Archive for Corporate Power

Understanding Capitalism

It is 79 years since the Great Depression. Some fear that this week’s chaos in the financial world means that the curtains are rising on Great Depression II. I don’t have a crystal ball, but I’m sure the immediate future is grim. At the very least we are in for a long and deep recession and our medicine will be very bitter indeed.

Clearly the style of capitalism which has dominated world markets for the last 20 years or so is flatlining. The question now is whether it is worth resuscitating. The answer must be Yes – but only if we jettison the “greed is good” ideology made famous by the slimy character Gordon Gekko in the 1987 film Wall Street. That was a movie. In real life it was the philosophy of Nobel Prize-winning economist Milton Friedman.

Friedman was probably the greatest economist of the 20th century. He influenced Ronald Reagan in the US, Margaret Thatcher in the UK, Brian Mulroney in Canada, and Paul Keating in Australia and his ideas led to critical economic reform in each of their countries. These economies were made stronger by following much of Friedman’s economic rationalism.

But at the heart of Friedman’s thought was the idea that greed is good, that greed works because it drives people to succeed. The reality, as we can now see, is that greed, in its truest sense, does not work.

A deadly sin

I have no doubt that greed is the cause of the current crisis. It was the greed of those who took easy money to buy houses beyond their means and the greed of bankers who lent to people borrowing beyond their means. The depth of this depravity can be seen in the Wall Street bankers who were collecting salaries over US$100 million per year even as their banks were collapsing.

Right now, even as the dominoes fall, disciples of Friedman are still contending that the culprit is not capitalist greed but excessive government regulation. However, while poor legislation and regulation may have contributed to the subprime mortgage market crisis that sparked the conflagration, it is absurd to suggest that the solution is merely a less regulated market.

Friedmanistas claim that the US subprime mortgage crisis didn’t happen in markets like Australia and the EU because their consumers are more sophisticated. Nothing could be further from the truth. Australians and Europeans are not smarter; they were protected by more stringent regulatory frameworks. If foreign banks have been dragged into the American crisis, it was mainly because they had joined the orgy on Wall Street.

Less regulation may be a good thing; but good regulation trumps it any day. How many ordinary Americans have to lose their jobs and homes before the ideology of laissez-faire capitalism is finally debunked?

Greed needs to be kept in check. Governments the world over should take the matter of bank regulation more seriously. The US’s subprime mortgage mess was created by politicians pandering to the not-unreasonable desire of Americans to own their own homes. But Congressmen who are currently skewering greedy Wall Street bankers should have protected ordinary consumers aspiring to home ownership. Their negligence points to a failure of leadership that reaches to the very top of the American political totem pole.

Tough choices

So, should governments be putting together rescue packages like the US Federal Reserve’s US$800 billion one to save the banks? Aren’t these rescue packages throwing good money after bad? After all, it was bad, even unethical, business decisions that have sunk the biggest financial institutions. If only that money were available now to help the people who are losing their homes, who face unemployment and who need to feed and educate their children.

But leaving the financial institutions that created the mess to stew in their folly is not a solution.

The viability of the world’s banking system needs to be ensured. If the banking crisis gets worse and more banks go under, it will be harder for businesses, big and small, to expand. Markets — which ultimately thrive on confidence — will shrink. That will mean more job losses and more pain. It could bring the world to Great Depression II, complete with soup kitchens and Hoovervilles. Right now, not bailing out the banks and other financial institutions is unthinkable.

Modern day capitalism may well be wanting. But – to paraphrase Winston Churchill’s description of democracy – it is the worst economic system except for all the others. The Great Depression played a part in the rise of communism, socialism, fascism and Nazism in the 1930s. That is, I am sure, not an outcome many would want from this crisis.

Saving the financial institutions that caused this crisis is the only way to keep the world from sliding into worse turmoil. But we have to learn from this calamity. Greed is not good. We need to inoculate our children against idolising Gordon Gekko. And we need to demand that governments regulate the markets more tightly . Capitalism works; but not when it is based on every man for himself. We need to find our way to a capitalism based on values and virtue.

