New Jersey Survival

Ask yourself this question: was the housing price bubble, which has burst, caused by (a) a Fed policy of too much liquidity, which caused artificially low interest rates, which in turn caused a great deal of malinvestment, or (b) a Fed policy of too little liquidity which caused high interest rates and a credit-starved economy? If you chose answer b, congratulations, you may have a future as a celebrated author, historian, and Wall Street Journal commentator.

Answer b is a theme of a truly ridiculous article by John Steele Gordon in the October 10 issue of the Wall Street Journal online entitled “A Short Banking History of the United States.” The article is an attempt to defend the Fed, its founding father, Alexander Hamilton, and the regime that it finances. (Gordon is the author of a book entitled Hamilton’s Blessing which sings the praises of a large public debt, something that Hamilton himself called a “public blessing.”)

Rather than faulting the Fed for creating yet another boom-and-bust cycle, Gordon blames the current economic debacle on “the baleful influence of Thomas Jefferson.” Jefferson was the foremost opponent of a bank capitalized with tax dollars and operated by politicians and their appointees from the nation’s capital — Hamilton’s Bank of the United States (BUS), a precursor of the Fed. Thus, despite the fact that the real blame for the current economic crisis lies squarely in the lap of the Fed and its ideological underpinnings — particularly the legends and myths surrounding Hamilton — Gordon attempts to convince us that opposition to politicized, centralized banking is the real problem. Anyone who believes this could easily be persuaded that up is down, white is black, and day is night. The purpose of the Fed, according to Gordon, is to serve as a sort of a monetary benevolent despot: “To guard the money supply … regulating the economy thereby.”

Right-wing statists like Gordon, like left-wing statists, have adopted the custom of smearing Jefferson as a slave owner not so much because they are appalled that he owned slaves, but because their objective is to denigrate his laissez-faire/limited-government political philosophy. Gordon includes the Jefferson slavery smear in his article, but fails to mention that his hero Hamilton also owned “house slaves,” which were brought into his marriage by his wife Eliza; he once purchased six slaves at an auction; and he supported the return of runaway slaves to their “owners” under the Fugitive Slave Clause of the original Constitution.

Indeed, nearly all of the “first families” of the New York City of Hamilton’s time — his main social and political circle — were slave owners. As Hamilton biographer Ron Chernow has written, during Hamilton’s time, “New York City, in particular, was identified with slavery … and was linked [economically] through its sugar refineries in the West Indies” (where Hamilton was born and raised). By the late 1790s slaves were “regarded as status symbols” by the wealthiest New York families.

Gordon spreads several other falsehoods about Jefferson in the leading paragraphs of his article. This in itself is telling, for it shows that court historians like John Steele Gordon fully understand the importance of Hamilton’s statist political philosophy in propping up the Fed and the regime that it finances. Gordon claims that Jefferson, a lifelong businessman, “hated commerce,” “hated banks,” and “may not have understood the concept of central banking.” He also argues that Hamilton, by contrast, had a “profound understanding of markets” because he worked as a bookkeeper for British slave-owning sugar-plantation operators and exporters as a teenager on the Caribbean island of St. Croix. This is nonsense on stilts, as the philosopher Jeremy Bentham is supposed to have said with regard to another spurious claim.

What Jefferson opposed was Hamilton’s mercantilist policies of government-controlled banking, corporate welfare, protectionist tariffs, heavy excise taxation, excessive public debt, and other interventions. Unlike Hamilton, Jefferson had read and understood Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations and his Theory of Moral Sentiments, as well as the work of David Ricardo, Jean-Baptiste Say (who Jefferson tried to get to join the faculty of the University of Virginia), Richard Cantillon, and other economic theorists of that era. Hamilton was ignorant of or ignored all of this. His major intellectual influence was a propagandist for the British mercantilist regime named Sir James Steuart.

