Hank Paulson appeared before the House committee on (Lack of) Oversight and (Prevention of) Government Reform last week to defend his actions in the Bank of America/Merrill Lynch deal. For those of you who haven’t been following along, Bank of America CEO Ken Lewis has accused Ben Bernanke and Hank Paulson of pressuring him to complete the Merill acquisition even after discovering that the losses at Merrill were several orders of magnitude higher than what he thought when the deal was struck. Bernanke and Paulson allegedly told Lewis that he and the entire board would be replaced if he didn’t conceal the losses until the deal was approved by shareholders.

I didn’t think Hammerin’ Hank’s reputation could fall any further but after listening to his arrogant testimony this week, I think I have to revise that. Paulson cast himself as the hero in his testimony:

“Many more Americans would be without their homes, their jobs, their businesses, their savings and their way of life,” he said in written testimony prepared for a hearing Thursday.

While losses have been staggering, “that suffering would have been far more profound and disturbing” had the government not intervened, he will tell the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee.

“Our responses were not perfect … But, having had the benefit of some time to reflect, and to consider views expressed by others, I am confident that our responses were substantially correct and they saved this nation from great peril,” Paulson wrote.

Well, gee, thanks Hank. There is no way to know how things would have turned out if you hadn’t bailed out every firm that acted as a counterparty to your net worth (Goldman Sachs), but it’s nice to know it hasn’t affected your self esteem.

While Bernanke prudently fell back on the “I don’t recall” defense, Paulson, believe it or not, defended his threat to Lewis:

Paulson said he told Lewis that reneging on the promise to purchase Merrill would show “a colossal lack of judgment.” He then pointed out to Lewis that the Fed could remove management at the bank if it saw fit, he said.

“By referring to the Federal Reserve’s supervisory powers, I intended to deliver a strong message reinforcing the view that had been consistently expressed by the Federal Reserve, as Bank of America’s regulator, and shared by the Treasury, that it would be unthinkable for Bank of America to take this destructive action for which there was no reasonable legal basis and which would show a lack of judgment,” Paulson said.

Paulson said he believed his remarks to Lewis were “appropriate.”

Faced with being forced out with only a golden parachute to cushion his fall, Lewis decided that maybe those Merrill losses weren’t really so important that they needed to be disclosed to BAC shareholders prior to voting on the merger. Based on the performance of BAC’s stock price since then, shareholders might disagree, but hey that’s a small price to pay for saving the “system”, right?

The charge that the failure of large financial institutions represents a systemic risk is one that suffers from a lack of evidence. Is the system really better off maintaining Citigroup on life support rather than letting it die a natural death? Is the system really better off by expanding the allegedly already too large to fail Bank of America? Is the system really better off when poorly managed companies are rescued at the expense of those who acted more prudently? Is the system really better off when losses are spread far and wide rather than concentrated with those who took the risks? What message does it send to prudent managers when their imprudent competitors are bailed out? Will they be so prudent next time?

The economic success of the US is not dependent on maintaining the status quo. Capitalism is a system which requires failure to advance. The failure of a few companies is not evidence that capitalism has failed but evidence that it is working. Failure sends a message to other market participants that the practices that caused the failure should be avoided. That message applies not only to private companies but to the government institutions that also failed us in this crisis. Attempting to return to the status quo rather than allowing private company failures and reforming failed government institutions does not advance us as a society. It mires us in mediocrity.

It is Paulson, Bernanke and Bush who showed a colossal lack of judgment. It is the management of Bear Stearns, AIG, Lehman, Merrill Lynch, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac who showed a colossal lack of judgment. It is Alan Greenspan and all the member of the Federal Reserve who showed a colossal lack of judgment. It is most of Congress that showed a colossal lack of judgment. It is Tim Geithner and President Obama who continue to show a colossal lack of judgment. And it is the American taxpayer who will have to pay the tab for the colossal lack of judgment shown by all of them.

The long term consequences of government actions over the last two years will become evident to investors in the coming years, but for now, attention is focused on the immediate situation. And the immediate situation is still improving. The stock market rallied 7% last week as earnings season kicked off with some highly visible positive surprises. Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Bank of America and Citigroup all reported better than expected earnings (thanks in large part to the implicit guarantee of the government) and the remainder of the financial sector seems likely to follow suit in the coming weeks. Intel and IBM got the tech sector off to a good start. Next week will see a flood of companies reporting their second quarter results and while there will be a few disappointments such as Google last week, I believe the aggregate numbers will continue to be better than the market expects.

Paulson: A Colossal Lack of Judgment – Joseph Calhoun, Alhambra Inv.

 

With so much complexity, and uncertainty about future performance, it is not surprising that the securities are difficult to price and that trading dried up. Without market prices, valuation on the books of banks is suspect and counterparties are reluctant to deal with each other.

The policy response to this problem has been circuitous. The Federal Reserve originally saw the problem as a lack of liquidity in the banking system, and beginning in late 2007 flooded the market with liquidity through new lending facilities. It had very limited success, as banks were still disinclined to buy or trade such securities or take them as collateral. Credit spreads remained higher than normal. In September 2008 credit spreads skyrocketed and credit markets froze. By then it was clear that the problem was not liquidity, but rather the insolvency risks of counterparties with large holdings of toxic assets on their books.

The federal government then decided to buy the toxic assets. The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was enacted in October 2008 with $700 billion in funding. But that was not how the TARP funds were used. The Treasury concluded that the valuation problem seemed insurmountable, so it attacked the risk issue by bolstering bank capital, buying preferred stock.

But those toxic assets are still there. The latest disposal scheme is the Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP). The concept is that private asset managers would create investment funds of half private and half Treasury (TARP) capital, which would bid on packages of toxic assets that banks offered for sale. The responsibility for valuation is thus shifted to the private sector. But the pricing difficulty remains and this program too may amount to little.

The fundamental problem has remained untouched: insufficient information to permit estimated prices that both buyers and sellers find credible. Why is the information so hard to obtain? While the original MBS pools were often Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registered public offerings with considerable detail, CDOs were sold in private placements with confidentiality agreements. Moreover, the nature of the securitization process has made it extremely difficult to determine and follow losses and increasing risk from one tranche and pool to another, and to reach the information about the original borrowers that is needed to estimate future cash flows and price.

This account makes it clear why transparency is so important. To deal with the problem, issuers of asset-backed securities should provide extensive detail in a uniform format about the composition of the original pools and their subsequent structure and performance, whether they were sold as SEC-registered offerings or private placements. By creating a centralized database with this information, the pricing process for the toxic assets becomes possible. Making such a database a reality will restart private securitization markets and will do more for the recovery of the economy than yet another redesign of administrative agency structures. If issuers are not forthcoming, then they should be required to file the information publicly with the SEC.