Alistair Nicholas lives in Beijing where he runs a consultancy firm. He has been an economic researcher, political adviser, and Australian diplomat. In his consultancy he advises international corporations on business ethics and communications in China. He is the co-author of a study on the privatisation of welfare in Australia.

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Quote of the Day

Caveat Emptor!     http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/

Long-standing readers and finance junkies may remember the Treasury’s structured investment vehicle fiasco of last fall. By way of background, banks had created off balance sheet entities called structured investment vehicles (SIVs) which contained subprime (and sometimes other) assets, funded by commercial paper and short-term debt. Like a regular bank, the economics worked because the assets were of longer maturity (3-5 years) than the funding sources, and short term money is generally cheaper than long-term funding.

Then the subprime crisis hit, lenders became very leery of funding subprime related assets, and the SIVs looked pretty certain, as it indeed played out, to produce losses. The banks had assumed they could simply let the SIVs fail, but were told in no uncertain terms by the debt investors that There Would Be Consequences if the SIVs went bust. Suddenly an off balance sheet exposure was not off balance sheet at all.

Hank Paulson attempted to ride to the rescue with an idea, the so called Master Liquidity Enhancement Conduit, that we said virtually from the get-go would not work. He wanted to set up a vehicle, to be managed by a third party that would buy the junky SIV holdings, which included risky real estate assets and murky stuff like collateralized debt obligations, and be funded by private investors. The problem was that there was no price which would solve the basic conundrum: investors were not willing to pay above market prices, and the banks were unwilling to sell at market. Paulson & Co. wasted nearly two months trying to breathe life into this stillborn idea, then abandoned the effort.

Ah, but the MLEC lives! It’s been retooled into the Paulson plan We still have a fund that will be managed by third parties. We still have the buying of drecky, hard to value assets, with emphasis on mortgage-related paper. And the taxpayer is being told that it is an investor, that it might actually make a profit on this venture.

And as with the MLEC, the big issue will be how to price the paper or at least some commentators treat that as an open question. But by foisting this on to chumps taxpayers, the problem goes away. It is clear now that the intent is to pay over whatever the book value of the paper is, both to recapitalize the banks and to generate high valuations that let other financial firms use these phony favorable prices for preparing their financial statements.

But the MLEC was designed to address the pressing problems of a year ago. The crisis has advanced considerably since then.

Remaining fixated on a solution that is badly out of date is tantamount to fortifying the Maginot Line when the blitzkrieg has rolled into the fields of France and the British are beating a retreat to Dunkirk. And I expect it will prove every bit as effective.

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Supply-Side Economics Contradictions Live on in Washington

Jeffey Frankel
Politicians have always faced the temptation to give their constituents tax cuts. But in recent decades “conservative” presidents have enacted large tax cuts that have been anything but conservative fiscally, and have justified them by appealing to theory. In particular, they have appealed to two theories: the Laffer Proposition, which says that cuts in tax rates will pay for themselves via higher economic activity, and the Starve the Beast Hypothesis, which says that tax cuts will increase the budget deficit and put downward pressure on federal spending. It is insufficiently remarked that the two propositions are inconsistent with each other: reductions in tax rates can’t increase tax revenues and reduce tax revenues at the same time. But being mutually exclusive does not prevent them both from being wrong.

The Laffer Proposition, while theoretically possible under certain conditions, does not apply to US income tax rates: a cut in those rates reduces revenue, precisely as common sense would indicate. As detailed in a new paper of mine “Snake-Oil Tax Cuts,” for the Economic Policy Institute, this conclusion was the outcome of the two big experiments of recent decades: the Reagan tax cuts of 1981-83 and the Bush tax cuts of 2001-03. It is also the conclusion of more systematic scholarly studies based on more extensive data. Finally, it is the view of almost all professional economists, including the illustrious economic advisers to Presidents Reagan and Bush, even though it contradicted the views of their employers. So thorough is the discrediting of the Laffer Hypothesis, that many deny that these two presidents or their top officials could have ever believed such a thing. But abundant quotes show that they did.