As Murray Rothbard wrote in an article entitled “A Future of Peace and Capitalism,”

Jefferson was very precisely in favor of laissez-faire, or free-market, capitalism. And that was the real argument between [Hamilton and Jefferson]. It wasn’t really that Jefferson was against factories or industries per se; what he was against was coerced [economic] development, that is, taxing the farmers through tariffs and subsidies to build up industry artificially, which was essentially the Hamilton program. Jefferson … was a very learned person. He read Adam Smith, he read Ricardo, he was very familiar with laissez-faire classical economics. And so his economic program … was a very sophisticated application of classical economics to the American scene … classicists were also against tariffs, subsidies, and coerced economic development…. The Jeffersonian wing of the founding fathers was essentially free-market, laissez-faire capitalists.

Compared to Jefferson, Hamilton was an economic ignoramus. His reputation as some kind of financial genius has been greatly exaggerated and fabricated, as the great late-nineteenth-century Yale sociologist William Graham Sumner wrote in his 1905 biography of Hamilton. In his Report on Manufacturers, for example, Hamilton presented the cockeyed notion that international competition would cause higher prices and protectionism would cause lower prices by causing domestic producers to compete more vigorously with each other. History had proven this to be an absurd idea long before Hamilton’s time.

Hamilton also condemned transportation costs, calling them “an evil which ought to be minimized” through protectionism. Of course, transportation costs also affect interstate trade, but Hamilton never voiced his opposition to them in that context. Hamilton was such a mercantilist that he even argued in favor of “a monopoly of the domestic market” by banning all imports altogether. It is little wonder that William Graham Sumner referred to Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures as a mass of economic confusion, just the opposite of a “profound and practical understanding of markets.”

Jefferson was not the only prominent opponent of Hamilton’s scheme to establish a bank operated by politicians out of the nation’s capital. James Madison also opposed the First Bank of the United States (BUS). The Virginia Senator John Taylor was as learned on the subject of political economy as Jefferson was, and immediately recognized the danger of imitating the Bank of England as a financier of mercantilist subsidies. “What was it that drove our forefathers to this country?” he asked. “Was it not the ecclesiastical corps and perpetual monopolies of England and Scotland? Shall we suffer the same evils in this country?” Hamilton’s answer would have been “why yes, we shall, for it is the surest route to accumulate power and wealth for myself and my fellow Federalists.” As Gordon wrote, “Hamilton wanted to establish a central bank modeled on the Bank of England.”

John Steele Gordon’s “short history” of banking is completely filled with falsehoods. Throughout his article, he blames Jefferson’s opposition to central banking for economic problems that were in fact created by Hamilton’s Bank of the United States.

As Murray Rothbard wrote in A History of Money and Banking in the United States (p. 69), as soon as Hamilton’s bank was established it

promptly fulfilled its inflationary potential by issuing millions of dollars in paper money and demand deposits, pyramiding on top of $2 million in specie. The Bank … invested heavily in loans to the United States government…. The result of the outpouring of credit and paper money by the new bank of the United States was … in increase [in prices] of 72 percent [from 1791–1796].

The BUS charter was not renewed after its first twenty years. Gordon blames Jefferson for this, but the above-mentioned economic instability that was caused by the BUS surely played a role. (And I’m sure Jefferson would have been proud to accept the credit for the demise of the BUS.) The BUS was revived after the War of 1812 (in 1817) and it immediately “ran into grave difficulties through mismanagement, speculation, and fraud,” wrote James J. Kilpatrick in his book, The Sovereign States. Consequently, “a wave of hostility toward the Bank of the United States swept the country,” which eventually led to President Andrew Jackson’s veto of the bank rechartering bill.

In 1817 the BUS quickly lent $23 million with a specie reserve of only $2.3 million. This flood of cheap credit created a brief economic boom, and then the inevitable bust, or depression, known at the time as the Panic of 1819. As Murray Rothbard wrote in The Panic of 1819, personal bankruptcies abounded, especially among farmers who had overextended themselves thanks to the BUS’s cheap credit; and there was for the first time large-scale unemployment in American cities, with manufacturing employment in Philadelphia falling from 9,700 employed persons in 1815 to only 2,100 in 1819. This was all Jefferson’s fault, says John Steele Gordon.