Mr. Scott is a professor of securities and corporate law at Stanford University and a research fellow at the Hoover Institution. Mr. Taylor, an economics professor at Stanford and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, is the author of “Getting Off Track: How Government Actions and Interventions Caused, Prolonged and Worsened the Financial Crisis” (Hoover Press, 2009).

Why Toxic Assets Are So Hard to Scrub – Kenneth Scott & John Taylor, WSJ

 

To promote car sales and home buying, Congress could have provided temporary but generous tax breaks. It didn’t. The housing tax credit applied to a fraction of first-time buyers; the car tax break permitted federal tax deductions for state sales and excise taxes on vehicle purchases. The effects are trivial. The recently signed “cash for clunkers” tax credit is similarly stunted; Macroeconomic Advisers estimates it might advance a mere 130,000 vehicle sales. States fared better. They received $135 billion in largely unfettered funds. But even with this money, economists at Goldman Sachs estimate that states face up to a $100 billion budget gap in the next year. Already, 28 states have increased taxes and 40 have reduced spending, reports the Office of Management and Budget.

There are growing demands for another Obama “stimulus” on the grounds that the first was too small. Wrong. The problem with the first stimulus was more its composition than its size. With budget deficits for 2009 and 2010 estimated by the CBO at $1.8 trillion and $1.4 trillion (respectively, 13 and 9.9 percent of gross domestic product), it’s hard to argue they’re too tiny. Obama and congressional Democrats sacrificed real economic stimulus to promote parochial political interests. Any new “stimulus” should be financed by culling some of the old.

Here, as elsewhere, there’s a gap between Obama’s high-minded rhetoric and his performance. In February, Obama denounced “politics as usual” in constructing the stimulus. But that’s what we got, and Obama likes the result. Interviewed recently by ABC’s Jake Tapper, he was asked whether he would change anything. Obama seemed to invoke a doctrine of presidential infallibility. “There’s nothing that we would have done differently,” he said.

Obama’s Squandered Stimulus Plan – Robert Samuelson, Washington Post

 

Error One was to permit a bubble in the 1980s. Error Two was to wait a decade before opting for monetary “shock and awe” through quantitative easing.

The US Federal Reserve has moved faster but already seems to think the job is done. “Quantitative tightening” has begun. Its balance sheet has contracted by almost $200bn (£122bn) from the peak. The M2 money supply has stagnated since January. The Fed is talking of “exit strategies”.

Is this a replay of mid-2008 when the Fed lost its nerve, bristling over criticism that it had cut rates too low (then 2pc)? Remember what happened. Fed hawks in Dallas, St Louis, and Atlanta talked of rate rises. That had consequences. Markets tightened in anticipation, and arguably triggered the collapse of Lehman Brothers, AIG, Fannie and Freddie that Autumn.

The Fed’s doctrine – New Keynesian Synthesis – has let it down time and again in this long saga, and there is scant evidence that Fed officials recognise the fact. As for the European Central Bank, it has let private loan growth contract this summer.

The imperative for the debt-bloated West is to cut spending systematically for year after year, off-setting the deflationary effect with monetary stimulus. This is the only mix that can save us.

My awful fear is that we will do exactly the opposite, incubating yet another crisis this autumn, to which we will respond with yet further spending. This is the road to ruin.

Fiscal Ruin of Western World Beckons – A Evans-Pritchard, Daily Telegraph

 

The stock market is rallying. The economy will recover by year end, and strong profits among big players like Goldman Sachs, IBM and Google will spread to other big corporations. However, many small businesses and working Americans won’t be cheering.

Since December 2007, the private sector has shed 6.6 million jobs-half in manufacturing and construction. Lousy banking practices and a surge in imports, mostly from China, are the main culprits but are not getting fixed.

President Obama’s bank reforms will fix many abusive lending practices. However his reforms hardly touch Wall Street’s increasing aversion to the ordinary business of making sound loans, and its obsession with abusive derivatives trading and the big bonuses that creates.

The Federal Reserve and FDIC have poured $2 trillion in cheap credit into the banks and financial houses, mostly benefiting the biggest players. Hence, Goldman Sachs and J.P. Morgan post record profits and Citigroup and Bank of America survive when they should simply be dismembered in bankruptcy court. Meanwhile, regional banks that rely on Wall Street for credit simply can’t get enough money to make loans or they end up like CIT Financial and others-broke and bankrupt.

Small and medium sized manufacturers, builders and retailers rely on those disenfranchised regional banks and can’t borrow enough money to sustain operations as the economy recovers. New opportunities in the President’s green economy will go to big players like GM and to businesses in China, where the government understands global commerce is played by rules of prison football.

China has more than 100 million rural underemployed workers, who if moved into factories could replace every manufacturing job in the United States, Western Europe and Japan. China lacks the technology to capture all those jobs but Beijing recognizes its huge, growing market provides leverage to impose teach-to-sell conditions on the likes of GM and GE.

Beijing maintains high barriers to imports, requires Western companies to transfer technology to sell in China and subsidizes exports to the tune of at least $500 billion a year.

Beijing requires 70 percent of all green energy hardware sold in China to be manufactured there. Buick is a top-selling brand, but GM can’t export from Michigan but must produce and source parts in China.

Any suggestion to get tough with Chinese mercantilism is naively labeled protectionism by President Obama and his aids.

Hence, the $789 billion stimulus will create some jobs but those will be mostly low-paying government jobs.

The economy will stage a moderate recovery but few jobs will be created that adequately replace lost high paying manufacturing and construction jobs.

Nevertheless, large companies like GE, GM and IBM are well poised to profit, having downsized domestic operations to service a smaller U.S. market and aggressively expanded in China.

President Obama is serving donuts. The big guys will get the cake and working Americans the hole inside.

Peter Morici is a professor at the University of Maryland School of Business and former Chief Economist at the U.S. International Trade Commission.
President Obama’s Donut Economics – Peter Morici, RealClearMarkets
 

Clean Coal: An Unsustainable Polital Myth – Bill Frezza, RealClearMarkets
Ending America’s Deadly Coal Addiction – Robert Kennedy, Financial Times

 
President Clinton at a 1993 NAFTA signing ceremony REUTERS/WIN MCNAMEE REUTERS/WIN MCNAMEE
President Clinton at a 1993 NAFTA signing ceremony

This past winter both the outgoing director of the CIA and a separate Pentagon report declared political instability in Mexico to be on a par with Pakistan and Iran as top-ranking threats to US national security. It was an exaggeration; Mexico is not yet a “failed state.” On the other hand, it is certainly drifting in that direction.

The NAFTA Disaster: Mexico 15 Years Later – Jeff Faux, The Nation

 
The Star-Ledger – NJ.com

NJ small-business owners brace themselves for side effects of
The Star-Ledger – NJ.com – Newark,NJ,USA
New Jersey’s economy is powered by an estimated 260000 small businesses — generally defined as having 50 employees or less.