The Starve the Beast Hypothesis claims that politicians can’t spend money that they don’t have. In theory, Congressmen are supposedly inhibited from increasing spending by constituents’ fears that the resulting deficits will mean higher taxes for their grandchildren. The theory fails on both conceptual grounds and empirical grounds. Conceptually, one should begin by asking: what it the alternative fiscal regime to which Starve the Beast is being compared? The natural alternative is the regime that was in place during the 1990s, which I call Shared Sacrifice. During that time, any congressman wishing to increase spending had to show how they would raise taxes to pay for it. Logically, a Congressman contemplating a new spending program to benefit some favored supporters will be more inhibited by fears of constituents complaining about an immediate tax increase (under the regime of Shared Sacrifice) than by fears of constituents complaining that budget deficits might mean higher taxes many years into the future (under Starve the Beast). Sure enough, the Shared Sacrifice approach of the 1990s succeeded. Compare this outcome to the sharp increases in spending that took place when President Reagan took office, when the first President Bush took office, and when the second President Bush took office. As with the Laffer Hypothesis, more systematic econometric analysis confirms the rejection of the hypothesis.

These matters are not solely of interest to historians or economists. The presidential campaign of Senator John McCain appears set to drive its wagon down the same road in which Reagan and Bush have already worn deep ruts. The candidate is apparently selling the same snake oil: he says he believes that tax cuts increase revenues. His principle policy director disavows the Laffer Principle, just as the economists who advised Presidents Reagan and Bush did. But the views of the economic advisers are not what determines what these presidents do.

“The Queen in Alice in Wonderland said that, with practice, she was able to believe as many as six impossible things before breakfast. Most of us are more limited in our capacity for credulity. If John McCain believes both the Laffer Proposition (tax cuts raise revenues) and Starve the Beast (higher revenues lead to higher spending, anathema to conservatives), then as a good conservative, his duty is clear. He ought to run on a truly novel platform of higher tax rates! Why? Higher tax rates would reduce revenues (this is what Laffer says would happen) and thereby reduce spending (this is what Starve the Beast says would happen).

Seriously folks. If McCain continues to propose extending the Bush tax cuts, he should at least be forced to choose between the Lafferite defense and the “Starve the Beast” defense. Only then can the rest of us know which of the two mutually inconsistent propositions to refute.

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More Awful Truths About Republicans

As the economic debacle facing Americans continues to materialize, those responsible are running for cover with ten Republican senators refusing to attend their own national convention. Four years ago we observed that the so-called “Republican philosophy” of small government, sound money, and balanced budgets was illusory in terms of the history and then-current policies of the Republican Party.[1] However, even we would never have guessed how awful the Republican Party economic policy would become. From mere mercantilism, the Republican Party is now flirting with comprehensive socialist economic policy and another Great Depression.

The Republican Party was founded on big government and economic intervention with roots in the economic platforms of Federalist icon Alexander Hamilton and Whig leader Henry Clay. Indeed, the term “New Deal” was coined in 1865 to characterize Lincoln and his Republican Party economic platform. Republicans became the “mercantile” party of big business, big government, external protection, centralized monetary control, strong restrictions on immigration, and aggressive foreign policy.

From FDR’s New Deal to LBJ’s Great Society, Democratic policies forced many free-market activists into the Republican fold. People like Robert Taft, Barry Goldwater, Ronald Reagan, and of course Ron Paul, represent this free-market faction in the Republican Party. For example, free markets, deregulation, and balanced budgets became the Republican mantra (if not reality) during the Reagan administration. The orchestrated marginalization of Ron Paul is just one indicator that the free-market faction has been routed and that the mercantilists are firmly in control. In fact, as we endure the current economic malaise, we can note that the Republican-dominated Congress (1994–2006) and the administrations of George W. Bush have morphed Republican-style mercantilism into corporate socialism.