Another one of Gordon’s false claims is that “The Civil War ended … monetary chaos when Congress passed the National Bank Act,” which would become the state’s monopolistic monetary regime until the creation of the Fed in 1913. In reality, the so-called Independent Treasury System that existed from the early 1840s to 1863 was arguably the most stable monetary system in US history. Modern economic scholars have evaluated the Lincoln regime’s National Currency Acts and have arrived at the opposite conclusion of Gordon’s. In an article entitled “Money versus Credit Rationing: Evidence for the National Banking Era, 1880–1914″ (in Claudia Goldin, ed., Strategic Factors in Nineteenth-Century American Economic Growth) Michael Bordo, Anna Schwartz, and Peter Rappaport concluded that this Hamiltonian system “was characterized by monetary and cyclical instability, four banking panics, frequent stock market crashes, and other financial disturbances.”

Gordon notes that “inflation took off in the 1960s” but does not blame the actual cause of the inflation — the Fed and its legalized counterfeiting operations. He concludes by praising the regime’s current plans to nationalize the financial markets by assuming stock ownership in banks and appointing the US Treasury secretary as the nation’s first financial dictator. He thinks this will finally, at long last, achieve Hamilton’s dream of a “unified and coherent regulatory system free of undue political influence.”

Of course, no government institution in the history of the world has ever been free of political influence, due or undue. This is perhaps Gordon’s most spectacularly stupid remark.

“Unified” or centralized regulation of industry has long been a goal of statists who favor regulatory dictatorship as opposed to a governmental regime that delegates “too much” regulatory power. Gordon himself bemoans the “conflicting” regulations on the banking industry that have been imposed by the Fed, and the FDIC, FSLIC, SEC, and other federal regulators.

The system of financial regulatory dictatorship that Gordon praises, and which is about to be forced down the throats of the American public, has been tried before in other countries. During one of its own periodic financial crises, Italian government officials complained bitterly, as Gordon does, of regulation that has been “disorganic” and “case by case, as the need arises.” The Italian regime altered its regulatory system so that it could pursue “certain fixed objectives,” just as Gordon argues for a “unified and coherent regulatory system.” This highly centralized or even dictatorial regulatory system, the Italians argued, would supposedly “introduce order in the economic field” and achieve the goal of “unity of aim” with regard to government regulation of industry.

All of the words in quotation marks in the preceding paragraph, except for the last ones, are the words of Benito Mussolini. The “unity of aim” phrase was from Mussolini apologist/propagandist Fausto Pitigliani. There is, after all, a very keen similarity between Hamiltonian mercantilism — or an economy directed and controlled by government, supposedly “in the public interest” but in reality for the benefit of a privileged few — and the economic fascism of Italy (and Germany) of the 1920s and ’30s.

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Thomas DiLorenzo is professor of economics at Loyola College and a member of the senior faculty of the Mises Institute.

Caveat Emptor!     http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/

Jeffey Frankel
Politicians have always faced the temptation to give their constituents tax cuts. But in recent decades “conservative” presidents have enacted large tax cuts that have been anything but conservative fiscally, and have justified them by appealing to theory. In particular, they have appealed to two theories: the Laffer Proposition, which says that cuts in tax rates will pay for themselves via higher economic activity, and the Starve the Beast Hypothesis, which says that tax cuts will increase the budget deficit and put downward pressure on federal spending. It is insufficiently remarked that the two propositions are inconsistent with each other: reductions in tax rates can’t increase tax revenues and reduce tax revenues at the same time. But being mutually exclusive does not prevent them both from being wrong.

