elsewhere.    No such feedback mechanism exists with government.  It’s worse than that, because with government, the capital raising process is involuntary.

Getting back to writing that one-time check,  I believe most of us would write it because most of us have a sense of genuine charity.  Faced with a genuine need and the distinct possibility of making a difference, we rally to the cause. Indeed, all of the major religions call upon us to be charitable.  And there’s the rub:  taxation, directed by politics, even when the proceeds are to be used for supposedly noble goals, is not charity.

Gov’t Spending: It’s the Waste, Stupid! – Dean Zarras, Civil Society Trust

 

Pittsburgh protesters demand G20 do more for jobs
Forbes
“We’re not going to accept a jobless recovery,” said Larry Adams, a postal worker who came from Jersey City, New Jersey, for the protest.

 

“When an unprecedented amount of taxpayer dollars were lent to financial institutions in unprecedented ways and the Federal Reserve refused to make public any of the details of its extraordinary lending, Bloomberg News asked the court why U.S. citizens don’t have the right to know”

-Matthew Winkler, the editor-in-chief of Bloomberg News.

>

I would have been surprised if it went the opposite way.

“Federal Reserve must make records about emergency lending to financial institutions public within five days because it failed to convince a judge the documents should be exempt from the Freedom of Information Act.

Manhattan Chief U.S. District Judge Loretta Preska rejected the central bank’s argument that the records aren’t covered by the law because their disclosure would harm borrowers’ competitive positions. The collateral lists “are central to understanding and assessing the government’s response to the most cataclysmic financial crisis in America since the Great Depression,” according to the lawsuit that led to yesterday’s ruling.

The Fed has refused to name the borrowers, the amounts of loans or the assets put up as collateral under 11 programs, saying that doing so might set off a run by depositors and unsettle shareholders. Bloomberg LP, the New York-based company majority-owned by Mayor Michael Bloomberg, sued Nov. 7 on behalf of its Bloomberg News unit.”

The only way this has been historically been allowed is when it imoacts National Security . .  .

>

Source:
Fed Must Release Reports on Emergency Bank Loans, Judge Says
Mark Pittman and Karen Gullo
Bloomberg, Aug. 25 2009

http://www.bloombergs.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=afi7TJiJFys0

 

Curiously, as Treasuries were rallying, equities on both sides of the Atlantic were capering to almost their highest levels this year. After moves this week, when bond and equity prices fell together, it has led some to ask whether the traditional relationship between equities and bonds — where bond prices fall as equities rise — has broken down. If true, that might point to the scary conclusion that investors are losing their appetite for risk across the board. More likely, though, is that falls in Treasuries this week simply reflected the market’s struggle to digest the huge issuance.

The rally in equities, meanwhile, has been caused by better-than-expected company results. Apart from Royal Dutch Shell, UK blue-chips BT, BAT, AstraZeneca, BSkyB and Rolls-Royce all offered encouragement yesterday, as did Cadbury and Reckitt Benckiser earlier this week. It was a similar tale on Wall Street, with decent figures yesterday from the likes of Tyco, Motorola and MasterCard.

But investors should not be carried away. Many of these good results were simply due to cost cuts, running-down of stocks or, in the case of AstraZeneca, an unexpected absence of competition.

Equity markets now look to be fully up with events. The FTSE 100 looks set to finish July about 9 per cent higher — its biggest monthly rise since September 1992. It would be surprising if it did not tread water for the rest of the Ashes series.

A Tougher Market for U.S. Treasury Issues – Ian King, Times of London

 

Walking Away When You Can Pay By Kelsey VanOverloop

Homeowners are turning to the “strategic default” — walking away from a mortgage even when there are funds available to keep paying. “Increasingly, the determination of when to default is not guided by the moral question: Is this the right thing to do? It is guided by the pragmatic concern: Am I too far underwater on my mortgage?” writes Kelsey VanOverloop. Read more »

 

Returning from China last month, U.S. Congressman Mark Kirk had a bearish take on a high-level visit by American officials.

Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner claimed the U.S.’s biggest creditor voiced great confidence in its debt. Kirk, an Illinois Republican, came back with the opposite impression.

“China is beginning to cancel Congress’s credit card,” he told Fox News on June 10. It “doesn’t want to lend much more money to the United States and especially is worried about the Fed’s policy of printing money to buy new debt.”