Harmful military spending, unbalanced budgets, fiscal irresponsibility, protectionist and monopoly handouts to friends is the old style Republican playbook. The new style is audacious, unprecedented, and truly awful for the economy. It begins with the Republican-controlled Federal Reserve, which, under Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke, has flooded the economy with money and credit and bailed out every economic crisis since 1987. Greenspan’s admonitions against “irrational exuberance” apparently were not intended to restrain the Federal Reserve’s irresponsible monetary policy. Who in their right mind could honestly say that the Fed had nothing to do with the housing bubble after driving the nominal interest rate to 1% and proclaiming that the mortgage market was well regulated?

But an insidious form of “market-based policy” is also a real culprit in the current mess. In 1999 a bill was passed by a Republican Congress and signed by Democratic President Bill Clinton that rescinded the Depression era’s divorce of commercial banking activities from investment banking, called the Glass-Stegall Act of 1933. That opened a floodgate of “creative” financial instruments backed by notes and other commercial paper. Much of the banking regulation of the Roosevelt administration — including abandonment of the gold standard — made absolutely no sense, but markets can fail with dire short-run consequences under a fiat monetary system. With Glass-Stegall, Congress put its finger on and mitigated the tendency and temptations of banks to create massive costly externalities to society, in this case, by holding bundled mortgage-backed securities which were deemed safe by rating agencies but which ultimately failed the market test.

The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 would make perfect sense in a world regulated by a gold standard, 100% reserve banking, and no FDIC deposit insurance; but in the world as it is, this “deregulation” amounts to corporate welfare for financial institutions and a moral hazard that will make taxpayers pay dearly. Such government privileges are nothing new to Republicans — consider the effective subsidies to the pharmaceutical, sugar, and steel industries — but this particular gift to financial institutions is what allowed the credit bubble to expand to such absurd proportions, because it allowed banks of all types to engage in increasingly risky transactions and to greatly expand the leverage of their balance sheets. As the crisis unfolds, credit continues to contract, the risk of bank failures increases, and the possibility of far more serious economic consequences become more apparent. The S&L crisis cost the taxpayers a few hundred billion, but this crisis has the potential of saddling the taxpayer with several trillion in bailouts.

So far, the Republican solution has been to bail out lenders — wealthy financial-industry professionals for the most part — who made unwise market decisions with subsidies and election-year subventions. With Hank Paulson, the former CEO of Goldman Saks, as Secretary of the Treasury and the big banks on the Board of Directors of the New York Fed, it should not be too surprising that the Fed has been listening only to Wall Street while ignoring Main Street.

But the real problem is that their policies will lead to the nationalization of much of the mortgage-real-estate market. On July 30, 2008, President George Bush signed a bill into law that bails out Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to the tune of an estimated $25 billion dollars in taxpayer losses, according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). The bailout is intended to stabilize the short-term economy, but this ill-conceived nod to socialism will have disastrous long-term effects. First, according to most economic estimates, the bill that taxpayers would have to eat is laughably small. Economist Don A. Rich has calculated the possible losses at as low as $1.3 to $1.6 trillion given likely housing price declines and as high as $2.5 trillion (if the housing price fall mimics that of the Great Depression).[2] The fallout from either of these scenarios would be catastrophic as the Federal Reserve accommodated (within the fiat money system) the taxpayer-backed debt. The real debt would be inflated away and America’s real income could be reduced by as much as twenty percent.

The expansion of Federal Reserve authority is almost as alarming as nationalizing the mortgage industry. While the bailout includes the typical reductions in the Federal Funds Rate and the Discount Rate, it also includes the unprecedented moves to auction off discount rate loans, accept mortgage-backed securities in exchange for the Fed’s Treasury Notes and the financing of J.P. Morgan’s takeover of Bear Sterns. In May, the Fed began to allow investment firms to draw emergency loans directly from the central bank, and in July, it began to allow Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to do the same even though such lending privileges had traditionally been restricted to commercial banks that have been subject to stricter regulatory supervision. All of this is predictable given the repeal of Glass-Stegall, which expanded the bad business practices that now “require” an expansion of the bailout.