The Laffer Proposition, while theoretically possible under certain conditions, does not apply to US income tax rates: a cut in those rates reduces revenue, precisely as common sense would indicate. As detailed in a new paper of mine “Snake-Oil Tax Cuts,” for the Economic Policy Institute, this conclusion was the outcome of the two big experiments of recent decades: the Reagan tax cuts of 1981-83 and the Bush tax cuts of 2001-03. It is also the conclusion of more systematic scholarly studies based on more extensive data. Finally, it is the view of almost all professional economists, including the illustrious economic advisers to Presidents Reagan and Bush, even though it contradicted the views of their employers. So thorough is the discrediting of the Laffer Hypothesis, that many deny that these two presidents or their top officials could have ever believed such a thing. But abundant quotes show that they did.

The Starve the Beast Hypothesis claims that politicians can’t spend money that they don’t have. In theory, Congressmen are supposedly inhibited from increasing spending by constituents’ fears that the resulting deficits will mean higher taxes for their grandchildren. The theory fails on both conceptual grounds and empirical grounds. Conceptually, one should begin by asking: what it the alternative fiscal regime to which Starve the Beast is being compared? The natural alternative is the regime that was in place during the 1990s, which I call Shared Sacrifice. During that time, any congressman wishing to increase spending had to show how they would raise taxes to pay for it. Logically, a Congressman contemplating a new spending program to benefit some favored supporters will be more inhibited by fears of constituents complaining about an immediate tax increase (under the regime of Shared Sacrifice) than by fears of constituents complaining that budget deficits might mean higher taxes many years into the future (under Starve the Beast). Sure enough, the Shared Sacrifice approach of the 1990s succeeded. Compare this outcome to the sharp increases in spending that took place when President Reagan took office, when the first President Bush took office, and when the second President Bush took office. As with the Laffer Hypothesis, more systematic econometric analysis confirms the rejection of the hypothesis.

These matters are not solely of interest to historians or economists. The presidential campaign of Senator John McCain appears set to drive its wagon down the same road in which Reagan and Bush have already worn deep ruts. The candidate is apparently selling the same snake oil: he says he believes that tax cuts increase revenues. His principle policy director disavows the Laffer Principle, just as the economists who advised Presidents Reagan and Bush did. But the views of the economic advisers are not what determines what these presidents do.

“The Queen in Alice in Wonderland said that, with practice, she was able to believe as many as six impossible things before breakfast. Most of us are more limited in our capacity for credulity. If John McCain believes both the Laffer Proposition (tax cuts raise revenues) and Starve the Beast (higher revenues lead to higher spending, anathema to conservatives), then as a good conservative, his duty is clear. He ought to run on a truly novel platform of higher tax rates! Why? Higher tax rates would reduce revenues (this is what Laffer says would happen) and thereby reduce spending (this is what Starve the Beast says would happen).

Seriously folks. If McCain continues to propose extending the Bush tax cuts, he should at least be forced to choose between the Lafferite defense and the “Starve the Beast” defense. Only then can the rest of us know which of the two mutually inconsistent propositions to refute.

As the economic debacle facing Americans continues to materialize, those responsible are running for cover with ten Republican senators refusing to attend their own national convention. Four years ago we observed that the so-called “Republican philosophy” of small government, sound money, and balanced budgets was illusory in terms of the history and then-current policies of the Republican Party.[1] However, even we would never have guessed how awful the Republican Party economic policy would become. From mere mercantilism, the Republican Party is now flirting with comprehensive socialist economic policy and another Great Depression.

But the real problem is that their policies will lead to the nationalization of much of the mortgage-real-estate market. On July 30, 2008, President George Bush signed a bill into law that bails out Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to the tune of an estimated $25 billion dollars in taxpayer losses, according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). The bailout is intended to stabilize the short-term economy, but this ill-conceived nod to socialism will have disastrous long-term effects. First, according to most economic estimates, the bill that taxpayers would have to eat is laughably small. Economist Don A. Rich has calculated the possible losses at as low as $1.3 to $1.6 trillion given likely housing price declines and as high as $2.5 trillion (if the housing price fall mimics that of the Great Depression).[2] The fallout from either of these scenarios would be catastrophic as the Federal Reserve accommodated (within the fiat money system) the taxpayer-backed debt. The real debt would be inflated away and America’s real income could be reduced by as much as twenty percent.