A month later, there’s no doubt about whose assessment was more accurate. Chinese leaders are clearly very concerned about the dollar. How they will react is a key question hanging over markets, and it’s time to take the discussion to the next level.

Everyone knows China wants to reduce its dollar holdings. Little is known about how that process may unfold and how much work and preparation needs to go into it. Lots, in fact.

Think of China and the U.S. in history’s most expensive divorce. The two economies total $17 trillion of output, and polls in China show little support for adding to almost $800 billion of U.S. Treasuries.

This argument can be broadened to the rest of Asia. The idea that China or Japan — with $686 billion of Treasuries — can just start selling massive blocks of dollars is ridiculous. It would devastate markets the world over and the fallout would boomerang back on Asia. If you think markets are shaky now, just wait until word of a central-bank fire sale gets around.

Copycat Selling

Sure, Singapore (with $40 billion of Treasuries), India ($39 billion) or South Korea ($35 billion) could try to dump dollars on the stealth. Good luck in this highly connected, around-the-clock world. News that a key economy seeks a first- mover advantage over peers would inspire copycat selling. Expect investors and traders to respond with massive sell orders.

Warren Buffett can discreetly trim Berkshire Hathaway Inc.’s interest in a company or a currency. How a central bank divests itself of tens or hundreds of billions of dollars on the sly is another matter.

Governments that may be concerned about getting stuck with their dollars for good have a point. And by curtailing investments in dollars today, Asia is ensuring that the U.S. currency will be worth less a year from now. Bernard Madoff can tell you a thing or two about how this process works.

Dollar Accord

What may be necessary is a global framework or pact to end the dollar’s dominance. A “Plaza Accord” of sorts may be needed to dismantle the so-called Bretton Woods II system of tying currencies to the dollar that emerged after the global crises of 1997 and 1998. A Dollar Accord, anyone?

Just as stocks take a hit when additional shares are issued, Asia faces a debt-dilution dynamic for which it never bargained. The Federal Reserve’s zero-interest-rate policies don’t help. And Asia can’t do a lot on its own here.

This process will require considerable cooperation, be it through the International Monetary Fund, the Group of 20, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or a yet-to-be-created entity. Goals must be set, mechanics discussed and timing negotiated. If ever there were a time for a currency summit, it’s now.

Politics will be a stumbling block. It’s hard to envision the U.S. signing on to scrap the dollar as the reserve currency. Neither the euro nor the yen is ready to replace it. And China’s designs on currency domination are a decade away — or longer.

IMF Solution

The amount of scrutiny the dollar’s successor would face makes you wonder who would want to print the reserve currency. That explains why the most credible argument making the rounds involves the IMF’s so-called Special Drawing Rights, or SDRs.

They are really an account of exchange, rather than legal tender, and are calculated according to a basket of currencies consisting of the dollar, euro, yen and pound. Chinese central bank Governor Zhou Xiaochuan wants the IMF to move toward creating a “super-sovereign reserve currency.”

Or, here’s another suggestion: Brady bonds for less- troubled economies. The idea behind bonds created in the 1980s as part of Latin America’s debt restructuring was to let investors swap their claims on nations in turmoil for tradable instruments. A similar process may work with the dollar.

Rumors of the dollar’s demise are no longer exaggerated. What is being exaggerated, though, is how easy it will be for Asia to get out of the quandary it’s in. Cutting off the U.S. government’s credit card, for example, means American consumers can’t buy your goods. And any sudden divorce between the world’s two main economic powers won’t be pretty. Far from it.

It’s time to figure out what the next step is, and policy makers need to get serious. Complaining about our dollar-based system won’t get us there. Some brainstorming about where to go from here would be far more constructive.

(William Pesek is a Bloomberg News columnist. The opinions expressed are his own.)

Our $17 Trillion Chinese Split Won’t Be Pretty – William Pesek, Bloomberg

 

The weekend G8 communiqué, coming after four months of stabilisation in most financial markets, seemed to mark the official end of the financial crisis. If so, what lessons should be learnt for economic and financial policies in the months ahead? The history of the crisis in the next few paragraphs may not be the standard version presented by most commentators and economists, yet recent events suggest it to be a plausible account of what went wrong.