But we see an even more insidious long-term economic problem, if that is imaginable. Moral hazard is endemic to this Bush-backed scheme to “relieve” an election-year economy. While the bill passed in late July does include some tighter regulation for the mortgage companies, it undeniably increases incentives for market participants — buyers and sellers — to engage in risky behavior. That is one of the products of financial socialism under a fiat monetary system — a system that mainly benefits wealthy lenders. Heads you win, tails you do not lose.

Further, every incentive by profit-seeking lenders and asset-poor buyers will be in place for a continuing or recurrent mortgage debacle. Financial institutions will not only have mercantile “protection” from the federal government in terms of regulations; they will become social arms of that government. While Democrats certainly facilitated these economic actions as fellow travelers, Republicans, most especially George W. Bush, acquiesced. (His only objection was a $4 billion grant to states and cities to “refurbish” foreclosed homes). The economic choice is clear: either maintain a fiat-money-creation system and reinstate the asset proscriptions of the Glass-Stegall Act or abandon or modify the existing system of money and banking altogether, possibly including elements of a gold standard. Without some basic alteration in rules, the entire economic system will continue to be at risk, as will America’s predominance in the world of finance.

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Notes

[1] Robert B. Ekelund and Mark Thornton, “Republican Redux,” Review: Milken Institute (Third Quarter, 2003): 5-7 and Robert B. Ekelund, “The Awful Truth about Republicans” (March 25, 2004).

[2] Don A. Rich, “The Real Cost of a Full Bailout” (August 22, 2008).

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The Market, Part 1

by Ludwig von Mises

  1. The Characteristics of the Market Economy
  2. Capital
  3. Capitalism
  4. The Sovereignty of the Consumers
  1. Competition
  2. Freedom
  3. Inequality of Wealth and Income
This article is excerpted from chapter 15 of Human Action. Robert Murphy has written a study guide for this chapter, available in HTML and PDF. This chapter follows “The Scope and Method of Catallactics.”

1. The Characteristics of the Market Economy

The market economy is the social system of the division of labor under private ownership of the means of production. Everybody acts on his own behalf; but everybody’s actions aim at the satisfaction of other people’s needs as well as at the satisfaction of his own. Everybody in acting serves his fellow citizens. Everybody, on the other hand, is served by his fellow citizens. Everybody is both a means and an end in himself; an ultimate end for himself and a means to other people in their endeavors to attain their own ends. This system is steered by the market. The market directs the individual’s activities into those channels in which he best serves the wants of his fellow men.

There is in the operation of the market no compulsion and coercion. The state, the social apparatus of coercion and compulsion, does not interfere with the market and with the citizens’ activities directed by the market. It employs its power to beat people into submission solely for the prevention of actions destructive to the preservation and the smooth operation of the market economy. It protects the individual’s life, health, and property against violent or fraudulent aggression on the part of domestic gangsters and external foes. Thus the state creates and preserves the environment in which the market economy can safely operate.

The Marxian slogan “anarchic production” pertinently characterizes this social structure as an economic system which is not directed by a dictator, a production tsar who assigns to each a task and compels him to obey this command. Each man is free; nobody is subject to a despot. Of his own accord the individual integrates himself into the cooperative system. The market directs him and reveals to him in what way he can best promote his own welfare as well as that of other people. The market is supreme. The market alone puts the whole social system in order and provides it with sense and meaning.

The market is not a place, a thing, or a collective entity. The market is a process, actuated by the interplay of the actions of the various individuals cooperating under the division of labor. The forces determining the — continually changing — state of the market are the value judgments of these individuals and their actions as directed by these value judgments. The state of the market at any instant is the price structure, i.e., the totality of the exchange ratios as established by the interaction of those eager to buy and those eager to sell. There is nothing inhuman or mystical with regard to the market. The market process is entirely a resultant of human actions. Every market phenomenon can be traced back to definite choices of the members of the market society.