 

Trade skirmishes are one thing, full-blown trade wars quite another. Politicians, even the most fervent believers in the virtues of free trade, sometimes have to bend to constituents’ demands for protection. Ronald Reagan urged Japanese auto manufacturers to accept “voluntary quotas” on their exports to the U.S., and George W. Bush found merit in domestic manufacturers’ demand for steel tariffs. No lasting harm done to what remained basically a globalized free trading system, made freer at periodic intervals by multilateral deals cut under the aegis of the World Trade Organization (WTO). When those proved difficult, then-U.S. Trade Representative Bob Zoellick, now head of the World Bank, led the way in negotiating bilateral trade-opening agreements and pushing them through a sometimes reluctant Congress.

A worldwide recession changes things. President Obama professes fidelity to the teachings of Adam Smith, perhaps without realizing it, but is driven by domestic pressures to tilt towards protectionism. Banks availing themselves of bail-out funds were told not to hire foreign workers, even though some of the most talented financial analysts working in these international institutions are not American citizens. States receiving stimulus money are enjoined to “Buy American,” a congressional insistence that the president, to his credit, tried to get around by introducing language to provide suppliers and contractors with a large, but in the event ineffective, loophole. And when wearing his hat as CEO of General Motors, Obama forced the car maker to shift production of small vehicles from China to states that were important contributors to his election victory.

U.S., China and a Protectionist Vortex – Irwin Stelzer, The Weekly Standard

 

Is there a clandestine understanding between the world’s two most powerful central banks, the Federal Reserve and the People’s Bank of China?

Naturally, no one can talk about it, let alone confirm or deny anything. But it’s not too difficult to make out the broad outlines of how Chinese-American monetary cooperation may be working.

People’s Bank governor Zhou Xiaochuan and other figures in the Chinese leadership seem to use every opportunity to broadcast finely calibrated skepticism over the dollar’s future. Such Jeremiahs feed on and — in turn — feed doubts about potential American inflation caused by the Fed’s quantitative easing and exploding budget deficits.

But both Washington and Beijing appear to recognize — whatever the saber-rattling — that large-scale shifts in the currency composition of Chinese currency reserves are more or less impossible. Roughly two-thirds of Chinese reserves of more than $2 trillion are thought to be held in the greenback.

Heavy Chinese sales, or even a deliberate policy of diverting export proceeds into Euro or yen by re-dominating sales contracts, would depress the U.S. currency and lower the value of Chinese reserves. It’s the well-known Beijing dollar trap. And it has to be said: the Chinese have maneuvered themselves into it of their own volition, and in full knowledge of the potential problem.

So Governor Zhou’s strictures are, to a certain extent, shadow boxing. However, in return for a tacit standstill agreement on the currency composition of reserves, the Americans have to acknowledge that the renminbi’s value will rise only moderately.

If the Chinese continue taking in dollars, logic tells us the Chinese currency can hardly revalue strongly. A signal of the U.S. authorities’ acceptance of this state of affairs is that the word “manipulation” for Chinese currency management now clearly is banned.

There is another, still more intriguing, side to Chinese currency pronouncements. The doubts voiced from Beijing on the dollar’s stability, far from unsettling the U.S. monetary authorities, are actually manna from heaven for the Federal Reserve. The Obama administration hardly can go in for years of reckless deficit spending when the country’s largest creditor is emitting so many warning signals.

More importantly, the Fed is getting a certain amount of cover from Beijing for its eventual “exit strategy” — a reversal of quantitative easing and a rise in interest rates as soon as economic recovery gets under way.

The Chinese even are giving a strong tailwind to Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke’s bid for re-nomination after his initial four-year term ends in January. The reason? With the Chinese appearing to turn the knife through gloom-laden dollar prognostications, President Obama knows that appointing a heavily political successor to Bernanke would be fraught with great risks.

Any Fed chairman who looks less than squeaky-clean on currency stability is likely to send dollar holders heading for the exits — and could spark the full-scale currency collapse that Wall Street bears have been growling about for months.

So, if Obama wishes to replace Bernanke, he can do so only by bringing in a full-scale monetary hawk — a step that he must rule out on domestic political grounds. The conclusion is that the Chinese maneuverings leave Obama with no choice but to re-appoint Bernanke, whatever the doubts about his stewardship that have arisen in recent months.

When Bernanke a little later this year eventually is confirmed in a second term of office, what’s the betting that a laconic red-rimmed telegram from Governor Zhou will turn up in his in-tray?

The missive and its contents, of course, will remain secret. We can only guess at the possibility that the two men, just for a moment, will share the opportunity for a modicum of discreet self-congratulation.

David Marsh is chairman of London and Oxford Capital Markets. The Marsh on Monday column appears in German in the newspaper Handelsblatt.

A Deal Between the Fed and Bank of China? – David Marsh, MarketWatch

 

When was this written?

*******
Under the surface of the governmental regulation of the securities market, the same forces that produced the riotous speculative excesses of the “wild bull market” of 1929 still give evidences of their existence and influence. Though repressed for the present, it cannot be doubted that, given a suitable opportunity, they would spring back into pernicious activity.

Frequently we are told that this regulation has been throttling the country’s prosperity. Bitterly hostile was Wall Street to the enactment of the regulatory legislation. It now looks forward to the day when it shall, as it hopes, reassume the reins of its former power.

That its leaders are eminently fitted to guide our nation, and that they would make a much better job of it than any other body of men, Wall Street does not for a moment doubt. Indeed, if you now hearken to the oracles of The Street, you will hear now and then that the money-changers have been much maligned. You will be told that a whole group of high-minded men, innocent of social or economic wrongdoing, were expelled from the temple because of the excesses of a few. You will be assured that they had nothing to do with the misfortunes that overtook the country in 1929-33; that they were simply scapegoats, sacrificed on the altar of unreasoning public opinion to satisfy the wrath of a howling mob blindly seeking victims.

These disingenuous protestations are, in the crisp legal phrase, “without merit.” The case against the money-changers does not rest upon hearsay or surmise. It is based upon a mass of evidence, given publicly and under oath before the Banking and Currency Committee of the United States Senate in 1933-1934, by The Street’s mightiest and best-informed men. . .

After five short years, we may now need to be reminded what Wall Street was like before Uncle Sam stationed a policeman at its corner, lest, in time to come, some attempt be made to abolish that post.


This week?  No…

“Wall Street Under Oath”

Preface

Ferdinand Pecora

1939

H/T to Naked Capitalism




 

We are now looking at unemployment numbers that undermine any confidence that we might be nearing the bottom of the recession. The appropriate metaphor is not the green shoots of new growth. A better image is to look at the true total of jobless people as a prudent navigator looks at an iceberg.