The blunders that produced last autumn’s financial crisis had nothing to do with the supposedly inflationary monetary policies of Alan Greenspan, or the fiscal profligacy of Gordon Brown, or with Mervyn King’s lack of practical market experience, or Hu Jintao’s mercantilist approach to currencies and exports. All these and many other factors contributed to the vulnerability of the world economy, but none of them would have been enough to cause its near-collapse last autumn. For that we can blame the unforced errors of a man almost forgotten since he slipped quietly out of office at the beginning of this year: Henry Paulson, the former US Treasury Secretary and ex-chairman of Goldman Sachs.

To understand how a localised financial problem in one segment of the US mortgage market turned into a near-collapse of the global financial system we need to recall Mr Paulson’s astonishing misuse of mark-to-market accounting standards to expropriate the shareholders of Fannie Mae and then to bankrupt Lehman Brothers. What made matters even worse was his inability to understand the systemic consequences of what he was doing. Anyone who doubts the importance of individuals in economic history should recall that the single worst day of last autumn’s entire financial crisis, as measured by the widening of risk spreads on interbank credit, was September 23. That was the day Mr Paulson appeared before the Senate Finance Committee to explain what he wanted to do with the $700 billion he had requested from Congress. This was the moment when everyone realised the world’s most powerful economic official did not know what he was doing.

Once the key role of personalities and financial policies is recognised, it is hardly surprising that things began to improve almost as soon as Mr Paulson was replaced by a competent Treasury Secretary, Tim Geithner. A collapse of share prices on Wall Street triggered by the Lehman bankruptcy in September ended the very day after President Obama responded to attacks on Mr Geithner’s personal probity by offering his unqualified support. A week later, the suicidal mark-to-market accounting regulations were dismantled. And it is no coincidence that the financial crisis, at least in America and Britain, effectively ended that week. From that point onwards, the US Government found itself collecting tens of billions of dollars in repayments from supposedly insolvent banks. Far from being forced to nationalise almost every bank and running out of money with which to refinance toxic assets, as predicted by panic-mongering Nobel Laureate economists, the US Treasury now finds itself almost embarrassed by the hundreds of billions of dollars it has budgeted for supporting a banking system that no longer needs state support.

Paulson Caused the Financial Crisis – Anatole Kaletsky, Times of London

 

A good article at Forbes:     http://www.forbes.com/2009/05/19/federal-reserve-ron-paul-fdic-sec-opinions-columnists-bernanke.html

 