The market process is the adjustment of the individual actions of the various members of the market society to the requirements of mutual cooperation. The market prices tell the producers what to produce, how to produce, and in what quantity. The market is the focal point to which the activities of the individuals converge. It is the center from which the activities of the individuals radiate.

The market economy must be strictly differentiated from the second thinkable — although not realizable — system of social cooperation under the division of labor: the system of social or governmental ownership of the means of production. This second system is commonly called socialism, communism, planned economy, or state capitalism. The market economy — or capitalism, as it is usually called — and the socialist economy preclude one another. There is no mixture of the two systems possible or thinkable; there is no such thing as a mixed economy, a system that would be in part capitalistic and in part socialist. Production is directed either by the market or by the decrees of a production tsar or a committee of production tsars.

If within a society based on private ownership of the means of production some of these means are publicly owned and operated — that is, owned and operated by the government or one of its agencies — this does not make for a mixed system which would combine socialism and capitalism. The fact that the state or municipalities own and operate some plants does not alter the characteristic features of the market economy. These publicly owned and operated enterprises are subject to the sovereignty of the market. They must fit themselves, as buyers of raw materials, equipment, and labor, and as sellers of goods and services, into the scheme of the market economy. They are subject to the laws of the market and thereby depend on the consumers who may or may not patronize them. They must strive for profits or, at least, to avoid losses. The government may cover losses of its plants or shops by drawing on public funds. But this neither eliminates nor mitigates the supremacy of the market; it merely shifts it to another sector. For the means for covering the losses must be raised by the imposition of taxes. But this taxation has its effects on the market and influences the economic structure according to the laws of the market. It is the operation of the market, and not the government collecting the taxes, that decides upon whom the incidence of the taxes falls and how they affect production and consumption. Thus the market, not a government bureau, determines the working of these publicly operated enterprises.

Nothing that is in any way connected with the operation of a market is in the praxeological or economic sense to be called socialism. The notion of socialism as conceived and defined by all socialists implies the absence of a market for factors of production and of prices of such factors. The “socialization” of individual plants, shops, and farms — that is, their transfer from private into public ownership — is a method of bringing about socialism by successive measures. It is a step on the way toward socialism, but not in itself socialism. (Marx and the orthodox Marxians flatly deny the possibility of such a gradual approach to socialism. According to their doctrine the evolution of capitalism will one day reach a point in which at one stroke capitalism is transformed into socialism.)

Government-operated enterprises and the Russian Soviet economy are, by the mere fact that they buy and sell on markets, connected with the capitalist system. They themselves bear witness to this connection by calculating in terms of money. They thus utilize the intellectual methods of the capitalist system that they fanatically condemn.

For monetary economic calculation is the intellectual basis of the market economy. The tasks set to acting within any system of the division of labor cannot be achieved without economic calculation. The market economy calculates in terms of money prices. That it is capable of such calculation w-as instrumental in its evolution and conditions its present-day operation. The market economy is real because it can calculate.

Continue at : http://mises.org/story/3029

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The State of the Union

CARTOON CAPITALISM
by Bill Bonner

Last week, purely in the spirit of mischief, we brought up a sore subject: America’s largest mortgage finance companies, Fannie and Freddie. The two have so much water in their lungs it will take at least $25 billion of the public’s money to save them. Possibly $300 billion. Were it up to us, we’d leave them on the beach.

But, last week, the U.S. Senate bent down and pressed its large mouth onto those gaping traps of the mortgage twins - gurgling into them a corrupt breath of life. Since the two hold one out of every two mortgages in the nation, in effect, Congress is nationalizing the U.S. housing stock itself. Henceforth, citizens will pay not only their taxes to the government, but their mortgage payments too.

In America itself, how this came to be is the subject of little concern. But despite the lack of interest, it is the subject of the next 500 words or so.