Further, every incentive by profit-seeking lenders and asset-poor buyers will be in place for a continuing or recurrent mortgage debacle. Financial institutions will not only have mercantile “protection” from the federal government in terms of regulations; they will become social arms of that government. While Democrats certainly facilitated these economic actions as fellow travelers, Republicans, most especially George W. Bush, acquiesced. (His only objection was a $4 billion grant to states and cities to “refurbish” foreclosed homes). The economic choice is clear: either maintain a fiat-money-creation system and reinstate the asset proscriptions of the Glass-Stegall Act or abandon or modify the existing system of money and banking altogether, possibly including elements of a gold standard. Without some basic alteration in rules, the entire economic system will continue to be at risk, as will America’s predominance in the world of finance.

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Notes

[1] Robert B. Ekelund and Mark Thornton, “Republican Redux,” Review: Milken Institute (Third Quarter, 2003): 5-7 and Robert B. Ekelund, “The Awful Truth about Republicans” (March 25, 2004).

[2] Don A. Rich, “The Real Cost of a Full Bailout” (August 22, 2008).

Ludwig von Mises had a theory about interventionism:It doesn’t accomplish its stated ends. Instead it distorts the market. That distortion cries out for a fix. The fix can consist in pulling back and freeing the market or taking further steps toward intervention. The State nearly always chooses the latter course, unless forced to do otherwise. The result is more distortion, leading eventually, by small steps, toward ever more nationalization and its attendant stagnation and bankruptcy.

When you think about the current Fannie Mae-Freddie Mac crisis, you must remember Mises’s theory of intervention.

Reporters will not, but you must, provided you want to understand what is going on. President Bush is considering a fateful step in a 60-year-old problem: the nationalization of these mortgage companies. He wants to guarantee the $5 trillion (that’s trillion with a “t”) in debt owned by these companies. Another option would be to put these monstrosities under “conservatorship,” which means that you and I will pay for their losses directly.

Either way, it turns out that there is no magic way to put every American citizen, regardless of financial means or credit history, in a 3,000 square foot home. Someone, somewhere, sometime has to pay. No matter what rescue plan they are able to cobble together, that someone is you.

The heck of it is that any option would be devastating to the already-suffering housing market. The reason this sector was so wildly inflated is that banks knew that Fannie and Freddie were capable of buying any mortgage debt created by the banking industry. For these companies to be nationalized would effectively end their capacity to do this on a market basis. That means banks would suddenly have to act responsibly.

Now, you might say, if that’s true, the real blame is with the individual bankers that had been making irresponsible loans under the condition that these government-sponsored enterprises would absorb them. But that’s not right. Put yourself in the shoes of a banker over the last twenty years. You have competitors. You have a bottom line. If you don’t extend these loans, you come off as a fool. Your competition eats your breakfast. To stay ahead of market trends means that you have to play the game, even though you know it is rigged.

Place the blame not only on the banks, but also on the institutions that are siphoning off their liabilities for irresponsible behavior, and that would be Freddie and Fannie. And who created these? Travel back in time to the New Deal. Here is an article about the creation of Freddie Mac. And here is another about Fannie Mae.

They were created by FDR in 1938 to fund mortgages insured by the Federal Home Administration. They were used by every president as a means to achieve this weird American value that every last person must own a home, no matter what. So they were given the legal permission to purchase private mortgages and make them part of their portfolios. Still later, under LBJ and Nixon, they became public companies and sold stock. People called this privatization, but that isn’t quite right. They had access to a guaranteed line of credit creation with the US Treasury. They had lower borrowing costs than any private-sector equivalent.