The Banks Are No Longer The Problem

From THE INSTITUTIONAL RISK ANALYST

http://us1.institutionalriskanalytics.com/pub/IRAstory.asp?tag=358

“You think that’s air you’re breathing?” Morpheus to Neo
The Matrix
We are gratified to see that Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner and Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke take our suggestion of several weeks ago on CNBC not to allow the TARP banks to repay the government debt until they prove the ability to function in the debt markets without reliance upon a government guarantee. Washington has indeed fixed the solvency problems of the large zombie banks — not with additional capital or stress tests, as many of us seem to think. Rather, the banks have been stabilized by turning them into GSEs via FDIC guarantees on their debt. Those banks which can end their dependence on federal guarantees will be the visible winners in the post stress test market, and valuations and spreads will reflect this divergence between zombies and viable private banks. Seen from this perspective, Chrysler, General Motors (NYSE:GM) and the large banks are GSEs rather than private companies, parestatales as they know them in Mexico. To talk about a rally in the equity of large US financials seems truly ridiculous, at least to us, especially true when you look at how the public sector subsidies being applied to the banks have distorted their financial statements. Maybe by the end of next year, when we know which banks can or cannot shed the need for government subsidies, then we can talk about investible equity in these GSEs. To that point, turning Bank of America (NYES:BAC), Wells Fargo (NYSE:WFC) and Citigroup (NYSE:C) into GSEs was just the first battle, Vol. II of the Lord of the Rings, to use another cinematic metaphor. Next comes dealing with the dysfunction in the non-bank market for securitization and financing, the real battle to save the US economy from a truly dreadful year-end 2009 and beyond. By the way, is it not remarkable that the FDIC has run dozens of resolutions and bank sales processes over the past 18 months without a single leak or breach of confidentiality of these sensitive transactions, including both the WaMu and Wachovia transactions? Yet the Fed and Treasury run a confidential stress test process via overt leaks the press! One thing we learned years ago working at the Fed of New York, the senior man never talks to the media and never goes to the meeting. Maybe our friend Nouriel Roubini could whisper this into Secretary Geithner’s ear next time they spend quality time. We hear from the Big Media, BTW, that Tim Geithner’s growing corps of handlers directs media inquiries to Roubini for “an objective view” of the Secretary’s handling of the financial crisis. One Democrat asks: Could it be Larry Summers to the Fed, Roubini to the White House? And speaking of the fall of the elites, FRBNY Chairman Steve Friedman finally resigned yesterday, ending a scandalous period when the greater community of present and past employees of Goldman Sachs (NYSE:GS), JPMorgan Chase (NYSE:JPM) and other dealers was arguably in control of the most important arm of the US central bank. The fact that the Board of Governors appointed former GS ibanker Freidman as a “C” class director, who are meant to represent the public interest and not be past officers of regulated banks, was scandal enough. But then, when GS formally became a bank holding company last year, the Board failed to remove Friedman when his conflict became acute. The Board also failed too to appoint another “C” class director, making it almost seem that the Board wanted to assist in the GS operation to influence the operations of a Federal Reserve Bank. Remember that the board of directors of the FRBNY selected Tim Geithner as President, who then bailed out AIG to the benefit of GS and the other OTC derivatives dealers that were facing AIG. That is why a congressional inquiry is needed to understand just why the Fed Board and, in particular, Fed Vice Chairman Don Kohn, tolerated the Freidman conflict and arguably neglected their statutory duty to ensure the proper governance and operation of a Federal Reserve Bank. But hold that thought. Earlier this week, IRA released to subscribers to our Advisory Service preliminary Q1 ratings for the 7,000 or so banks that have submitted their call reports to the FDIC. Users of the IRA Bank Monitor professional edition may view the preliminary ratings for the units of their BHCs as the reports are released by the FDIC. Once we are finished testing this preliminary dataset, we will also enable these displays in the consumer version of the IRA Bank Monitor. Click here to go to our Picking Nits blog where IRA CEO Dennis Santiago provides his take on the preliminary data from the FDIC and some observations about what the data suggests for 2009. While the idea of public stress testing is a new concept in Washington, we’ve been conducting a census of all US banks for years, first via our public Basel II benchmarks and Economic Capital model, and more recently with the bank ratings from our Bank Stress Index. Each quarter, we ask two basic questions about all US banks: Stressed View: First, how did you do this past quarter? Looking at factors such as capital, lending, realized losses, income and efficiency, we grade all US banks on a six notch scale, which forms the basis for our “A+” through “F” ratings. Risk Adjusted View: Second, we calculate Economic Capital or “EC” factors for all US banks, and compare the “stressed,” maximum probable loss from trading, investing and lending to their current capital, from tangible common equity up through the various regulatory measures. By looking at EC, we provide users of the IRA Bank Monitor with a second, risk-adjusted perspective on the safety and soundness of the institution. Based on the institutions for which data has been released by the FDIC, it is pretty clear in our latest stress test that the condition of the US banking industry is continuing to deteriorate and that we are still several quarters away from the peak in realized losses for most banks. The key telltale in the Q1 FDIC data is that ROE degradation, not charge-offs, still leads the rising stress evidenced by the IRA Banking Stress Index. Remember that provisions are a leading indicator, while charge-offs lag the credit cycle. Once you see ROE performance improving, meaning a decline in the need to build loss reserves to buffer future losses, and charge-offs are the leading factor in our index, then you’ll be able to test the thesis that the worst is over for US banks and valuations are beginning to stabilize. So based on what we see now, is it time to be being financials? One IRA reader in SF named Jonathan asks: “This market for financial stocks must have some of your clients scratching their heads. What do you make of things? Is this irrational exuberance or have we turned?” We’ll be addressing the Q1, post stress test valuations for the largest banks as the rest of the units in the bank universe fill in their FDIC CALL reports. No, in our opinion we have not turned the corner in financials. The current FDIC data suggests that bank loss rates may not peak until next year. We