At a speech in Vancouver, James Kunstler seemed positively delighted. Finally, gasoline over $4 a gallon was going to do what generations of artistic scorn could not - destroy Fannie and Freddie’s collateral. Kunstler’s critique of American suburban vernacular architecture is that its products are not real houses at all - but “cartoon houses.” They have porches that look like real porches from a distance, but they are too narrow to sit on. They have shutters too - nailed to the wall, making them completely useless. They may have “picture” windows…looking out on nothing…or no windows at all. And they wouldn’t exist at all were it not for cheap credit and cheap gasoline.

Of course, the same may be said of America’s - and Britain’s - entire economies during the last 20 years. The loose credit that built cartoon houses also constructed cartoon economies; they look like real economies, but they are essentially perverse, consuming wealth rather than creating it.

For proof, we return to Fannie and Freddie. Here were two companies that appeared to be helping Americans own houses. But since they were created, homeowners’ equity - that portion of the house actually owned and paid for by the homeowner - fell from 70% to below 50%. Currently, Americans’ total equity is lower than their mortgage debt. As a whole, the nation’s homeowners are “upside down,” in other words. Nearly 9 million Americans have zero or negative equity already - and house prices are still falling.

How comes this to be? The answer is simple: lenders lent more than the houses were worth to people who couldn’t pay it back anyway. This Looney Tune approach to finance radiated to all points of the economy. People pretended that they earned more - spending more and more money to buy more and more goods and services - but wages did not really increase. Then, they bought houses - believing the roofs over their heads were investments, rather than consumer items. With no down payment, no proof of income, and zero interest loans - for most of the new buyers, home ownership was merely a dangerous conceit. Now that the roofs have caved in, it is a staggering burden.

The “consumer economy” was always a mockery. No serious economist ever suggested that you could get richer by consuming wealth. But that didn’t make consumerism unpopular. The more people consumed, the more GDP went up. GDP measures output, not wealth creation; but who could tell the difference? In a cartoon economy - no one. Besides, spending made people feel as though they were getting richer.

Then, whenever the consumer threatened to come to his senses, the feds rushed to “stimulate” him - by giving him more of what he least needed, more credit. More spending kept the cartoon economy running - allowing the consumer, the businessman and the speculator to add to his burden of debt. In 1971, when the United States went off the gold wagon, household debt was less than 50% of GDP. Now, it is more than 100%. And now, the poor consumer’s knees buckle; he will be forced to work the rest of his life just to keep up with his debt burden, let alone pay it off.

Even the rentiers were bamboozled by their own claptrap. Stocks rose from ‘82 to 2000…fell heavily to 2002 and bounced back. For the last 10 years, shareholders have gotten little for their effort. In July of ‘98, the FTSE hit a high of 5,458. This month, it has reached 5,625. And in America, if stock prices were quoted in gallons of gasoline, the Dow would take the driver no further in 2008 than it did 40 years ago.

The cartoon capitalists did it all backwards; they are supposed to exploit the workers, not be exploited by them. But while consumers and investors were going nowhere, corporate managers and Wall Street hustlers were getting rich. The two Bozos running Fannie and Freddie, for example, pocketed about $32 million between them last year - during a period in which the companies lost almost $5.2 billion - not to mention the losses to shareholders. And on Wall Street, managers paid out $250 billion in bonuses in the 4 years leading up to the credit crunch. The firms declared a profit and paid bonuses when the bets were made; they didn’t wait to see how they turned out. Thus did the big banks and big brokers become capitalists without capital, dependent on the gullibility of investors to keep them in business. And when investors began to wise up, they turned to the public for capital support.

What kind of scam is this? It may look like capitalism from a distance. But this is not real capitalism; this is cartoon capitalism - run by clowns, who sell freak investments to chump investors, and encourage the lumpen householder to ruin himself.

Editor’s Note: Bill Bonner is the founder and editor of The Daily Reckoning. He is also the author, with Addison Wiggin, of the national best sellers Financial Reckoning Day: Surviving the Soft Depression of the 21st Century and Empire of Debt: The Rise of an Epic Financial Crisis.