What we see on the surface is disconcerting enough. The estimate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics of job losses for June is 467,000. That increases by 7.2 million the number of unemployed since the start of the recession. The cumulative job losses over the past six months have been greater than for any other half-year period since World War II, including demobilization. What’s more, the job losses are now equal to the net job gains over the previous nine years, making this the only recession since the Great Depression to wipe out all employment growth from the previous business cycle.

That’s bad enough. But here are nine reasons we are in even more trouble than the 9.5 percent unemployment rate indicates.

One. June’s total included 185,000 people who were assumed to be at work, many of whom probably were not. The government could not identify them; it made an assumption about trends. But many of the mythical jobs are in industries that have absolutely no job creation: finance, for example. When the official numbers are adjusted over the next several months, look to some of the 185,000 boosting the unemployment totals.

Two. More companies are asking employees to take unpaid leave. These people don’t count on the unemployment roll.

Three. No fewer than 1.4 million people wanted or were available for work in the past 12 months. They were not counted. Why? Because they hadn’t searched for work in the four weeks preceding the survey. The assumption is that they had found work or don’t want it, but there are other explanations: school attendance, family responsibilities, sheer exhaustion.

Four. The number of workers taking part-time jobs because of the slack economy, a kind of stealth underemployment, has doubled in this recession to about 9 million, or 5.8 percent of the workforce. Add those whose hours have been cut to those who cannot find a full-time job, and the total of unemployed and underemployed rises to 16.5 percent, putting the number of involuntarily idle workers in the range of an overwhelming 25 million.

Five. The inside numbers are just as bad. The average workweek for production and nonsupervisory private-sector employees, around 80 percent of the workforce, dropped to 33 hours. That’s 48 minutes a week less than before the recession began, the lowest level of activity since the government began tracking such data 45 years ago. Full-time workers are being downgraded to part time as businesses slash labor costs to remain above water and factories operate at only 65 percent of capacity. If American workers were still putting in those extra 48 minutes a week now, 3.3 million fewer employees could perform the same aggregate amount of work. With a longer workweek, the unemployment rate would reach 11.7 percent, not the official 9.5 percent (which in turn dramatically exceeds the 8 percent rate projected by the Obama administration).

Six. The average length of official unemployment increased to 24.5 weeks. This is the longest term since the government started to track these data in 1948. The number of long-term unemployed (those out of a job for 27 weeks or more) has now jumped to 4.4 million, an all-time high.

Seven. The average worker saw no wage gains in June, with average compensation running flat at $18.53 an hour.

Eight. The jobs report is even uglier when you consider that the sector producing goods is losing the most jobs–223,000 in the last report alone.

Nine. The prospects for job creation are equally distressing. The likelihood is that when economic activity picks up, employers will first choose to increase hours for existing workers and bring part-time workers to full-time status.

Many unemployed workers looking for jobs once the recovery begins will discover that jobs as good as the ones they lost are almost impossible to find because more layoffs in this recession have been permanent and not temporary. Instead of shrinking operations, companies have closed whole business units or made sweeping structural changes in the way they conduct their business. For example, General Motors and Chrysler shut down hundreds of dealerships and reduced brands; Citigroup and Bank of America cut tens of thousands of jobs and exited many parts of the world of finance. In other words, we could face a very low upswing in terms of the creation of new jobs, and we may be facing a much higher level of joblessness on an ongoing basis. Job losses may last well into 2010 to hit an unemployment peak close to 11 percent. And then joblessness may be sustained for an extended period.

Can we find comfort in knowing that employment has long been considered a lagging indicator? It is conventionally seen as having limited predictive power because employment reflects decisions taken earlier in the business cycle. But today is different. Unemployment has doubled from 4.8 to 9.5 percent in just 16 months, a record rate so fast it may influence future economic behaviors and outlooks. Bear in mind that the lackluster increase in inventories suggests that there’s little prospect in the pipeline of real growth in consumption, investment, and exports. So the terrible state of the labor market is likely to be a strong head wind against consumer spending for a long time as wages and overall income growth are decelerating and households, within a fairly short period, will have received their full portion of the stimulus package.

How could this happen when Washington has thrown trillions of dollars into the pot, including the famous $787 billion in spending that was supposed to yield $1.50 in growth for every dollar spent? For a start, too much of the money went to transfer payments–Medicaid, jobless benefits, and the like–that do nothing for jobs and growth. The spending that creates new jobs is new spending, particularly on infrastructure. It amounts to less than 10 percent of the stimulus package today.

Second, the stimulus package may have been well intentioned, but it was too small and too badly constructed to get money into the economy fast enough to replace lost consumer and business spending and to slow unemployment. Workers’ pessimism is justified: About 40 percent believe the recession will continue for another full year. As paychecks shrink and disappear, consumers are more hesitant to spend and won’t lead the economy out of the doldrums quickly enough.

It may have made him unpopular in parts of the Obama administration, but Vice President Joe Biden told it as it is when he said the administration misread how bad the economy was. The administration inherited the problem, but then it failed to understand how ineffective its solution would be. The program was supposed to be about jobs, jobs, and jobs. It wasn’t. The recovery act may have been a single piece of legislation, but it included thousands of funding schemes for tens of thousands of projects, and those programs are stuck in the bureaucracy as the government releases the funds with typical inefficiency.

An additional $150 billion, which was allocated to state coffers so as to continue existing programs like Medicaid, did not add new jobs. Hundreds of billions of dollars were set aside for tax cuts and for new benefits for the poor and the unemployed, and that did not add new jobs. Now state budgets are drowning in red ink as jobless claims and Medicaid bills climb.

Next year, state budgets will have depleted their initial rescue dollars. Absent another rescue plan, they will have no choice but to slash spending or raise taxes, or both. The complete state and local government sector, which makes up about 15 percent of the economy, is beginning the worst contraction in postwar history in the face of a deficit gap of $166 billion for fiscal year 2010, according to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, and a cumulative gap of $350 billion in fiscal year 2011.

Similarly, households overburdened with historic levels of debt will be saving more. The savings rate has already jumped from zero in 2007 to almost 7 percent of after-tax income now, and it is still rising. Every dollar of saving comes out of consumption. Because consumer spending is the economy’s main driver, we are going to have a weak consumer sector, and many businesses simply won’t have the means or the need to hire employees. In the aftermath of the 1990-1991 recession, Americans bought houses, cars, and other expensive goods. This time, the combination of a weak job picture and a severe credit crunch means that people won’t be able to get the financing for big expenditures, and those who can borrow will be reluctant to do so.