are not yet even on the right block to make the turn, in our view. Suffice to say that the composition of the Q1 loss data we see from the FDIC makes us believe that the peak in terms of losses for the US banking industry will be closer to Q4 2009 than our original target of Q2 2009. Given where large bank loss rates were in Q1 2009, just imagine where we’ll be by Q4. Or put another way, now you know why regulators are pushing BAC and WFC to raise additional capital. The bank stress tests conducted by regulators are not so much about capital adequacy through the current economic cycle as identifying enough capital to get the large zombie banks through the end of the year. While Larry Summers and the other economic seers who populate the Obama Administration actually believe that we’ll see an economic bounce in Q3 2009 – a key assumption that also underlies the regulators’ approach to designing the bank stress tests – we see nothing in the credit channel that suggests improvement in the real economy. Both residential real estate or “RES” and commercial real estate or “CRE” markets in the NY area, for example, are starting to see an acceleration in price declines, this as the swelling population of frustrated sellers is starting to capitulate in the face of few or no buyers. But the chief reason for this sad tale above is that there is no financing for jumbo loans in the RES market. Indeed, as one of the bankers who participated in the “Market & Liquidity Risk Management for Financial Institutions” conference sponsored by PRMIA at the FDIC University on Monday noted, banks are not originating any RES paper that cannot be sold to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, soon to be merged into “Frannie Mae,” as we noted earlier. During a luncheon keynote address at that event, Josh Rosner of Graham Fisher & Co. noted much of the “growth” in non-conforming real estate markets during the final years of the boom was fueled by speculative buying and that the lack of financing in the jumbo, non-conforming RES markets is forcing price compression in markets like the urban RES and CRE markets of NY, CA, MA, etc. “The lack of attention paid to the creation of industry wide standards and a more solid legal basis for securitzation has only hindered the recovery of a financial intermediation in a market that once funded about 50 percent of all consumer revolving and non-revolving credit,” Rosner told The IRA. While regulators think that stabilizing the banks was the real battle, is it in fact the dysfunction of the non-bank securitization markets and the effect of this dysfunction on valuations in the RES and CRE real estate markets that is now driving the US economic meltdown? While the Fed as a good bit to the toxic securitizations in cold storage on its balance sheet, the central bank’s best efforts at adding liquidity facilities cannot replace this multi-trillion dollar market if banks won’t originate paper. If you want to learn more about the problems in the non-bank sector and how products like ARMs are about to push the US economy into a meltdown, take a look at the presentation from the PRMIA event on Monday by Alan Boyce, the former CFC executive and now chief executive officer of Absalon, a joint venture between George Soros and the Danish financial system that is assisting in the organization of a standardized mortgage-backed securities market for Mexico. Go to the last slide. This is an illustration of the Option Adjusted Duration (“OAD”) of the US mortgage markets. Notice that the OAD calculated by Boyce has grown from a low of $23 trillion in Sep 05, which just happens to be the nadir of loan defaults for the US mortgage market, to $45 trillion in Mar 09. The OAD is set to grow significantly as US interest rates rise or as the slope of the interest rate curve steepens. OAD is essentially a way to measure the economic weight of debt, basically time x money or the price response for a given move in interest rates. Using existing data and some clever suppositions, Boyce constructed an alternate explanation of “the conundrum” of 2003 to 2006. This was driven by the Fed’s very predictable interest rate policy, which flattened the interest rate curve and compressed interest rate volatility. Homeowners were encouraged to refinance into ARMs and there was significant cash out refinancing into premium fixed rate mortgages. Interest rate risk was transferred to US consumers and created a ticking time bomb for US markets in terms of the future duration of the total corpus of outstanding mortgage debt. During the PRMIA conference, Boyce echoed the view of other participants that the failure to act on securitization ensures further RES and CRE price compression. In a rising rate environment the OAD of this RES exposure in particular will grow exponentially and dwarf the “weight” or OAD of the UST debt issuance. The US homeowner will be trapped in their homes, unable to sell as nominal mortgage debt exceeds house values. Of note, in the Danish system, rising interest rates do not create negative equity for home owners, performing borrowers may redeem their mortgage by purchasing the associated bond at the prevailing market rate. Credit risk is kept out of the bond market, making the mortgage bonds a pure reflection of the associated interest rate risks. By efficiently splitting credit and interest rate risk, there are no surprises as each risk resides where it is best analyzed and hedged. Bottom line is that securitization machine operated by Wall Street doubled the outstanding stock of mortgages during the last five years of the boom, but the falling OAD driven by Fed rate policy hid the growth. Unfortunately, in their wisdom, federal regulators actually encouraged US mortgage originators to use ARMs and other products to push interest rate risk onto the backs of homeowners and bond market investors ill-equipped to understand let along manage such risks. Boyce and many others believe that without a complete refinancing for all performing mortgage borrowers, the US real estate markets – and thus the financial industry – will in trapped in a deflationary environment for years to come. The only way to fix this mess, Boyce suggested at the conference, is to refinance the entire performing mortgage market into standardized, transparent, callable, fixed rate loans, which allow the homeowner to value his liability at the market price. The interest of the mortgage originator needs to closely aligned to that of the borrower via a minimum 10% first loss risk sharing. Rosner told The IRA he doubts that America’s political and business sectors are ready or willing to embrace the transparency and consumer-friendliness of Denmark’s mortgage sector, but the fact that Boyce and George Soros are advancing this example as a solution may be significant – especially as the year-end deadline for resolving the conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac approaches. Rosner and Boyce believe that the restructuring of the housing GSEs presents an opportunity to set a new, consistent standard for securitization in the US. More on this issue of “reformation” of the non-bank financial sector in a future issue of The IRA.
H/T TO JESSE”S CAFE AMERICAIN
 