Government-sponsored enterprises are not subject to market discipline like regular private-sector companies. Their securities are listed as government securities, so their risk premiums were not dictated by the free market. They could leverage themselves at 50-, 75-, 100-1, pyramiding debt on a tiny foundation of equity. The financial markets have long believed that the GSEs would be bailed out no matter what. And so this put them in a completely different position from a company like Enron, which the markets watched closely. What’s causing the current panic is that the markets have wised up and started evaluating these institutions by market standards. Freddie and Fannie have collapsing market prices, and their bonds are carrying ever-higher risk premiums.

In other words, we are not talking about market failure. If you have a housetop you can shout that from, please do so, because the press and the government are going to make every effort to blame private borrowers and lenders for this calamity. But the origin of both these outfits is with federal legislation. They are not market entities. They have long been guaranteed by you and me. No, they have not been socialist entities either because they are privately owned. They occupy a third status for which there is a name: fascism. Really, that’s what we are talking about: the inexorable tendency of financial fascism to mutate into full-scale financial socialism and therefore bankruptcy.

Mr. Bush might have prevented this meltdown by curbing the privileges of Freddie and Fannie long ago. But no, he had another plan, one which was assisted by the Republican think tanks in Washington (the curious can Google it up). The idea was a new slogan called the “ownership society.”

Sounds nice, doesn’t it? Sounds like free enterprise. But if you think about it, there is nothing particularly free market about the demand that everyone should own anything in particular. The idea of free markets is that your rights to own justly are not to be infringed by public or private criminals. The suggestion that everyone should own some particular thing, by whatever means, can only be funded through financial socialism or mass theft. The claim on the part of a government that it will create an “ownership society” can prove to be highly dangerous.

As for the future, Mises’s theory that the government will always favor more government seems wholly sound.

Here is John McCain:

Those institutions, Fannie and Freddie, have been responsible for millions of Americans to be able to own their own homes, and they will not fail, we will not allow them to fail … we will do what’s necessary to make sure that they continue that function.

Not a single Democrat disagrees.

As with the S&L fiasco from years ago, the case of the housing bust followed by the trillions in taxpayer liabilities for the disaster will again be cited as a case of “the shock doctrine” and “disaster capitalism” in which the elites make fantastic amounts of money at the expense of the little guy. The critique will be mostly solid but for the one most important point: this kind of fiasco would not happen in a free market. It happens because government, through credit creation and guarantees, makes it possible.

Look down the road a bit here. What happens when banks won’t lend for houses anymore? What will government do then? We might as well prepare for a future in which applying for a housing loan will have similar features to getting an SBA loan. This is where we are headed.

Government intervention is like a vial of mutating poison in the water supply. We can get by for a long time and no one seems really worse off. One day we wake up and everyone is desperately ill, and blaming not the poison but the water itself. So it is with the housing crisis. Lenders are being blamed for the entire fiasco, and capitalism is going to be subjected to a beating as usual, since Freddie and Fannie are traded in public markets. But the fact remains that there is only one reason that this went on as long as it did and became as bad as it is. It was that vial of government poison.

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by Bill Bonner“This is a society of true believers. The belief in democracy, market economics and the importance of religion is far more pervasive here than Marxism ever was in Russia.”
- Michael Ignatieff, The Daily Telegraph

It is the Fourth of July. Should we hang out the red, white, and blue bunting from our office balcony…or the black crepe? Should we whine about the America we have lost, or give a whoop for what we have left of it?

That star-spangled banner still waves, but does it still fly over the land of the free, we ask? Or over a country with a spy camera on every street corner…a nation so deeply in debt that freedom has become a luxury it can no longer afford?

Whatever direction we take, we trip over a contradiction. Things always seem to be black and white at the same time.

That is why we took up tango, dear reader. People who dance the tango or write poems don’t let contradictions bother them. They glide across the floor and enjoy themselves. As far as we know, no serious tango dancer has ever committed suicide. It’s the mathematicians and engineers who blow their brains out.

An ideologue or a mathematician cannot tolerate contradiction. His little world has to fit together neatly, like a crossword puzzle. It is ‘cat’ in one direction and ‘day’ in the other. Each intersection has to work perfectly.