In recent times, Americans found myriad ways to fuel spending, even as incomes stagnated: borrowing against the once rising price of their homes and tapping plentiful credit cards. No longer. The paycheck has returned as the primary source of spending, and pay is eroding even for those who have jobs. This process is nowhere near complete, and, until it is, the economy will barely grow, if at all, and may well oscillate between sluggish growth and modest decline for the next several years until the rebalancing of the excessive debt has been completed. Until then, the private economy will be deprived of adequate profits and cash flow, and businesses will not start to hire. Nor will they race to make capital expenditures when they have vast idle capacity.

In other words, there are many more reasons today to expect the downturn to continue than to expect a turnaround. Consumer spending and residential investment could be even weaker than most estimates, and, as the level of fiscal stimulus begins its decline in the second half of 2010, we may be facing an even more difficult future.

No wonder poll after poll shows a steady erosion of confidence in the stimulus measures. One survey even showed 45 percent believe the limited results suggest they should simply be abandoned midway. The disappointment is understandable–but that would only make things worse. So what kind of second-act stimulus program should we look for? This time, it should not be an excuse to pass a lot of programs like those in the first stimulus package that do not really have the kind of multiplier effect on job creation and on economic growth that was intended. In any event, given the trends, it is absolutely critical that the Obama administration not play politics with the issue but really begin to prepare a second stimulus program, so that if the economy does take a major downturn, it will be possible this time to provide much more rapid government support to infrastructure spending that will maximize the creation of jobs. The time to get ready is now.

 

The Fed: A Systemic Risk Generator – Richard Salsman, InterMarket FC
A Signficant Rise In the PPI – Anika Khan, Wells Fargo Economics

 

Tougher times for inflation targeters: Over the past two decades, inflation targeting has become the holy grail of modern central banking. Most central banks have adopted some form of inflation target and have set interest rates mainly with a view to stabilising inflation around that target over the medium term.  However, the recent experience poses a major challenge for inflation-targeting central banks, for two reasons:

First, the wild gyrations of commodity prices and the boom-bust credit and economic cycle have caused big swings in inflation. Only a year ago, actual inflation was way above most central banks’ targets; now it is far below in most cases. This has contributed to rising uncertainty about the longer-term inflation outlook, as illustrated by more volatile market-implied inflation expectations and by a much greater dispersion of economists’ inflation forecasts.

•           Second, the asset price bubble and bust has been a useful reminder that stabilising consumer price inflation does not automatically stabilise asset prices.  On the contrary, as we have argued repeatedly over the years, by focusing too narrowly on consumer prices, which were kept low for a long time by non-monetary factors such as globalisation, deregulation and IT-led productivity increases, central banks fostered asset price inflation by keeping interest rates too low for too long.  Looking ahead, many central banks are thus likely to pay more attention to asset prices in setting monetary policy.  This, in turn, may lead to bigger and longer-lasting deviations of inflation from target and thus constitutes a challenge to the credibility of their inflation targets (see “The Morning After”, The Global Monetary Analyst, April 1, 2009).

Higher Savings Is Not Consumer Retrenchment – Richard Berner, Morgan

 

Book Review: The Myth of the Rational Market

July 14th, 2009

 

The Wall Street Journal reports, House Health Bill Slaps 5.4% Tax on Top Earners. The Tax Foundation calculates that adding this surcharge to existing taxes would raise the top tax rate to over 50 percent in 39 states. Click on the link to find out where your state stands in their ranking.

I believe the relevant marginal tax rate is even higher than the Tax Foundation suggests. Their calculations seem to ignore sales taxes, which are significant in many states. Because income earned will eventually be spent and thus subject to sales taxes, sales tax rates need to be combined with income tax rates to find the true tax wedge that distorts the consumption-leisure decision. Once sales taxes are included, a top earner in a typical state would face a marginal tax rate of about 55 percent.

Top Tax Rate May Soon Exceed 50 percent – Greg Mankiw’s Blog

 

The death of Robert McNamara has confronted the architects of another massive national catastrophe with a challenge: Will they, like McNamara in his post-Vietnam agony, acknowledge their failings and confess the error of their ways? Will they come up with a list, as McNamara did, of what to do differently next time?

There has already been speculation aplenty about whether Donald Rumsfeld will ever reassess his performance in the Iraq war. But I’m not thinking about Rumsfeld or the other men who brought us the war in Iraq. I have in mind the architects — every bit as cerebral and self-certain as McNamara — of the financial world that imploded last year. The real latter-day McNamara may not be Rumsfeld but Robert Rubin, Treasury secretary under Bill Clinton.

In fact, the similarities between the men who crafted the Iraq war and the men who crafted Vietnam aren’t that strong. McNamara’s hubris was that of a hyper-rationalist. He and his whiz kids, his systems analysts and efficiency experts, stormed into an intellectually sleepy capital determined to subject what had been the haphazard realm of policy to scientific measurement. The Air Force flyboys may have wanted to bomb the bejesus out of the commies, but McNamara’s boys could tell you precisely what tonnage would destroy precisely what industrial capacity. Victory was just an equation or two away.

The hubris of the late and unlamented Bush presidency was of a different order. If it was McNamara’s math that made it hard for him to grasp how a peasant army could resist half a million American troops, it was a simple refusal to take seriously the utterly predictable consequences that Saddam Hussein’s removal would have on a fractured Iraq that led Bush and his crew to plunge us, and Iraq, into a needless war. As once the hyper-rationalists had failed to factor for human complexity, so too, four decades later, did the ideologues who disdained the reality-based community do the same. Brought low by the hubris of the brilliant, we were brought low again by the hubris of fools.

Our time is no stranger to the hubris of the brilliant, though. To find it, we need to look not to Washington but to Wall Street. The real successors to McNamara’s whiz kids are the economic geniuses, the “quants,” who figured out how to build a tower of investment on a dot of assets, arbitrage everything, and hedge any risk, except, of course, the ones that plunged us into a depression.

The devastation they wrought may not have reached the level of the Vietnam War, which embittered this nation for decades and cost the lives of tens of thousands of Americans and many times more Vietnamese. But considering that they were merely economists, bankers and their ideologues, the damage is impressive enough. It’s not just the millions of jobs lost, the retirement savings wiped out, the homes foreclosed on. It’s also the offshoring of American manufacturing and the concomitant creation of mountains of consumer debt (which the American people owed to Wall Street) so that their compatriots could continue to consume even though their incomes had stagnated. It’s the transformation of a nation that once invested in productive enterprise into a nation sustained by asset bubbles.

Will the creators of this crisis wander through an intellectual and moral desert as McNamara did for decades? As yet, the mea culpas have been few and, like McNamara’s, incomplete. Alan Greenspan did admit to a congressional committee that his belief in the rational behavior of financial institutions had been shattered. But the confessions of failure and assumptions of responsibility from Chicago School economists, leading Wall Street bankers and lax governmental regulators, all of whom assured us that the very profitable financial vehicles they had devised also reduced the risk to the rest of us, are almost nowhere to be found.