Bill’s latest book, Mobs, Messiahs and Markets: Surviving the Public Spectacle in Finance and Politics, written with co-author Lila Rajiva, is available now by clicking here:

Mobs, Messiahs and Markets

http://www.dailyreckoning.com/

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Gas and War - the Connection

What’s it got to do with the price of gas? Would some reporter with access to the Republican presidential candidate please ask John McCain why he wants to continue President Bush’s Mideast policy when it has proved so ruinous for American taxpayers? Because McCain is determined to ignore our economic meltdown and shift the debate to foreign policy, shouldn’t he have to explain why an open-ended military presence in the Mideast will make us economically and militarily more secure when the opposite is clearly the case?

Let’s not waste too much time on the military side of the equation. The argument that troops on the ground have made us militarily more secure is absurd on its face. American resources and lives have been squandered in an inane effort that McCain aptly criticized before becoming a presidential candidate. As a Senate watchdog, he distinguished himself by sharply denouncing one defense contractor boondoggle after another in cases involving hundreds of billions for modern weapons that had nothing to do with fighting cave-based terrorists. But as a presidential candidate, McCain now unabashedly apologizes for every twist of the downwind spiral of the Bush administration foreign policy, from wasteful weapons to inhuman torture.

McCain’s strategy is clearly that of distracting attention from the calamitous economy by sounding the demagogue’s alarm about enemies at the gate. This week, McCain again blasted Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama on the grounds that he underestimated the threat from Iran while ignoring the vast increase in Iran’s power — an increase actually resulting from Bush eliminating Iran’s only effective enemy, Saddam Hussein. The other winners in this folly have been the oil kingdoms that Hussein periodically threatened, led by the Saudi royal family. Seizing upon the opportunity presented by the 9/11 attacks, Bush knocked off not the Saudis, who had produced Osama bin Laden and 15 of his hijacker minions, but rather the royal family’s sworn enemy in Iraq, who had absolutely nothing do with 9/11.

And how did the Saudis thank us? Just check the price of oil, which has increased more than sixfold since 9/11. On Friday, Bush went to dine at Saudi King Abdullah’s bizarrely opulent horse farm and pleaded for an increase in oil production, but to no avail. Bush received the same rebuff in April 2005, when oil was selling for $54 a barrel. On Tuesday, it sold for $129, and the price rise is a good measure of Saudi gratitude for the Bush family’s unwavering support over past decades. Saudi Arabia’s oil minister, Ali al-Naimi, couldn’t have been more condescending when he turned down Bush’s request with the observation that “presidents and kings have every right, every privilege, to comment or ask or say whatever they want.” He added at a press conference, “How much does Saudi Arabia need to do to satisfy people who are questioning our oil practices and policies?”

Enough to get the price back down to where it was when we saved your sorry oil-well excuse for a country, you ingrate, Bush might have retorted. But our bold leader was too polite for anything like that. “He didn’t punch any tables or shout at anybody,” said Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal. “I think he was satisfied.” Why? Instead of pointing out that the Saudis could easily open their spigots in gratitude for our keeping them in power, the president threatened the Saudi king not with an invasion but with a U.S. recession. “My point to His Majesty,” Bush warned in an interview with The New York Times before encountering the great man himself, “is going to be, when consumers have less purchasing power because of high prices of gasoline — in other words, when it affects their families, it could cause this economy to slow down. If the economy slows down, there will be less barrels of oil purchased.”

He’ll show them — we’ll have a recession, our families will suffer and, boy, will the Saudis be sorry. A regular Teddy Roosevelt. There is no better measure of the failure of Bush’s foreign policy than that, five years after we conquered the second-most important pool of oil in the world, the American taxpayers who paid for this grand imperial adventure are rewarded with skyrocketing prices at the pump.

At least when Bush first hyped his Iraq invasion plan, he had Paul Wolfowitz telling Congress that Iraqi oil would more than pay for it all. Not so McCain, who is so charged with imperial hubris that he is willing to commit to a 100-year lease on Iraq without expecting a penny in oil revenue in return.

Robert Scheer’s new book, “The Pornography of Power: How Defense Hawks Hijacked 9/11 and Weakened America,” will be released June 9 by Twelve.

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