From Bloomberg:

May 7 (Bloomberg) — The current global crisis is “vastly worse” than the 1930s because financial systems and economies worldwide have become more interdependent, “Black Swan” author Nassim Nicholas Taleb said.

“This is the most difficult period of humanity that we’re going through today because governments have no control,” Taleb, 49, told a conference in Singapore today. “Navigating the world is much harder than in the 1930s.”

The International Monetary Fund last month slashed its world economic growth forecasts and said the global recession will be deeper than previously predicted as financial markets take longer to stabilize. Nouriel Roubini, 51, the New York University professor who predicted the crisis, told Bloomberg News yesterday that analysts expecting the U.S. economy to rebound in the third and fourth quarter were “too optimistic.”

“Certainly the rate of economic contraction is slowing down from the freefall of the last two quarters,” Roubini said. “We are going to have negative growth to the end of the year and next year the recovery is going to be weak.”

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke told lawmakers May 5 that the central bank expects U.S. economic activity “to bottom out, then to turn up later this year.” Another shock to the financial system would undercut that forecast, he added.

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=avf2KVFwU8xQ

 
“The Treasury Department has decided to extend bailout funds to a number of struggling life-insurance companies, helping an industry that is a lynchpin of the US financial system, people familiar with the matter said. … The news will come as a relief to a number of iconic American companies that have suffered big losses made worse by generous promises to buyers of some investment products. Shares of life insurers have fallen more than 40% this year. Their troubles led to a string of rating-agency downgrades that, in a vicious cycle, made it more difficult for some insurers to raise funds. … If massive numbers of customers sought to redeem their policies, it could cause a cash crunch for some companies. … The decision by the Treasury Department adds a third industry to the banks and auto companies that have already received bailouts from the government. … Any life insurer that gets TARP funds will have to comply with strict executive compensation rules required by Congress. … Hartford and Lincoln have applied for TARP funds. Genworth said it has applied with the Office of Thrift Supervision to approve its thrift purchase. … Treasury had said last year that life insurers could be eligible for TARP funds if they owned bank-holding companies, but it hadn’t officially decided to give funds to these companies as it focused much of its energies on banks and auto makers. … Life insurers have been waiting several months to learn whether they would get federal funds. Many have resorted to contortions to bolster capital as they awaited word. Hartford recently said it plans to infuse $20 million into a cash-strapped Florida thrift it agreed to purchase for $10 million to qualify for federal aid under TARP”, my emphasis, Scott Patterson and Deborah Solomon at the WSJ, 8 April 2009.
During the S&L crisis I saw home builders buy S&Ls to use the S&Ls to finance their construction on favorable terms. Look at the perverse incentives TARP has created for life insurers.
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