If there’s an analogous figure to McNamara in this mess, then, it’s probably Rubin — socially liberal, like McNamara; concerned with the world’s poor, like McNamara; architect, like McNamara, of a system perfected by the best minds of his time, a system that should have worked but that failed catastrophically. Rubin’s repentance is a private matter, but the lessons that his protégés Larry Summers and Tim Geithner derive from the failure of deregulated hypercapitalism are of the utmost public concern. Whiz kids themselves, do they still believe in the capacity of their fellow whizzes to concoct financial devices so mathematically sound that strong regulation would be superfluous? Their reluctance to tightly regulate credit-default swaps suggests that they haven’t really been disenthralled of their faith in self-regulating markets. If we’re lucky, the image of Bob McNamara calculating the war on his slide rule, and spending the subsequent decades trying to understand where he went wrong, may bring them to their senses. It certainly should do that for us.

meyersonh@washpost.com

Is Robert Rubin Today’s McNamara? – Harold Meyerson, Washington Post

 
Despite the administration’s aggressive and costly economic policy initiatives, there is trouble all around.

Barely six months in office, President Obama already finds himself in an economic box. For despite his aggressive and costly economic policy initiatives, the jobs market shows no sign of healing. At the same time, the housing market foreclosure crisis continues apace, while renewed questions are again surfacing about the soundness of the U.S. banking system. To complicate matters, financial markets are now starting to fret about the longer-run inflationary consequences of the unusually large budget deficits in prospect for as far as the eye can see.

In January 2009, on presenting its $780 billion fiscal stimulus package, the Obama administration assured the public that because of that stimulus package U.S. unemployment would not exceed 8 percent. Yet already by June 2009, unemployment had risen to 9.5 percent; including part-time workers, who would prefer to be working full time, unemployment rose to a staggering post-war high of over 16 percent. Worse still, the jobs market shows every sign of being far from bottoming out.

The degree to which unemployment has exceeded the administration’s forecasts has to raise basic questions about the appropriateness and coherence of President Obama’s economic policy approach.

The degree to which unemployment has exceeded the administration’s forecasts has to raise basic questions about the appropriateness and coherence of President Obama’s economic policy approach. These questions pertain not simply to the very poor design of the fiscal stimulus package. Rather they pertain to the adequacy of the measures aimed at stabilizing the housing market and at resolving the country’s most wrenching credit crisis in the post-war period.

At the most basic level, one has to question how much sense it made for President Obama to allow the fiscal package to become excessively back-loaded at time when the economy needed immediate large scale support. If a large fiscal stimulus was indeed needed, why has only $60 billion of that package been dribbled out by June? And why is less than a third of the package scheduled to come into effect in 2009, the year when the package is most sorely needed?

Similarly one has to wonder about the heavy price that the Obama administration paid for effectively outsourcing the package’s design to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and the rest of the Democratic congressional leadership. Should it really have come as a surprise to us that the resulting stimulus package would be laden with pork and with expenditures that are going to be very difficult to roll back? Or should we now be shocked that the package fell sadly short of including fast acting and effective fiscal stimulus measures that might have gotten the most bang for the buck?

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Obama fiscal stimulus package is the serious way in which it compromises the country’s long-run public finances and fans long-run inflationary expectations. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office estimates that the Obama budget not only implies unusually large budget deficits over the next two years but it implies that, even when the economy eventually fully recovers, the deficit will remain in the region of between 4 and 6 percentage points of GDP. As a result, over the next decade, the public debt will rise in a manner that has never occurred before in peacetime, from around 41 percent of GDP in 2008 to 82 percent of GDP by 2019.

Over the next decade, the public debt will rise in a manner that has never occurred before in peacetime from around 41 percent of GDP in 2008 to 82 percent of GDP by 2019.

The rising tide of unemployment must also raise questions about the Obama administration’s efforts to stabilize the housing market, which the administration correctly views as a necessary condition for producing a meaningful economic recovery. One has to expect that a weaker job market will only exacerbate the country’s present foreclosure crisis, which is adding supply to an already glutted housing market. The Center for Responsible Lending estimates that 2.4 million homes could be in foreclosure in 2009 and as many as 8.1 million homes over the next four years. Yet, the Obama administration’s loan modification program announced earlier this year has to date only resulted in 190,000 offers at mortgage loan modification.

Rising unemployment also has to raise questions about whether the Obama administration is not being overly sanguine about the health of the U.S. banking system. For it would seem that unemployment will now well exceed the worst-case scenario in the bank stress test presented by the administration earlier this year. Yet, despite a weakening unemployment outlook that is sure to boost bank losses, the Obama administration is now cavalierly backing away from its earlier initiatives to reduce the toxic assets that remain on the banks’ balance sheets.

Less than six months into his term, President Obama already faces difficult economic policy choices. He can choose, as he now seems to be doing, to counsel patience and assure us that all is well at considerable cost to his credibility on economic policy management. Or he can own up to the facts that he misread the economy in January and that his economic team now needs to go back to the drawing board. For the sake of the U.S. economy, one has to hope that he has the courage to review the overall coherence of his policy approach before it is too late.

Desmond Lachman is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. He was managing director and chief emerging market economic strategist at Salomon Smith Barney and a deputy director in the International Monetary Fund’s policy and review department.

FURTHER READING: Lachman wrote “Does Bernanke Really Deserve a Second Term?” and “Despite the Doubters, It’s Still Top Dollar” on the likelihood that the Chinese renminbi will eventually replace the U.S. dollar as the world’s preeminent international reserve currency. He also penned “Can the IMF Really Save the World Economy?” and “The World Economy’s Europe Problem.” His article “Don’t Repeat Japan’s Mistakes” warns against the policies Japanese authorities followed during their financial crisis in the early 1990s.

Obama Is Stuck In an Economic Box – Desmond Lachman, The American

 

Our current economic crisis has revived economic and political discussions about the Great Depression. One reader wrote to me that Google citations for both the “Great Depression” and the “New Deal” have increased by several million since just last year. And while our current crisis remains far milder than the Depression, many nevertheless compare the two episodes, particularly when it comes to discussions about what the government should–or should not–do to promote economic recovery. And comparisons between today and the Great Depression will not end soon, as our crisis continues, and as some have called for a second round of federal spending to promote recovery.

A number of commentators and some in Congress have cited some of my research on the New Deal to caution against large-scale government programs to spur recovery, while research by other economists, including Dr. Christina Romer, chair of President Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers, is cited by others in Congress for the need for large-scale stimulus programs. (Both Dr. Romer and I presented our views during recent testimony before the U.S. Senate Banking Committee. Hers can be found here and mine here. )

Why Are Economists Divided About the Depression? – Lee Ohanian, Forbes

 

July 15 (Bloomberg) — Congress can’t make up its mind. First, legislators pushed to let banks take a rosy view of the value of some hard-hit holdings. Now, two key committee chairmen claim banks aren’t being realistic enough about the values of some loans.