But that is not the way real life or real people work. A healthy woman loves her husband, but often hates him too. She has two eyes, and sees a slightly different view of him with each of them. What is wrong with that? Likewise, even a man with only a single eye cannot help but notice that the world is menaced by inflation and deflation at the same time…and that America is both free and un-free at exactly the same moment.

What we have come to dislike about the neo-conservatives is not that their view of the world is right or wrong – for how could we know? – but that it is so small. They are true believers in a very tiny world…one with no room for mystery, contradiction, ignorance or humility. It has to be small; otherwise they could not understand it.

Neo-cons think they can see what no mortal has ever seen: the future. That is the twisted genius of the ‘Preemptive Attack’; they stop the criminal before he has committed his crime!

They think they can know what no mortal has ever known: not only what is good for himself and his country…but what is good for the entire world. And they intend to give it to them, whether they want it or not. In today’s email box, for example, George W. Bush himself sends us the following message:

“…liberty is God’s gift to humanity, the birthright of every individual. The American creed remains powerful today because it represents the universal hope of all mankind.”

Here we will take a wild guess: there are probably more than a few bipeds hobbling around the planet for whom the “American creed” is not so much a hope as a dread.

But the president continues:

“We are winning the war against enemies of freedom, yet more work remains. We will prevail in this noble mission. Liberty has the power to turn hatred into hope.”

“America is a force for good in the world,” continues the leader of the world’s only super-duper power, “and the compassionate spirit of America remains a living faith. Drawing on the courage of our Founding Fathers and the resolve of our citizens, we willingly embrace the challenges before us.”

America’s citizens, meanwhile, are deeply in debt. They see little choice but to back the system, such as it is. Free or un-free, they could care less. Just keep the money flowing. They have come to rely on government. They need Fannie Mae…and unemployment insurance…and social security…and jobs…and the Fed…and fiscal stimulus. Or, at least, they think they do.

After 50 years of the Dollar Standard boom, the average American finds himself less free than ever. He is a slave to the highest government spending and biggest public debt burden in history…and to the heaviest mortgage and other private debt load ever. He has mortgaged up his house…he has taken the bait of credit-card lenders. Now he has no freedom left; he must keep a job…he must pay attention to the Fed’s rates…he must have an interest in George Bush’s government (for now he depends on it)!

“July 4 should be about celebrating freedom and independence,” wrote Richard Benson, published in this week’s Barron’s, “yet the bankers are the only people jumping for joy. Never have Americans owed so much in terms of their total debt, the ratio of total debt to income and the amount of cash flow the debt needs to serve it. Americans used to believe that if they were debt-free, they were free. Today, Americans just want the freedom to borrow more, even if it means they are on the way to becoming enslaved by their debt.”

The average citizen is only a few paychecks from getting put out of his house. He no longer has the freedom to step back…to reflect…to think…to wonder about things…or enjoy the contradictions. Instead, he must listen to the words of economists as if they meant something…and bow before the politicians who control his livelihood…and place himself at the beck and call of every government agency with a dollar to spend.

The message from George W. Bush concludes with an endearing personal note, in which “Laura joins me in sending our best wishes for a safe and joyous Independence Day…”

Laura who, we wondered? Oh yes…the First Lady.

How we got to be on a first-name basis with the woman, we don’t know. We have never even met her. Why she should wish us a happy day, we don’t understand. But these are the peculiar, baroque eccentricities of America that make it such an endearing place to its citizens and such a rich treasure for contemporary ethnologists and stand-up comics.

They, too, will wonder about the contradictions. Why do Americans celebrate “freedom” ever more loudly, while becoming ever less free…? How can they crow about the “home of the brave” when they attack pitiful, third world nations that can’t defend themselves? How can they ballyhoo their own independence when their armies occupy two foreign nations?

Most people will ignore the contradictions altogether. Many will see them as hypocrisy. Some will be outraged. And a few will hear the off-tempo tango beat, and enjoy the holiday anyway.

Bill Bonner at Daily Reckoning : http://www.dailyreckoning.com/