The allegation by House Financial Services Chairman Barney Frank and Senate Banking Chairman Christopher Dodd that banks are holding some loans at “potentially inflated values” should trouble investors, since it came just days before institutions like JPMorgan Chase & Co., Bank of America Corp. and Citigroup Inc. are due to report second-quarter results. If some loan values are “inflated,” that again calls into question the quality of banks’ results.

Why, after arguing for banks to have more leeway, is Congress now pushing back? Because many government responses to the financial crisis are more about manipulating prices — and behavior — than truly getting markets back on their feet.

Dressing up bank balance sheets was a first-quarter political priority. Now there is a push to get banks to modify more troubled mortgages. That effort is being stymied by a rosy view taken by many banks of the value of home-equity loans and second-lien mortgages.

Many banks have marked down these loans only by 3 percent to 4 percent, said Paul Miller, bank analyst at Friedman Billings Ramsey & Co. These loans in many cases would likely fetch about 40 cents on the dollar if sold in today’s market.

The losses are “a big part of the toxic asset issues facing banks,” Miller added.

Balk at Losses

A first mortgage on a house often can’t be restructured without the agreement of the holder of the second loan, which would entail writing it down in value. Banks have balked at doing that, due to the losses that would result. And why shouldn’t they? Congress, the Obama administration and regulators all told them earlier this year to hope for the best when it came to valuing their assets.

Let’s review. Congress this spring browbeat accounting rulemakers to make it easier for banks to ignore dour market prices for some holdings battered by the credit crisis. That was designed to help banks’ finances look better.

Without subsequent rule changes by the Financial Accounting Standards Board, earnings at 45 banks and financial companies would have been 42 percent lower than reported, according to a report last month by Jack Ciesielski, editor of The Analyst’s Accounting Observer.

The rule changes allowed companies to sidestep some impact of mark-to-market accounting on securities, many of them backed by mortgages, that have fallen in value for an extended period.

Saved From Losses

The “maneuver saved eight of the firms — Prudential Financial Inc., SI Financial Group Inc., First Commonwealth Financial Corp., National Penn Bancshares Inc., Bank of New York Mellon Corp., Zenith National Insurance Corp., Sun Bancorp Inc. and American Equity Investment Life Holding Co. — from reporting first-quarter losses instead of net income,” Ciesielski wrote.

Another rule change allowed companies in some cases to ignore market values and use their own estimates for troubled assets. That helped Wells Fargo & Co. avoid what may otherwise have been a $4.5 billion hit to its capital.

This was all part of ongoing and often unsuccessful efforts to push prices in a particular direction.

Last fall, the Securities and Exchange Commission instituted a temporary ban on selling financial stocks short — or betting they would decline in value — to try and prop up the value of bank shares. Talk about reining in speculation in commodity markets, meanwhile, is designed to keep prices for oil and some foodstuffs from rising too high. And all arms of government have tried since the credit crunch began to keep home prices from falling.

Buyers Don’t Play

Efforts to direct prices usually fail because buyers aren’t willing to play along. Financial stocks continued to fall despite the short ban.

And the congressional flip-flop on how banks should value assets shows that such efforts can backfire.

The logjam in the drive to modify troubled mortgages is vexing the Obama administration. It is in some ways a problem of the government’s own making. To try and undo it, the House’s Frank and the Senate’s Dodd wrote late last week to banking regulators complaining about valuations of home-equity loans.

The chairmen said, “We are concerned that the loss allowances associated with these subordinated liens may be insufficient to realistically and accurately reflect their value.”

Fudging Confirmed

Throughout the crisis, investors have worried that banks are fudging their numbers. Now congressional leaders are confirming those fears.

Underlining the political nature of their request, Dodd and Frank didn’t call for an investigation of the supposedly “inflated” values.

That’s no reason for the SEC to stand pat. The agency needs to act, now that it has an allegation from top legislators that potential financial-reporting abuses are taking place at banks.

Failure to follow up will send a message that it is all right for banks to cook their books, so long as the resulting values are seasoned to suit the current political taste.

(David Reilly is a Bloomberg News columnist. The opinions expressed are his own.)

Barney Frank, Chris Dodd Do Banking Back Flip – David Reilly, Bloomberg

 

Has it all come to this? The wars and invasions, the death and destruction, the exile and torture, the resistance and collapse? In a world of shrinking energy reserves, is Iraq finally fated to become what it was going to be anyway, even before the chaos and catastrophe set in: a giant gas pump for an energy-starved planet? Will it all end not with a bang but with a gusher? The latest oil news out of that country offers at least a hint of Iraq’s fate.

For modern Iraq, oil has always been at the heart of everything. Its very existence as a unified state is largely the product of oil.

In 1920, under the aegis of the League of Nations, Britain cobbled together the Kingdom of Iraq from the Ottoman provinces of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul in order to better exploit the holdings of the Turkish Petroleum Company, forerunner of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). Later, Iraqi nationalists and the Baath Party of Saddam Hussein nationalized the IPC, provoking unrelenting British and American hostility. Hussein rewarded his Sunni allies in the Baath Party by giving them lucrative positions in the state company, part of a process that produced a dangerous rift with the country’s Shiite majority. And these are but a few of the ways in which modern Iraqi history has been governed by oil.

Iraq is, of course, one of the world’s great hydrocarbon preserves. According to oil giant BP, it harbors proven oil reserves of 115 billion barrels–more than any country except Saudi Arabia (with 264 billion barrels) and Iran (with 138 billion). Many analysts, however, believe that Iraq has been inadequately explored, and that the utilization of modern search technologies will yield additional reserves in the range of 45 to 100 billion barrels. If all its reserves, known and suspected, were developed to their full potential, Iraq could add as much as 6 to 8 million barrels per day to international output, postponing the inevitable arrival of peak oil and a contraction in global energy supplies.

Nailing Down the Energy Heartland of the Planet

Iraq’s great hydrocarbon promise has been continually thwarted by war, foreign intervention, sanctions, internal disorder, corruption and plain old ineptitude. Saddam Hussein did succeed for a time in elevating oil output, in the process raising national income and creating a well-educated middle class. However, his ill-conceived invasions of Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 1990 led to devastating attacks on Iraqi oil facilities, as well as trade embargoes and crippling debt, erasing much of his country’s previous economic gains. The trade sanctions imposed by Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton in the wake of the First Gulf War only further eroded the country’s oil-production capacity.

When President George W. Bush launched the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, his overarching goals all revolved around the geopolitics of oil. He and his top officials were intent on replacing Saddam Hussein’s regime with one that would prove friendly to American oil interests. They also imagined that, greeted as liberators by a grateful population, they would preside over a radical upgrading of Iraq’s petroleum capacity, thereby ensuring adequate supplies for American consumers at an affordable price. Finally, by building and manning a constellation of major military bases in a grateful Iraq, they saw themselves ensuring continued American dominance over the oil-soaked Persian Gulf region, and so the energy heartland of the planet.

All of this, of course, proved to be a mirage. The US invasion and ensuing occupation policies provoked a bitter Sunni insurgency that quickly overshadowed all other American concerns, including oil. As a result, no matter how much money they poured into the task, the Bush administration and its Baghdad agents found themselves incapable of boosting petroleum output even to the levels of the worst days of Saddam Hussein’s regime–and so their plans to use oil revenues to pay for the war, the occupation and the reconstruction of the country all vanished into thin air.

The data provided by BP on yearly production tallies cannot be starker when it comes to the impact on oil output of the insurgency, rampant corruption, the loss of the nation’s oil professionals (many of whom fled into exile amid sectarian warfare) and other related factors. Prior to the American invasion, Iraq was pumping 2.6 million barrels of oil per day, already significantly below its pre-invasion peak of 3.5 million barrels per day. In the first year of the ill-starred US occupation, production quickly plunged to a paltry 1.3 million barrels per day. Only in 2007 did it finally top the 2 million mark and, with improved security, 2.4 million in 2008. Assuming conditions continue to improve, Iraqi output could, for the first time, exceed pre-invasion levels, though barely, in 2009 or 2010–six years or more after Baghdad fell to American forces.

Will Iraq Transform Into a Global Gas Pump? – Michael Klare, The Nation

 

In California and a handful of other states, one out of every five people who would like to be working full time is not now doing so.

Part-Time Workers Mask Jobless Woes – David Leonhardt, New York Times

 

Returning from China last month, U.S. Congressman Mark Kirk had a bearish take on a high-level visit by American officials.

Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner claimed the U.S.’s biggest creditor voiced great confidence in its debt. Kirk, an Illinois Republican, came back with the opposite impression.

“China is beginning to cancel Congress’s credit card,” he told Fox News on June 10. It “doesn’t want to lend much more money to the United States and especially is worried about the Fed’s policy of printing money to buy new debt.”

A month later, there’s no doubt about whose assessment was more accurate. Chinese leaders are clearly very concerned about the dollar. How they will react is a key question hanging over markets, and it’s time to take the discussion to the next level.

Everyone knows China wants to reduce its dollar holdings. Little is known about how that process may unfold and how much work and preparation needs to go into it. Lots, in fact.

Think of China and the U.S. in history’s most expensive divorce. The two economies total $17 trillion of output, and polls in China show little support for adding to almost $800 billion of U.S. Treasuries.

This argument can be broadened to the rest of Asia. The idea that China or Japan — with $686 billion of Treasuries — can just start selling massive blocks of dollars is ridiculous. It would devastate markets the world over and the fallout would boomerang back on Asia. If you think markets are shaky now, just wait until word of a central-bank fire sale gets around.

Copycat Selling

Sure, Singapore (with $40 billion of Treasuries), India ($39 billion) or South Korea ($35 billion) could try to dump dollars on the stealth. Good luck in this highly connected, around-the-clock world. News that a key economy seeks a first- mover advantage over peers would inspire copycat selling. Expect investors and traders to respond with massive sell orders.

Warren Buffett can discreetly trim Berkshire Hathaway Inc.’s interest in a company or a currency. How a central bank divests itself of tens or hundreds of billions of dollars on the sly is another matter.

Governments that may be concerned about getting stuck with their dollars for good have a point. And by curtailing investments in dollars today, Asia is ensuring that the U.S. currency will be worth less a year from now. Bernard Madoff can tell you a thing or two about how this process works.

Dollar Accord

What may be necessary is a global framework or pact to end the dollar’s dominance. A “Plaza Accord” of sorts may be needed to dismantle the so-called Bretton Woods II system of tying currencies to the dollar that emerged after the global crises of 1997 and 1998. A Dollar Accord, anyone?

Just as stocks take a hit when additional shares are issued, Asia faces a debt-dilution dynamic for which it never bargained. The Federal Reserve’s zero-interest-rate policies don’t help. And Asia can’t do a lot on its own here.

This process will require considerable cooperation, be it through the International Monetary Fund, the Group of 20, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or a yet-to-be-created entity. Goals must be set, mechanics discussed and timing negotiated. If ever there were a time for a currency summit, it’s now.

Politics will be a stumbling block. It’s hard to envision the U.S. signing on to scrap the dollar as the reserve currency. Neither the euro nor the yen is ready to replace it. And China’s designs on currency domination are a decade away — or longer.

IMF Solution

The amount of scrutiny the dollar’s successor would face makes you wonder who would want to print the reserve currency. That explains why the most credible argument making the rounds involves the IMF’s so-called Special Drawing Rights, or SDRs.

They are really an account of exchange, rather than legal tender, and are calculated according to a basket of currencies consisting of the dollar, euro, yen and pound. Chinese central bank Governor Zhou Xiaochuan wants the IMF to move toward creating a “super-sovereign reserve currency.”

Or, here’s another suggestion: Brady bonds for less- troubled economies. The idea behind bonds created in the 1980s as part of Latin America’s debt restructuring was to let investors swap their claims on nations in turmoil for tradable instruments. A similar process may work with the dollar.

Rumors of the dollar’s demise are no longer exaggerated. What is being exaggerated, though, is how easy it will be for Asia to get out of the quandary it’s in. Cutting off the U.S. government’s credit card, for example, means American consumers can’t buy your goods. And any sudden divorce between the world’s two main economic powers won’t be pretty. Far from it.

It’s time to figure out what the next step is, and policy makers need to get serious. Complaining about our dollar-based system won’t get us there. Some brainstorming about where to go from here would be far more constructive.

(William Pesek is a Bloomberg News columnist. The opinions expressed are his own.)

Our $17 Trillion Chinese Split Won’t Be Pretty – William Pesek, Bloomberg

 

Washington’s enormous expansion of the government’s spending share of GDP to over 40 percent — including Bailout Nation, TARP, and government takeovers in numerous industries — is eerily reminiscent of Old Europe’s old policies. In a twist of irony, Europe seems to be moving toward a lower-tax-and-spend-and-regulate, Ronald Reagan–type approach, while we in the U.S. are regressing to the failed socialist model of Old Europe. This makes no sense.

Here’s the clincher: Year-to-date, Dow Jones stocks are off 7 percent, while China stocks are up 71 percent. The world index is up 4 percent. Emerging markets are up 25 percent. They’re all beating us. None of this is good.

We’re going the wrong way. That’s why stock markets are not voting for the United States anymore.

Washington Is Going the Wrong Way – Larry Kudlow, CNBC